But his opinion on this point would have added nothing to his testimony that "grip" is an acute, infectious fever due to a specific germ produced only by exposure to the germ, which may be found anywhere. Green v. Gilbert, 60 N.H. 144. If Mrs. Crawford's cold was a "grip cold," solely due to exposure to a germ and not due to the exposure in the defendants' station, it was entirely immaterial where it was contracted. The exclusion of the question may have been upon that ground.

What is reasonable is a question of fact, whether the water is private or public, and is one of fact for the jury. Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N.H. 580; Green v. Gilbert, 60 N.H. 144. Drury Peaslee, for the state.

Whatever may be the law in other jurisdictions, it must be regarded as settled in this state that the test is the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the business in question under all the circumstances. The owner may put his land or other property to any use not unlawful which, in view of his own interest and that of all persons affected by it, is a reasonable use. For the consequence to others of such a use, he is not responsible. The question of reasonableness is a question of fact. Bassett v. Company, 43 N.H. 569; Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N.H. 580; Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439; Eaton v. Railroad, 51 N.H. 504, 530-533; Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 446-448; Holden v. Lake Co., 53 N.H. 552; Thompson v. Company, 54 N.H. 545, 556, 559; Garland v. Towne, 55 N.H. 55, 59; Green v. Gilbert, 60 N.H. 144; Jones v. Aqueduct, 62 N.H. 488; Rindge v. Sargent 64 N.H. 294; Graves v. Shattuck, 35 N.H. 257, 265-268; McIntire v. Plaisted, 57 N.H. 606; Lumber Co. v. Company, 65 N.H. 290, 390-392; Davis v. Whitney, ante, p. 66. It is found that the use made by the defendants of their land is not unreasonable to the plaintiff, — that is to say, it is not unreasonable so far as by it she is affected.

At common law, between him and persons exercising their right to a reasonable use of the lake, or of the stream flowing from the lake, the question whether his throwing saw dust into the brook was a reasonable use of the brook is a judicial question of fact. Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N.H. 580; Green v. Gilbert, 60 N.H. 144. What might be reasonable on a brook running through an uninhabited country into the ocean might be unreasonable on a tributary of the lake from which the people of Manchester obtain the water they use for domestic purposes. If his saw dust became a nuisance, there would be ample remedy in equity without a statute.

According to the decisions in this state, the defendants are entitled to judgment. Bassett v. Salisbury Co., 43 N.H. 569; Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N.H. 580; Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439; Eaton v. Railroad, 51 N.H. 504, 533; Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442; Haley v. Colcord, 59 N.H. 7; Green v. Gilbert, 60 N.H. 144; Rindge v. Sargent, 64 N.H. 294. Judgment for the defendants.

. Kidder, 24 N.H. 364, 378, 379; Runnels v. Bullen, 2 N.H. 532, 537; Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East 208; Embrey v. Owen, 6 Ex. 353; Watuppa R. Co. v. Fall River, 134 Mass. 267; Mill River Co. v. Smith, 34 Conn. 462; State v. Pottmeyer 33 Ind. 402 W. Ice Co. v. Shortall, 101 Ill. 46. Chase Streeter and W. L. Foster, for the defendants, cited Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 67; Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H. 524, 526, 527; State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 550, 561; West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 7 Allen 158; Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160, 173: Fay v. S. Aq. Co., 111 Mass. 27; Hittinger v. Eames, 121 Mass. 539; Gage v. Steinkrauss, 131 Mass. 222; Rowell v. Doyle, ib. 474; Watuppa R. Co. v. Fall River, 147 Mass. 548; P. Ice Co. v. Steamer, 44 Mich. 229; Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441; Brastow v. R. Ice Co., 77 Me. 100; Stevens v. Kelley, 78 Me. 445; Woodman v. Pitman, 79 Me. 456; Crawford v. Rambo, 44 Ohio St. 279; Hayes v. Waldron 44 N.H. 580; N. P. Co. v. Bradly, 52 N.H. 86, 109; Holden v. Lake Co., 53 N.H. 552; Green v. Gilbert, 60 N.H. 144. DOE. C. J.