Opinion
Case No. 2:01-CV-0936TC
February 20, 2003
ORDER
Michael Green appeals the denial of his March 1999 application for disability insurance benefits and April 1999 application supplemental security income. Mr. Green contends that he has been unable to work since October 1998 due to back pain, leg pain and numbness, depression, hepatitis C, and headaches. An administrative law judge ("ALJ") held a hearing on Mr. Green's applications on August 3, 2000. On March 9, 2001, the ALJ issued a decision ruling that Mr. Green was not disabled. Mr. Green appealed the decision to the Appeals Council, which denied review. Mr. Green then appealed to the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) and 1383(c)(3) (2002).
Mr. Green's Complaint states that he has been disabled since March 15, 1992. (See Complaint ¶ 8.) His Application for Social Security Income states that he has been impaired since October 21, 1998. (See Record at 271.)
Mr. Green contends that the administrative decision should be reversed or modified because substantial evidence did not support the decision and because the ALJ applied incorrect legal standards. For the reasons that follow, the administrative decision is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Green was born on June 28, 1958. Mr. Green is a high school graduate with some completed college work, and previously had worked in structural assembly, as a millwright, and as a groundskeeper. At the hearing, Mr. Green testified to the following impairments: (1) chronic back pain that radiated into his legs; (2) depression; (3) migraine and non-migraine headaches; (4) hepatitis C; and (5) reflux problems.
Mr. Green's impairments are discussed in more detail below where relevant.
At the hearing, the ALJ asked Dma Galli, M. Ed., a vocational expert ("VE"), to consider an individual of Mr. Green's age, education, and work experience who could stand and walk two hours in an eight hour workday and stoop occasionally, but was unable to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (See R. at 69-71.) Additionally, the ALJ stated that the hypothetical person should avoid even moderate exposure to unprotected heights or hazardous equipment, could not lift more than ten pounds, and needed to sit or stand at his option, with sitting limited to twenty minutes at a time and standing to five minutes at a time. (See R. at 71-72.) Ms. Galli testified that such an individual could perform ninety-five percent of the parking lot attendant and plastic medical products assembler jobs and seventy-five percent of ticket seller jobs in the national economy. (See R. at 71-72.) Ms. Galli testified that an individual could lie down as much as ninety minutes per day during lunch and break times and perform the named jobs. (See R. at 72-73.)
The ALJ found that Mr. Green had several severe impairments, namely "lumbosacral disc disease, status post three surgeries and mild chronic left S 1 radiculopathy, migraine headaches and gastroesophageal reflux disease." (R. at 22.) The ALJ found, however, that Mr. Green's impairments when considered individually or in combination — did not meet or equal an impairment described in the Listing of Impairments (the "Listings"). (See R. at 16); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (d). Because the ALJ accepted the VE's vocational expert opinion and found that Mr. Green was "able to perform one or more occupations existing in significant numbers in the national economy," the ALJ found that Mr. Green was not disabled. (R. at 23.)
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
A person seeking social security benefits bears the burden of proving that because of his disability, he is unable to perform his prior work.See Miller v. Chater, 99 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1996). Once the claimant establishes that he has such a disability, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant retains the ability to do other work and that such jobs exist in the national economy. See id.; Saleem v. Chater, 86 F.3d 176, 178 (10th Cir. 1996).
The court reviews the ALJ's decision "to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied." Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1371 (10th Cir. 2000). The ALJ's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive upon judicial review. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Qualls, 206 F.3d at 1371. "Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or constitutes mere conclusion." Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). In reviewing the ALJ's decision, the court may "neither re-weigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency." Hinkle v. Apfel, 132 F.3d 1349, 1351 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Castellano v. Sec'y Health and Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994)).
II. Discussion
As stated above, the Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to evaluate disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)-(f); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (a)-(f). The five steps require the Commissioner to determine: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the date the application for benefits was filed, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b); (2) whether the claimant has a "severe impairment," 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (c); (3) whether the claimant's severe impairment or combination of impairments meet or equal an impairment described in the Listing of Impairments (the "Listings"), 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d); (4) whether the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (e); and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing other work that is available in the national economy, 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (f).
It is the ALJ's burden "at step five to show that there are jobs in the regional or national economies that the claimant can perform with the limitations the ALJ has found him to have." Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084, 1088 (10th Cir. 1999). The claimant does not have the burden "to produce or develop vocational evidence at step five." Id.
