The defendant moved to dismiss and both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied both of the defendant's motions and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, ruling that because the policy language mirrored the language used in Green Mountain Insurance Co. v. George, 138 N.H. 10, 634 A.2d 1011 (1993), the plaintiff was entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. On appeal, the defendant argues that the superior court erred in applying Green Mountain to the facts of this case and in failing to require the plaintiff to provide some factual basis for her allegation that the motor vehicle that caused her injury was uninsured.

It ruled that the parties had not expressly chosen Massachusetts law to govern their contract, and that under a common law choice-of-law analysis, New Hampshire law controlled because the insured motor vehicle was garaged here. See Green Mt. Ins. Co. v. George, 138 N.H. 10, 13, 634 A.2d 1011, 1013 (1993). It also ruled that RSA 264:15, I, voided the UM liability limit in Nassar's policy because the statute applies to insurance policies on motor vehicles principally garaged in New Hampshire.

Id. In this appeal, the plaintiff contends that despite the application of the fireman's rule, our decisions in Green Mountain Insurance Co. v. George, 138 N.H. 10 (1993), and Gorman v. National Grange Mutual Insurance Co., 144 N.H. 157 (1999), "unequivocally establish the Petitioner's contractual right to receive uninsured motorist benefits." The plaintiff notes that in Green Mountain, we held that the phrase "legally entitled to recover" contained in the applicable insurance policy was ambiguous, and construed the ambiguity against the insurer.

Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 770, 423 A.2d 980, 984 (1980). If the language of a policy is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation and one interpretation favors coverage, the policy will be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer. Green Mt. Ins. Co. v. George, 138 N.H. 10, 14, 634 A.2d 1011, 1014 (1993). See generally Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531 (1996) (noting the policies behind this rule).

Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 138 N.H. 229, 231, 637 A.2d 903, 904 (1994). If the language of the policy reasonably may be interpreted more than one way and one interpretation favors coverage, an ambiguity exists in the policy that will be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer. Green Mt. Ins. Co. v. George, 138 N.H. 10, 14, 634 A.2d 1011, 1014 (1993). The NHIC policy provides coverage for

In actual fact, the policy behind the Second Restatement substantially mirrors those considerations contained in Leflar's work.Id. at 595; see also, e.g., Green Mountain Ins. Co. v. George, 634 A.2d 1011, 1013 (N.H. 1993) (abrogated on other grounds byMatarese v. N.H. Mun. Ass'n Prop.-Liab. Ins. Trust, Inc., 791 A.2d 175 (N.H. 2002)) (applying the "most significant relationship" test in a contract case), Cercere v. Aetna Ins. Co., 766 A.2d 696, 698 (N.H. 2001) (same).

So, the definition of occurrence in the policies is ambiguous under New Hampshire law. See Green Mt. Ins. Co. v. George, 138 N.H. 10, 14 (1993) ("If . . . the policy language is reasonably susceptible of at least two different interpretations, one of which favors coverage, the language is ambiguous.") Ordinarily, an ambiguity such as that presented here would be construed in favor of the insured to provide coverage.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire similarly concluded that a foreign jurisdiction's no-fault statute effectively rendered the tortfeasor uninsured for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage. Green Mountain Ins. Co. v. George, 634 A.2d 1011 (N.H. 1993). In Green Mountain, the vehicle liability insurer sought a declaratory judgment concerning whether the uninsured motorist provision in a New Hampshire insurance policy applied to an accident in the no-fault state of Massachusetts. The court concluded that the Massachusetts no-fault statute rendered the tortfeasor uninsured because to hold otherwise would effectively create a no-fault law in New Hampshire.

She also contends, however, that the relevant language in her insurance policy is ambiguous and that this ambiguity entitles her to uninsured motorist coverage regardless of the applicability of the fireman's rule. This latter argument, based on her reading of Green Mountain Insurance Co. v. George, 138 N.H. 10, 634 A.2d 1011 (1993), does not appear in her notice of appeal, and she has not forwarded to this court any exhibits relating to this issue, such as the insurance contract. Moreover, the plaintiff has not moved to add this question to her notice of appeal.