As we review a trial court's order to modify custody, we may not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Green v. Green, 843 N.E.2d 23, 26 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied.
See In re Paternity of J.J., 911 N.E.2d at 731 (stating “we observe that the trial court's order does not lead us to the conclusion that the court considered each factor listed in section 31–17–2.2–1(b) ”). The trial court has a statutory duty to consider these factors in arriving at its determination. Because the court did not issue findings, we cannot be certain which of the factors the court considered important or the manner in which the factors were evaluated. See Green v. Green, 843 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (holding that “[a]s the trial court did not issue findings in the proceeding below, we cannot be certain as to which of the section 8 factors the trial court considered important or as to the manner, if at all, in which each factor was evaluated”). Accordingly, we reverse the October 31, 2013 order and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter an order demonstrating that the court fully considered the relevant statutory factors based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the October 21, 2013 hearing and other incorporated proceedings.
Accordingly, the trial court did err by not entering special findings of fact. Nevertheless, Mother contends that Green v. Green, 843 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), dictates a different result. In Green, the father filed a request for a modification of child support in March 2004 to reflect his frequent parenting time with his son, which included daily visits and 150 overnights per year.
We review custody modifications for an abuse of discretion, "with a `preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.'" Green v. Green, 843 N.E.2d 23, 26 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) (quoting Apter v. Ross, 781 N.E.2d 744, 757 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), trans. denied).
On February 27, 2006, we held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Jason's petition for modification of custody because it failed to properly consider the factors listed in Indiana Code § 31-17-2-8, as required by Indiana Code § 31-17-2-21, which governs the modification of child custody. Green v. Green, 843 N.E.2d 23, 27-28 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006). We concluded, "We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court for a determination regarding whether the effect of Laura's relocation to Iowa is of such a nature as to require a modification in the custody of B.G."
Likewise, Father has not shown that Mother's various moves or relationship changes have adversely affected T.R. We have previously held that “[a] custodial parent's relocation, alone, will not support a modification of custody; rather, it is the effect of the move upon the child that renders a relocation substantial or inconsequential—i.e., against or in line with the child's best interests....” Green v. Green, 843 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). Here, there is no evidence that Mother's moves and relationship changes have adversely affected T.R., other than Father's self-serving testimony that T.R. is tired when he comes to visit.
Rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and any reasonable inferences from that evidence.Green v. Green, 843 N.E.2d 23, 26 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “The burden of demonstrating that an existing child custody arrangement should be modified rests with the party seeking the modification.”
On February 27, 2006, we held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Father's petition for modification of custody because it failed to properly consider the factors listed in Indiana Code § 31-17-2-8, as required by Indiana Code § 31-17-2-21, which governs the modification of child custody. Green v. Green, 843 N.E.2d 23, 27-28 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) ("Green I"). We concluded, "We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court for a determination regarding whether the effect of [Mother's] relocation to Iowa is of such a nature as to require a modification in the custody of B.G."
Id. Samer's argument is essentially a challenge to the weight to be given, not the admissibility of, Dabbagh's testimony regarding the risk that Samer would abduct A.S. Upon appeal, however, we do not reweigh the evidence. Cf. Green v. Green, 843 N.E.2d 23, 26 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) ("[w]hen reviewing a trial court's determination to modify custody, we may not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses"). Thus, we decline Samer's invitation to re-evaluate the weight to be given Dabbagh's conclusions.
Under this original relocation section, "[a] custodial parent's relocation, alone, [would] not support a modification of custody; rather, it is the effect of the move upon the child that renders a relocation substantial or inconsequential — i.e., against or in line with the child's best interests — when determining whether to change custody." Green v. Green, 843 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) (citing Lamb v. Wenning, 600 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ind. 1992)). As Lamb points ed out, a relocation may or may not involve a substantial change affecting the child's best interests, depending on the child's age, interrelationship with others, and degree of engagement in social, educational, and recreational opportunities.