Mr. Green disputes the ALJ's findings at steps three and five. (See Pl.'s Brief at 7.) Mr. Green specifically alleges that the ALJ made the following three legal errors: (1) the ALJ failed to place the proper weight on the opinion of Mr. Green's treating physician; (2) the ALJ did not consider the cumulative effect of Mr. Green's combined impairments; and (3) the ALJ's negative credibility finding was not sufficiently supported by the evidence.
A. Did the ALJ Violate the Treating Physician Rule?
Mr. Green contends that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence partly because the ALJ "discounted" the RFC assessments of Mr. Green's treating physician, Dr. Mark Mitchell. (See Pl's Brief at 8.) The ALJ made no error, however, because he provided specific and legitimate reasons, which were supported by substantial evidence, for his decision to give Dr. Mitchell's opinions "little weight." (See R. at 21.)
The Tenth Circuit has explained that "[a] treating physician may offer an opinion which reflects a judgment about the nature and severity of the claimant's impairments including the claimant's symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, and any physical or mental restrictions." Castellano v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, 416.927). The Commissioner "will give controlling weight to that type of opinion if it is well supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and if it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record." Id.
The Commissioner therefore "must give substantial weight to the evidence and opinion of the claimant's treating physician, unless good cause is shown for rejecting it." Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 244-45 (10th Cir. 1988); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(2). If an ALJ rejects the treating physician's opinion, he "must give specific, legitimate reasons for his action." Reyes, 845 F.2d at 245; see also Drapeau v. Masanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001).
A treating physician's opinion is considered in relation to its consistency with other evidence, the length and nature of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examination, and the extent to which the opinion is supported by objective medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(2); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927 (d)(2); see also Drapeau, 255 F.3d at 1213 (listing considerations). "[T]he more knowledge a treating source has about [a claimant's] impairment(s) the more weight [the Commissioner] will give to the source's medical opinion." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(2)(ii). Further, "[a] treating physician's opinion may be rejected if his conclusions are not supported by specific findings." Castellano, 26 F.3d at 1029.
The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Mark Mitchell's statements and opinions for the following reasons: (1) the opinions were not supported by objective medical evidence in the Record; (2) they were internally inconsistent with "Dr. Mitchell's own consultative examination"; (3) they were not based on a thorough review of Mr. Green's medical record; (4) the opinions were based to an inappropriate degree on Mr. Green's subjective complaints; and (4) they focused on issues reserved to the Commissioner. (See R. at 21.) The evidence in the Record supports the ALJ's findings.
It is possible that the ALJ confused Dr. Mark Mitchell, Mr. Green's treating physician, with Dr. Hal Mitchell, a consultative physician. (See R. at 21, 264, 182.) Nevertheless, the other reasons the ALJ provided for giving Dr. Mark Mitchell's opinion little weight are sufficient to support the ALJ's findings.
Dr. Mitchell's opinions largely focused on Mr. Green's vocational prospects and did not provide the results of specific examinations or tests. (See R. at 228-29, 230, 247-48, 264.) Further, the medical findings that Dr. Mitchell made — namely that Mr. Green had a "remote back injury," (R. at 230), "chronic back pain," (R. at 264), and a "very limited range of motion," (R. at 264) — are not "specific findings." See Castellano, 26 F.3d at 1029.
The Record shows only two visits — August 12, 1999 and July 18, 2000 — between Dr. Mitchell and Mr. Green concerning Mr. Green's back condition. (See R. at 231, 239.) Dr. Mitchell, however, stated in a September 28, 2000 Lumbar Spine RFC Questionnaire that he had seen Mr. Green "bi-weekly" over a period of three months. (See R. at 265.)
The ALJ's specific, legitimate reasons for downplaying Dr. Mitchell's opinions are supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ made no error in giving Dr. Mitchell's opinions little weight.
B. Did the ALJ Fail to Consider the Cumulative Effect of Mr. Green's Combined Impairments?
Mr. Green next contends that the combination of his alleged mental and physical impairments met or equalled a listed impairment. (See Pl.'s Brief at 9.) He further claims that the ALJ erred by not developing evidence concerning Mr. Green's medical impairment. (See Pl.'s Brief at 11.) The ALJ made no legal error and substantial evidence supported his findings.
1. Did the ALJ Consider the Cumulative Effect of Mr. Green's Combined Impairments?
At step three, an ALJ may find medical equivalence to a listed impairment when the medical findings, supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, "are at least equal in severity and duration to the listed findings." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526 (a)-(b). The ALJ determines whether a particular condition meets the requirements of the Listing of Impairments by comparing the "symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings about [the claimant's] impairment(s), as shown in the medical evidence . . . with the medical criteria shown for the listed impairment." See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526 (a).
