Defendant-appellant Gagnon challenges the convictions and concurrent sentences imposed pursuant to a jury verdict finding him guilty of (1) breaking and entering with intent to commit robbery, (twenty years); (2) robbery, (twenty years); and (3) aggravated assault (five years). See related case of Grech v. State, Fla.App. 1970, 243 So.2d 216 (Case No. 69-854). Grech and Gagnon were tried together. The defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and sentences on numerous grounds.

" Grech v. State, 243 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 3 D.C.A. 1971). Agreeing with the Florida Appellate Court's observations, as did the district court, we cannot conclude that the denial of Grech's motion for severance was an abuse of discretion as would amount to a deprivation of due process. Grech's third contention, that his jury was selected in a manner which does not comport with the Constitution, merits a more extensive discussion. It is prompted by the fact that the trial judge excused all Jewish veniremen from jury service because Grech's trial commenced on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. The trial judge's explanation for his action was as follows:

Because the criteria of State v. Freber have been satisfied in that Ms. Gelson was available at trial for cross-examination with respect to her out-of-court identifications, the final point before us must fail. Harris v. State, 129 Fla. 733, 177 So. 187 (1937); Martin v. State, 100 Fla. 16, 129 So. 112 (1930); Grech v. State, 243 So.2d 216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); accord, United States v. Sullivan, 456 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Anderson v. State, 92 Fla. 477, 110 So. 250 (1926).

April 29, 1971. Certiorari denied. 243 So.2d 216. ERVIN, Acting C.J., and CARLTON, ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.

There was no deliberate or systematic exclusion of members of the Jewish faith, as the defendant himself concedes in his brief. The mere fact that a voir dire of a jury is conducted on a Jewish holiday does not constitute an infringement of the right to a jury composed of a fair cross section of the community ( Grech v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 747; United States v Suskin, 450 F.2d 596, 599; Scott v. State, 411 So.2d 866 [Fla]; Grech v. State, 243 So.2d 216 [Fla App], cert denied 247 So.2d 439 [Fla]; People v. Goodman, 92 Misc.2d 927; cf. People v Guzman, 60 N.Y.2d 403, cert denied ___ US ___, 104 S Ct 2155; People v. Seymour, 97 A.D.2d 907). The allegedly improper comments made by the prosecutor during his opening statement and summation did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.

Appellant's other point on appeal, i.e., whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a pre-trial identification, is without merit. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); Settle v. State, 288 So.2d 511 (Fla. 1974); Ashford v. State, 274 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1973); and Grech v. State, 243 So.2d 216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). For the reasons set forth above, the judgment and sentence appealed are reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

Abbott v. State, 334 So.2d 642 (Fla.3d DCA 1976). See also State v. Talavera, 243 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1971); Rodriguez v. State, 237 So.2d 772 (Fla.3d DCA 1970); Grech v. State, 243 So.2d 216 (Fla.3d DCA 1971); Dove v. State, 287 So.2d 384 (Fla.1st DCA 1973). After a review of the record, we conclude Stripling has failed in his burden of showing the denial of his severance motion constituted an abuse of discretion.

Motions for severance are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and the order will not be reversed except for palpable abuse of judicial discretion. Grech v. State, Fla.App. 1971, 243 So.2d 216, 218. Therefore, it is incumbent upon a defendant who appeals a denial of his motion for severance to show at least a likelihood that he did not get a fair trial because of the denial of the motion to sever.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed on the authority of United States v. Burke, 495 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Harper, 460 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Prieto-Olivas, 419 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1969); Williams v. State, Fla. 1975, 316 So.2d 267; Hernandez v. State, Fla.App. 1975, 323 So.2d 318; Ballard v. State, Fla.App. 1975, 323 So.2d 297; Borders v. State, Fla.App. 1975, 312 So.2d 247; Williams v. State, Fla.App. 1975, 307 So.2d 877; Starling v. State, Fla. App. 1972, 263 So.2d 645; Grech v. State, Fla.App. 1971, 243 So.2d 216; Patrick v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 203 So.2d 62; Pessolano v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 166 So.2d 706; and Rules 3.150, 3.151, and 3.152 Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 F.S.A.

Motions for severance are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Grech v. State, Fla.App. 1971, 243 So.2d 216. Therefore, it is incumbent upon a defendant who appeals a denial of his motion for severance to show at least a likelihood that he did not get a fair trial because of the denial of the motion to sever.