" Of like import are Tessmer v. Tessmer, 261 Mich. 681; Green v. Green, 282 Mich. 34, and Clark v. Clark, 315 Mich. 254. Plaintiff's contention that the payments required by the decree, which payments he failed to make, were in part in lieu of dower or other property rights of the defendant in the property of the plaintiff, is not tenable. Such payments were intended for the support of the divorced wife.

" The Tessmer Case was followed in Green v. Green, 282 Mich. 34, where the decree was in similar form, stating, after specific provisions for plaintiff's benefit, that such provisions should be in lieu of dower rights and property interests. There, as in the case at bar, a specific amount to be paid monthly for the use and benefit of a minor child was referred to as "permanent alimony."

Plaintiff contends the original decree made an award for permanent alimony to plaintiff and that the lower court had jurisdiction to entertain a petition for the clarification and modification of such decree and to vacate the order of September 1, 1938. We think the trial court was right. Tessmer v. Tessmer, 261 Mich. 681; Green v. Green, 282 Mich. 34. The statute (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 12748 [Stat. Ann. § 25.106]) provides that after decree for alimony for the wife, the court may, on her petition, revise and alter the decree respecting the amount of alimony and the payment thereof, "and may make any decree respecting any of the said matters which such court might have made in the original suit." This statute authorized the action taken.

Further, a matter which is still more persuasive, by the agreement in the instant case the parties definitely referred to the payments which defendant agreed to make to plaintiff as alimony. Since they were so earmarked in the agreement, they should be held to be payments of alimony when embodied in the decree of the court. The instant case falls within Tessmer v. Tessmer, 261 Mich. 681; Green v. Green, 282 Mich. 34. There is no merit to appellant's contention that a contempt proceeding instituted in this case by plaintiff prior to the amendment or clarification of the decree is res judicata of the present proceeding.

Ann. § 25.106); Kutchai v. Kutchai, 233 Mich. 569; Winter v. Winter, 270 Mich. 707, and contempt will lie for failure to make payments under the decree. Tessmer v. Tessmer, 261 Mich. 681; Green v. Green, 282 Mich. 34. However, a provision in lieu of dower or on a property settlement is final and cannot be modified or altered except for such cause as any other final decree may be reviewed, Winter v. Winter, supra, and contempt will not lie for failure to make payments thereunder. Shafer v. Shafer, 257 Mich. 372. If the amended decree of July 2, 1937, was a decree for alimony or the support of the daughter, contempt will lie and no further amendment was necessary. If it was not such a decree, contempt will not lie and the amendment of November 24, 1937, to the amended decree, was of no effect, since the time permitted under Court Rule No. 48, § 1 (1933), for application for rehearing had expired when the petition to amend was filed on November 12, 1937.