Where a claimant has more than one impairment, none of which meets or equals a listed impairment, the ALJ must match the collective medical findings of the combined impairments "to the specific set of symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings of the listed impairment to which they can be most closely related." Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 86-8, available at 1986 WL 68636, at *3 (S.S.A. 1986); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526 (a). "The mere accumulation of a number of impairments will not establish medical equivalency." SSR 86-8.
In determining medical equivalence, the ALJ may "consider the medical opinion or psychological consultants designated by the Commissioner." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526 (b). "While the Tenth Circuit has not specifically addressed this issue, other circuits have held that `[t]he ALJ is entitled to rely on the opinions of reviewing physicians when considering whether the claimant meets the requirements of a listed impairment.'" Valdez v. Apfel, 102 F. Supp.2d 1203, 1205 (D. Colo. 2000) (quoting Ostronski v. Chater, 94 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 1996)).
Mr. Green has neither specified which listed impairment he believed his impairments equaled, (see Pl.'s Brief at 9), nor supported his claim with specific evidence in the Record. Listing § 1.05C, which Mr. Green's representative brought up at the hearing, (see R. at 37), governed "other vertebrogenic disorders" and is the most appropriate Listing in Mr. Green's case. See Munoz v. Barnhart, 47 Fed. Appx. 770, available at 2002 WL 31163868, at **4 (7th Cir. 2002); see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.05C (2001). Section 1.05C required proof of (1) "[plain, muscle spasm, and significant limitation of motion in the spine," and (2) "[a]ppropriate radicular distribution of significant motor loss with muscle weakness and sensory and reflex loss."See Munoz, 2002 WL 3116368, at **4.
Mr. Green's memorandum merely cites to evidence in the Record supporting his contention that he "suffers from lower back pain, headaches, migraines, and depression." (See Pl.'s Brief at 9; R. at 137, 150, 175, 182, 254-60.)
Listing section 1.05, as currently numbered, pertains to amputations and is not at issue here. See Curran-Kicksey v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 964, 966 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2003); see also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (2001). All references to Listing section 1.05C in the text of this Order are to the previous version of section 1.05, which addressed spine disorders. See Curran-Kicksey, 315 F.3d at 966 n. 2.
The ALJ found that the evidence did not establish the existence of medical findings that were equal in severity to the medical findings required by Listing section 1.05C. (See R. at 16, 22.) Further, the ALJ pointed to specific medical findings and found that the collective findings did not match the elements of that Listing. (See R. at 16, 22.)
The evidence supports the ALJ's findings. Mr. Green had a history of back pain and surgeries, (see. e.g., R. at 230, 264), but the Record indicated no evidence of muscle spasm or "radicular distribution of significant motor loss with muscle weakness and sensory and reflex loss."See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 1.05C (2001). No evidence in the Record indicated that Mr. Green's depression, hepatitis C, headaches, and reflux disease — when considered separately or collectively — resulted in medical findings of the same or similar severity as those listed in section 1.05C. (See. e.g., R. at 187 (stating that Mr. Green's "status [was] non-severe"), 180 (explaining that "Hepatitis . . . high blood pressure and migraine headaches . . . [were] usually well controlled with medication").
Further, Mr. Green's medical evidence was reviewed by Robert Matheson, M.D., K. Sander, M.D., and Margaret Moore, Ph.D. (See R. at 186, 283, 287.) All concluded that Mr. Green did not have an impairment that met or was the equivalent of a listed impairment. (See R. at 283, 287 (marking "claimant not disabled").) Although the ALJ did not specifically mention the Disability Determination and Transmittal forms in which Dr. Matheson, Dr. Sander, and Dr. Moore determined that Mr. Green was not disabled, these forms are substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that Mr. Green's impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment.See Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that the mere presence of a report in the record justified the ALJ's decision to discredit the claimant's testimony); see Valdez, 102 F. Supp.2d at 1205 (permitting an ALJ to rely on the opinions of reviewing physicians); (see also R. at 16 (discussing opinion of Dr. Moore)).
2. Did the ALJ Err by not Developing Medical Evidence Concerning Mr. Green's Mental Impairment?
Mr. Green argues that he had a severe mental impairment, that the ALJ had a duty to develop the medical evidence regarding a mental impairment, and that the ALJ was required to complete a PRTF. (See Pl.'s Brief at 10-11.) Mr. Green cites Hawkins, 113 F.3d at 1164, and SSR 96-7p, available at 1996 WL 374186, at *8 n. 3 (S.S.A. 1996), to support his argument that the ALJ had a duty to develop evidence concerning his depression. (See Pl.'s Brief at 11.)
