Although Polote mentions several contracts that it either bid or tried to bid on, Polote was not awarded a contract in any of these cases. Without a contractual relationship, Polote's claim must fail. Green v. Johnston Realty, 212 Ga. App. 656, 658, 442 S.E.2d 843 (1994). 2.

"To establish a cause of action for tortious interference with existing and prospective contractual relations claimant must show that defendant (1) acted improperly and without privilege, (2) purposely and with malice with intent to injure, (3) induced a third party or parties not to enter into or continue a business relationship with plaintiff, and (4) for which plaintiff suffered some financial injury". Green v. Johnston Realty, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 656, 659, 442 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1994). The Plaintiff has not offered any proof that Honda acted improperly and without privilege.

E.g., with regard to Burns' allegation that he is entitled to a finder's fee for one venture, the essential elements of price and the due date of the payment are absent. See Green v. Johnston Realty, 212 Ga. App. 656 ( 442 S.E.2d 843) (1994); Bellsouth Advertising c. Corp. v. McCollum, 209 Ga. App. 441 ( 433 S.E.2d 437) (1993). Accordingly, as the claims against Phrazer rest upon the same allegations as the claims against the estate of O'Donnell, the trial court properly granted plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment.

(Citation omitted.) Green v. Johnston Realty, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 656, 659-660 (4) ( 442 S.E.2d 843) (1994). Significantly, Project Control failed to allege improper or malicious conduct.

Further, neither the Agreement nor the Loan Agreement prohibit the defendants from making a loan with anyone else. Neither party was obligated to make a loan, because the Agreement did not require either party to do so, and the parties never had a meeting of the minds that the Agreement required the defendants to enter into a second loan with Fontaine. O.C.G.A. § 13-1-1; see generally Jackson v. Easters, 190 Ga. App. 713, 714-715(1) ( 379 S.E.2d 610) (1989); Wells v. H. W. Lay Co., 78 Ga. App. 364, 367 (1) ( 50 S.E.2d 755) (1948) Thus, the Agreement as to a second loan is totally lacking in mutuality of obligation, because neither party bound themselves to do anything in the future regarding a second loan that is enforceable as a contract; there was no consideration or mutual promises given. Vester v. Mug A Bug Pest Control, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 644 ( 500 S.E.2d 406) (1998) reversed on other grounds 270 Ga. 407 ( 509 S.E.2d 925) (1999); Green v. Johnston Realty, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 656 ( 442 S.E.2d 843) (1994); Halley v. Harden Oil Co., supra at 785. Defendants were free not to ask for a second loan from Fontaine and could seek a second loan anywhere else. Fontaine had the option to refuse to make a second loan to the defendants if they asked for such. The only thing fixed was the amount of a second loan, if made.

(Citation omitted.) Green v. Johnston Realty, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 656, 658 (1) ( 442 S.E.2d 843) (1994). O.C.G.A. § 13-3-44 (a) created promissory estoppel by statute.

"`The appropriate standard of care in a negligent hiring/retention action is whether the employer knew or should have known the employee was not suited for the particular employment.' Kemp v. Rouse-Atlanta, 207 Ga. App. 876, 878(1) ( 429 S.E.2d 264) (1993)."Green v. Johnston Realty, 212 Ga. App. 656, 659(3) ( 442 S.E.2d 843) (1994). See also Cherry v. Kelly Services, 171 Ga. App. 235, 236(2) ( 319 S.E.2d 463) (1984); OCGA § 34-7-20.

"To prove tortious interference with [contractual] relations, [TII] would have to prove that [Zampatti] acted improperly and without privilege, acted purposely with malice and intent to injure, induced a third party or parties not to enter into or continue a business relationship with [TII], and thereby caused some financial injury." Rogers v. First Union Nat. Bank, 220 Ga. App. 821, 823 (1) (c) 470 S.E.2d 246) (1996); Green v. Johnston Realty, 212 Ga. App. 656, 659-660 (4) ( 442 S.E.2d 843) (1994). "The term malicious or maliciously means any unauthorized interference or any interference without justification or excuse."

Tortious interference claims, whether asserting interference with contractual relations, business relations, or potential business relations, share certain common essential elements: (1) improper action or wrongful conduct by the defendant without privilege; (2) the defendant acted purposely and with malice with the intent to injure; (3) the defendant induced a breach of contractual obligations or caused a party or third-parties to discontinue or fail to enter into an anticipated business relationship with the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant's tortious conduct proximately caused damage to the plaintiff. Renden, Inc. v. Liberty Real Estate c., 213 Ga. App. 333 ( 444 S.E.2d 814) (1994); Green v. Johnston Realty, 212 Ga. App. 656 ( 442 S.E.2d 843) (1994); Integrated Micro Systems v. NEC Home Electronics (USA), 174 Ga. App. 197, 200 (3) ( 329 S.E.2d 554) (1985). For purposes of this type of tort, "privilege" means legitimate economic interests of the defendant or a legitimate relationship of the defendant to the contract, so that it is not considered a stranger, interloper, or meddler. Driggers v. Continental Grain Co., 210 Ga. App. 293, 295 (2) ( 435 S.E.2d 722) (1993); Nilan's Alley v. Ginsburg, 208 Ga. App. 145, 146 (2) ( 430 S.E.2d 368) (1993).

The terms of the contract must be agreed upon unconditionally and be sufficiently definite or ascertainable for enforcement, or the propertied agreement has no enforceability as a binding agreement. Green v. Johnston Realty, 212 Ga. App. 656, 658-659 (1) ( 442 S.E.2d 843) (1994); Lamb v. Decatur Fed. c. Assn., 201 Ga. App. 583, 585-586 (1) ( 411 S.E.2d 527) (1991); Panfel v. Boyd, 187 Ga. App. 639, 645-646 (3) ( 371 S.E.2d 222) (1988); Farmer v. Argenta, 174 Ga. App. 682, 683-684 ( 331 S.E.2d 60) (1985). There exists no written contracts signed by each individual appellant and by the appellee; nor does any series of writings signed and agreed upon by appellee and by each individual appellant exist.