General Elec. Capital Computer Services v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 240 Ga. App. 629, 630-631 (1) ( 523 S.E.2d 651) (1999). See also Great Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 161 Ga. App. 680, 682 ( 288 S.E.2d 287) (1982) (insurance company precluded from asserting insured's fraud in subsequent action). To avoid this result, Atlanta Casualty could have followed the "`procedurally safe course' of providing a defense under a reservation of rights and filing a declaratory judgment action to determine its obligations."

See Blakewood v. Yellow Cab Co., 61 Ga. App. 149, 150-151 ( 6 S.E.2d 126) (1939) (assignee has mutual or successive relationship with assignor and is privy of assignor). Consequently, absent fraud that would cause the divorce judgment to be set aside, Great Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 161 Ga. App. 680 ( 288 S.E.2d 287) (1982), appellee is collaterally estopped from again adjudicating the paternity issue against appellant in an action under OCGA § 19-11-6 (a). See Travelers Ins. Co., supra (insurer, who stands in shoes of insured for purpose of subrogation claim, is estopped from litigating the issue of alleged tortfeasor's liability to insured after prior litigation between insured and alleged tortfeasor resulted in judgment against insured); see also Dept. of Human Resources v. Brown, 196 Ga. App. 875, 876 (1) ( 397 S.E.2d 73) (1990) (consent decree in prior child support action adjudging that appellee was father of children precluded him from denying paternity in subsequent suit brought by DHR to recover past due child support payments).

Johnson v. Shook, 156 Ga. App. 878 (2) ( 275 S.E.2d 815) (1981). See also Great Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 161 Ga. App. 680 ( 288 S.E.2d 287) (1982); McCook v. Beck, 138 Ga. App. 351 ( 226 S.E.2d 72) (1976). Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur.

[Cit.]" Great Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 161 Ga. App. 680, 683 ( 288 S.E.2d 287) (1982). Therefore, even assuming that the complaint stated an actionable claim against the appellees, summary judgment was demanded in their favor.

Georgia preclusion principles prohibited Mrs. Lops from refiling the same action in a state or federal court in Georgia and claiming that venue and personal jurisdiction existed in Georgia. See Thompson v. Thompson, 237 Ga. 509, 509, 228 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1976) ("[P]arties to stipulations and agreements entered into in the course of judicial proceedings will not be permitted to take positions inconsistent therewith in the absence of fraud, duress or mistake."); Ghrist v. Fricks, 219 Ga. App. 415, 417, 465 S.E.2d 501, 504 (1995) (applying collateral estoppel to mother's statement of paternity contained in settlement agreement because "[p]arties to stipulations and agreements entered into in the course of judicial proceedings are estopped from taking positions inconsistent therewith") (quotation omitted); see also Great Atl. Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 161 Ga. App. 680, 683, 288 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1982) (stating that collateral estoppel applies to consent judgments). Finally, even assuming that Mrs. Lops, by stipulating to the transfer, lost the right to appeal the Georgia court's venue and personal jurisdiction rulings, those rulings are nonetheless binding on subsequent courts.