In Hawkins, the claimant argued "that the ALJ should have ordered a consultative mental examination based on the evidence in the record of her depression." See 113 F.3d at 1164. The record before the court contained "no objective medical test results to verify [the] claimant's depression." Id. at 1165. A psychiatrist, however, completed a psychiatric review technique form (a "PRTF") and stated that the "claimant had no medically determinable impairment." Id. The court held that "[a]lthough the ALJ inexplicitly did not mention this report in his decision, the report is substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that [the] claimant [did] not suffer from a severe mental impairment."Id. Given the PRTF form opinion and the absence of objective medical findings concerning the claimant's depression, the court held that the ALJ "was not required to order further psychological examination." Id.
In Mr. Green's case, Dr. Kirkham, a consultative psychologist, had already evaluated Mr. Green when the ALJ made his decision. (See R. at 173-81.) The Record in this case also contained a PRTF completed by Dr. Moore. (R. at 186-94.) Given this evidence and the fact that Mr. Green was not receiving mental health treatment, the ALJ was not required to order further psychological examination. See Hawkins, 113 F.3d at 1165.
This and other evidence substantially supported the ALJ's finding that Mr. Green did not have a severe mental impairment. On May 27, 1999, Dr. Kirkham diagnosed Mr. Green with major depressive disorder and attributed depression to situational factors. (See R. at 178, 180, 181.) Dr. Kirkham described Mr. Green as "friendly and upbeat." (R. at 176.) Dr. Kirkham believed Mr. Green's symptoms could be controlled with medication and recommended short-term psychotherapy only if a medication change did not control Mr. Green's depression. (See R. at 181.)
Treating physicians at the VAMC prescribed anti-depressant medication for sleep, but not for depression. (R. at 176, 196-97, 207-08, 214, 261-63.) At the administrative hearing, Mr. Green testified that he was not receiving mental health treatment or medication for depression. (See R. at 52.)
Further, Dr. Moore concluded that Mr. Green did not have a severe mental impairment. (See R. at 186-87.) The ALJ could rely on the expert opinion evidence from the Disability Determination Services psychologist, as that opinion was well supported by other evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.K. §§ 404.1527(f), 416.927(f), SSR 96-6p, available at 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (S.S.A. 1996); (see also R. at 16 (discussing Dr. Moore's opinion).)
Mr. Green further contends that the ALJ "erred by failing to complete and attach a Psychiatric Review Technique Form [a "PRTF"] to his decision." (See Pl.'s Brief at 10.) ALJs, however, are no longer required to complete a PRTF form at step three of a disability determination analysis. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e). PRTF forms are "only required at the stages of the administrative review process that precede consideration of an application by an administrative law judge." Bickford v. Barnhart, No. 02-59-B, 2002 WL 31599980, at *3 n. 4 (D. Me. Nov. 20, 2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e)). The Record in this case contains a PRTF completed by Dr. Moore on August 26, 1999. (See R. at 186-94.) Further, as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e), the ALJ discussed the application of the technique. (See R. at 16.)
C. Was the ALJ's Negative Credibility Finding Supported by the Evidence?
Mr. Green next asserts that the ALJ's credibility finding was not supported by the evidence. (See Pl.'s Brief at 11-13.) As explained below, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Mr. Green was not credible.
The Tenth Circuit has stated that "[c]redibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and [a reviewing court] will not upset such determinations when they supported by substantial evidence." Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotingDiaz v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir. 1990)). "However, `[f]indings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.'" Id. (quoting Huston v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 1133 (10th Cir. 1988)); see also Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that the ALJ "must articulate specific reasons for questioning the claimant's credibility"). When determining whether a claimant's assertions of pain and are credible, an ALJ should consider
the levels of medication and their effectiveness, the extensiveness of the attempts . . . to obtain relief the frequency of medical contacts, the nature of daily activities, subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ, the motivation of and relationship between the claimant and other witnesses, and the consistency or compatibility of nonmedical testimony with objective medical evidence.Kepler, 68 F.3d at 391 (quoting Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1993) (further quotation omitted)).
