This Court's observation that this claim was cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding simply meant that, as a procedural matter, the claim could be properly brought in a habeas action. See Green v. Dunn, 257 Ga. 66, 67 ( 355 SE2d 61) (1987). It did not attempt to adjudicate the merits of the claim.
OCGA § 9-14-42 (a). As previously noted, however, the preclusion upon a sentencing jury's consideration of the issue of parole eligibility is based upon Georgia statutory and case law, and does not arise from any right of the accused under the state or federal constitution. Thus, even if the jurors' affidavits were not otherwise inadmissible, they still would be irrelevant and insufficient to authorize the grant of habeas relief. See Green v. Dunn, 257 Ga. 66 ( 355 S.E.2d 61) (1987); Parker v. Abernathy, 253 Ga. 673 ( 324 S.E.2d 191) (1985). There is no contention that, in the habeas proceeding, the court denied Todd the opportunity to produce admissible and relevant evidence which would demonstrate the occurrence of juror or bailiff misconduct which was so egregious as to violate his constitutional right of due process.
[Cit.]" Green v. Dunn, 257 Ga. 66, 67 ( 355 S.E.2d 61) (1987). Compare England v. Bussiere, 237 Ga. 814 ( 229 S.E.2d 655) (1976) (decided before state habeas relief was limited to instances of denial of constitutional rights).
Such a claim is not of constitutional dimensions and so "is not cognizable in a habeas action." Green v. Dunn, 257 Ga. 66, 66, 355 S.E.2d 61 (1987). See OCGA § 9-14-42 (a) (habeas action may be brought by a prisoner who "asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or of this state").