The district court order more thoroughly recounts the factual background of plaintiff Green's reporting of the behavior and the subsequent investigation by defendant MOBIS. Green v. MOBIS Alabama, LLC, 995 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1293-94 (M.D. Ala. 2014). Because plaintiff Green appeals only as to the alleged retaliatory termination, we need not here recount the course of the reporting and investigation.

Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986).” Green v. MOBIS Alabama, LLC, 995 F.Supp.2d 1285, 1305, 2014 WL 457683, *17 (M.D.Ala. February 5, 2014). “ ‘In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to an issue raised in an administrative proceeding, the following elements must be present:

A policy contains reasonable complaint procedures if it provides alternative avenues to report sexual harassment in the event the harasser is an employee's supervisor. SeeGreen v. MOBIS Alabama, LLC , 995 F.Supp.2d 1285, 1301 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (finding policy complied with EEOC guidelines by instructing employees to promptly report sexual harassment "to the aggrieved Team Member's Supervisor, Department Manager, Team Relations Department, or HR."). Neither party disputes the fact that ULA disseminated its policy.

Also, evidence that her supervisor "scrutinized her work and pointed out her shortcomings on a regular basis . . . does not approximate the severity required to state a claim for hostile work environment." See Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 773, 816 (M.D. Ala. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Moore v. State of Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 1412 (M.D. AL 1997); see also Green v. MOBIS Alabama, LLC, Case No. 2:12-cv-277-MEF, 2014 WL 457683, *18 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 5, 2014)(employee's claim that employer watched her and scrutinized her work was "nothing more than ordinary workplace conflict"). Wilson has not presented evidence of any overtly racist or sexist intimidation, ridicule, and/or insult based on her race or her gender.

As the PSC also points out, this Court has held that Nassar's but-for causation requirement applies at the prima facie stage of a retaliation claim, rather than at the pretext stage. See Green v. MOBIS Ala., LLC, No. 12-cv-277, ___ F.Supp. 2d. ___, 2014 WL 457683, at *18 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 5, 2014); Parker, 2014 WL 116341, at *10. The Court reiterates that holding here.

Flythe v. D.C. , 994 F. Supp. 2d 50, 68-69 (D.D.C. 2013), rev'd in part on other grounds, 791 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). See also , Green v. MOBIS Alabama, LLC , 995 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (Under Alabama law, "An employer is liable for negligent supervision if the employer has actual or constructive notice of his employee's incompetency. A plaintiff must show that the employer would have discovered the employee's incompetency through the exercise of proper diligence."); Mandy v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. , 940 F. Supp. 1463, 1471 (D. Minn. 1996) (Under Minnesota law, the tort of negligent supervision "is directed at an employer's duty to control his or her employee's physical conduct ... even when the employee is acting outside the scope of the employment, in order to prevent intentional or negligent infliction of personal injury.... The duty imposed is unambiguously limited to preventing an employee from inflicting personal injury upon a third person on the master's premises or inflicting bodily harm by use of the employer's chattels.").