HINES, Justice. We granted the application for discretionary appeal in this divorce case to determine whether the professional concerns expressed in Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551 ( 437 S.E.2d 457) (1993), require that notice of trial be given to a defendant not otherwise entitled to notice under Hardwick v. Hardwick, 245 Ga. 570 ( 266 S.E.2d 184) (1980). Finding that, in this case, they do not, we affirm.

Additionally, providing pro se parties with reasonable notice of the final hearing is in keeping with the legislative mandate that the trial court consider all the circumstances and render a decision that furthers the best interest of the children. See Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551, 558 ( 437 S.E.2d 457) (1993) (Sears, J., concurring specially). O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3.

Therefore, in this case, Wife waived any notice regarding the final hearing by failing to file a responsive pleading, and the trial court properly denied her motion for a new trial. Contrary to Wife's arguments, Anderson v. Anderson, 264 Ga. 88 ( 441 SE2d 240) (1994) and Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551 ( 437 SE2d 457) (1993), do not change this result, as these cases are distinguishable from the matter now before us. In Anderson, we found that a pro se defendant who fails to file defensive pleadings but who receives the express assurance of the trial court at a temporary hearing that he will receive notice of the final hearing on a divorce petition is entitled to notice of the final hearing.

The Code of Professional Responsibility and the Standards of Conduct are separate and distinct from the Professionalism considerations contained in State Bar Rule 9-102. The Professionalism considerations are "non-mandatory" and "aspirational," State Bar Rule 9-101, see Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551, 557 ( 437 S.E.2d 457) (1993) (Sears-Collins, J., concurring specially), and are intended to encourage courtesy, civility, and respect among members of the profession. See State Bar Rule 9-102.

Cormier v. Cormier , 280 Ga. 693, 693-694 (1), 631 S.E.2d 663 (2006) (punctuation and footnote omitted).Green v. Green , 263 Ga. 551, 554 (2), 437 S.E.2d 457 (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). See Wright , 270 Ga. at 230-231, 509 S.E.2d 902 (holding that a subpoena did not give sufficient notice that the court would be conducting a trial, and the court should have mailed the husband in a divorce a copy of the trial calendar); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw , 267 Ga. 20, 21 (1), 471 S.E.2d 845 (1996) (holding that, under the circumstances, "notice by publication was not reasonably designed to [e]nsure that the wife [in a divorce action] had notice of the trial date"); Green , 263 Ga. at 552-555 (1)-(2), 437 S.E.2d 457 (holding that notice by publication and a calendar call that did not require the wife's presence did not provide sufficient notice of a trial in a divorce action, and the husband's lawyer should have notified the pro se wife that the case was on the trial calendar).

In its only enumeration of error, Old National asserts that the trial court should have set aside the consent judgment because the sole member of a limited liability corporation was not given notice of the lawsuit and did not approve the consent judgment. In support of its claim, Old National relies upon the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion in Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551 ( 437 SE2d 457) (1993); In Green, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a judgment when a pro se party in a divorce action, who resided in another state, did not receive actual notice of a trial calendar published in the legal organ for the county and failed to appear.

Because we are able to affirm the trial court's judgment for the foregoing reason, we need not address the constitutional issue that the trial addressed and that formed the basis of jurisdiction in this Court. See Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551, 552 ( 437 SE2d 457) (1993) (This Court will not decide cases "on constitutional issues when other issues are dispositive."). SEARS, Chief Justice.

In the present case, it is without dispute that husband received notice of the final hearing, that he engaged in discussions with wife's attorney on the eve of trial knowing that the case was scheduled for the next morning, and that he agreed to meet with counsel at the courthouse 30 minutes in advance of the call of the case on the morning of trial. He cannot now be heard to argue that he was confused about his obligation to appear. Compare Wright v. Wright, 270 Ga. 229 ( 509 SE2d 902) (1998); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 267 Ga. 20 (1) ( 471 SE2d 845) (1996); Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551 ( 437 SE2d 457) (1993). Nor did husband apprise the court or wife's counsel of his anticipated tardiness, or request a continuance.

Compare Wright v. Wright, 270 Ga. 229 ( 509 S.E.2d 902) (1998), in which defendant was not given notice of the trial date even though he filed an answer and a demand for jury trial. This case is not like Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551 ( 437 S.E.2d 457) (1993), or Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 267 Ga. 20 ( 471 S.E.2d 845) (1996). In those cases, we held that the plaintiff who brought suit, and was not represented by counsel at the time of the hearing, was entitled to be given notice of the hearing by opposing counsel.

OCGA § 5-5-25. Because we decide this case based upon a trial court's discretion to grant a new trial, we need not decide whether the rationale of Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551 ( 437 S.E.2d 457) (1993), required Ms. Melcher's attorney's to notify Mr. Melcher's counsel of the trial date and whether the failure to do so required the trial court to set aside the judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d). See also Lucas v. Lucas, 273 Ga. 240, 240-241 ( 539 S.E.2d 807) (2000).