In the present case, the ALJ found that Mr. Green's allegations were not credible for several reasons. (See R. at 20.) The ALJ first noted discrepancies between Mr. Green's testimony regarding his "general activity level" and his reports to physicians. (See R. at 20); see also Huston, 838 F.2d at 1132 (discussing credibility factors). The ALJ noted that Mr. Green's pain was treated with "conservative measures, such as non-prescription pain relievers, rest and exercise," and non-steroidal anti-inflammatories. (See R. at 20); see also Huston, 838 F.2d at 1132 (considering a claimant's "level of medication"); see also White v. Massanari, 271 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2001). The ALJ also explained that Mr. Green's psychological testing showed signs of somatization and "Waddell's signs." (See R. at 20.) The ALJ further noted inconsistencies between Mr. Green's testimony and the objective medical findings. (See R. at 20); see also Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 165 (10th Cir. 1987) (considering "the absence of an objective medical basis" for pain).
Somatization is "the conversion of anxiety into a physical disorder or physical symptoms." Teter v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 1104, 1106 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting 3 J Schmidt, Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine S-116-17 (1985)). The phrase "Waddell's Signs" can be a "buzz word" for malingering. See. e.g., Rudolph L. Kose, Insurance Fraud, 652 Practicing Law Institute/Litigation 167, 176 (2001).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings. For example, at the hearing, Mr. Green admitted that he was not seeing a doctor for his back pain. (See R. at 49.) Mr. Green had not been prescribed pain medications. (R. at 48-49.) Although Mr. Green testified that his back pain radiated into his legs and his right leg gave out, (R. at 50, 67), no neurological, strength, or reflex abnormalities were noted on examinations. (See R. at 182-85, 207-08, 261-62.)
The ALJ gave specific reasons for questioning Mr. Green's credibility. These reasons were supported by substantial evidence. The court will not disturb the ALJ's findings.
D. Did the ALJ Err by Relying on the Vocational Expert's Testimony at Step Five?
Mr. Green contends that given his impairments, the ALJ erred in concluding that he could perform one or more occupations existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The ALJ, however, properly relied on the VE's testimony concerning the jobs an individual with Mr. Green's limitations can perform.
At step five in the sequential evaluation process, an ALJ may relate the claimant's limitations and impairments to the VE and ask the VE whether, in the VE's opinion, jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See Young v. Apfel, 39 F. Supp.2d 1327, 1332 (N.D. Okla. 1999); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566 (e), 416.966(e). When an ALJ's findings about a claimant's limitations are reflected in a hypothetical question presented to a VE, the ALJ may rely on the VE's testimony to determine at step five of the sequential evaluation analysis that the claimant is not disabled. See Decker v. Chater, 86 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that because the ALJ's medical findings were supported by substantial evidence and were reflected in the ALJ's hypothetical inquiries, the VE's testimony provided substantial evidence that the claimant could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy); see also Garza v. Apfel, 162 F.3d 1173, available at 1998 WL 778041, at **3 (10th Cir. 1988) (unpublished decision) (applyingDecker, 86 F.3d at 955).
As an initial matter, the ALJ in the present case found that Mr. Green had the RFC for "sedentary-to-light exertion." (R. at 22.) He specifically found that Mr. Green was
capable of lifting up to 10 pounds occasionally, standing or walking at least two hours a day and sitting less than six hours during an eight-hour workday with a sit/stand option . . . with no climbing of ladders, ropes and scaffolds, stooping 40% of normal and kneeling, crouching or crawling 75% of normal, and avoiding hazards such as heights and moving machinery. The claimant could also accommodate his need to lie down during a standard break schedule.
(R. at 22-23.) This finding reflected the RFC assessment of Robert Matheson, M.D. (See R. at 18, 219-27); see also SSR 96-6p, available at 1996 WL 374180, *3 (S.S.A. 1996) (stating that "the administrative law judge or Appeals Council must consider and evaluate any assessment of the individual's RFC by a State agency medical or psychological consultant and by other program physicians or psychologists").
Mr. Green has not specifically disputed the ALJ's RFC finding. He appears to contend that the ALJ erred in not including Mr. Green's mental health problems in the hypothetical inquiry to the VE. However, as explained above, substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that Mr. Green's mental health problems did not constitute a severe impairment. (See R. at 16, 22.)
The ALJ's RFC findings were reflected in a hypothetical question presented to the VE. (Compare R. at 70-72 (posing hypothetical limitations), with R. at 22-23 (making RFC findings)); see also Decker, 86 F.3d at 955. The ALJ therefore was entitled to rely on the VE's testimony to determine that Mr. Green was not disabled. (See R. at 71-72 (listing jobs).) Substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that Mr. Green was able to perform one or more occupations existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ's decision is AFFIRMED.