Opinion
No. Civ 05-1749 PHX RCB.
May 16, 2006
ORDER
On June 10, 2005, Plaintiff Michael Grayson filed his complaint in this matter. Complt. (doc. 1). On October 6, 2005, Defendants Dora Schriro, et al., filed a motion to dismiss this case. Mot. (docs. 10). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Plaintiff's Motion to Deny Dismissal." Resp. (doc. 11, 12). The Court shall construe this document as Plaintiff's response to Defendants' motion to dismiss. This motion was fully briefed on November 2, 2005. Reply (doc. 13).
On February 14, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. Mot. for Summ. Judg. (doc. 14). In response, Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Mot. to Strike (doc. 15). Plaintiff did not file a response in opposition to Defendants' motion to strike. Having carefully considered the arguments presented by the parties on all of these matters, the court now rules.
I. Background Facts
On June 10, 2005, Plaintiff filed a seven-count Complaint against Defendants. Complt. (doc. 1). In Count 1, Plaintiff alleges that "state agency and agents," which includes Defendants Schriro and Butcher, violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by "arbitrarily subjecting [him] to life threatening conditions outside the parameters of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines" and violated the Arizona State Constitution. Id. at 2. In Counts 2 through 7, Plaintiff alleges Federal and State claims against the State of Arizona.Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $2.5 million dollars and the removal of his name from sex offender registration files. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff's complaint is void of any alleged facts related to his claims. Only through sections of Plaintiff's response to Defendants' motion to dismiss can the Court deduce a general idea of what alleged events and injuries Plaintiff bases his claims upon. It seems that Plaintiff is either challenging the registration of his name as a sex offender or unhappy with the terms of a prior plea agreement in which he entered. Resp. (doc. 11) at 5.
Plaintiff, in his response, notes that in 1983, he was convicted at trial of three counts of sexual assault and was sentenced to a term of incarceration of ten and one half years. Resp. (doc. 11) at 1. Thereafter, in 1995, Plaintiff states that he returned to prison due to an aggravated assault offense. Id. Then, in 1999, Plaintiff states that he returned to prison for forgery and burglary. Id. However, Plaintiff asserts that throughout this entire time, no sex offender registration was ever ordered. Id. Plaintiff notes that in 2000 he was relocated to "Eyman-Complex Florence Sex Offender Unit." Id. He states that he "was not in danger before his relocation," however he maintains that he was "in jeopardy [when he returned to the Yuma facility after a parole violation in 2004] since registration was already accomplished." Id.
II. Discussion
A. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Defendants move for dismissal of Plaintiff's claims based on numerous alleged deficiencies in his Complaint. Mot. (doc. 10). First, Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Id. at 2. Second, Defendants argue that, because Plaintiff failed to bring his constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), there exists no direct cause of action against Defendants Schriro and Butcher for alleged constitutional violations. Id. at 3, citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981). Third, Defendants contend that, to the extent that Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth Federal claims against the State of Arizona, the Arizona Department of Corrections, or any other State agency, these parties are not proper, as they are not "persons" within the meaning of Section 1983, and, thus, such claims must be dismissed. Id., citing Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Fourth, Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars Plaintiff's monetary claim against Defendants in their official capacities. Id., citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 677-78 (1974). Fifth, Defendants note that much of the authority cited by Plaintiff as the basis of his claims (the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Uniform Commercial Code, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 872) are not applicable to this civil action. Id. at 4-5. Sixth, Defendants assert that the Arizona Department of Corrections is not a proper defendant in this matter, because it is a non-jural entity. Id. at 5. Seventh, Defendants argue that Counts 1 through 4, alleging violations of the Arizona State Constitution, must be dismissed due to Plaintiff's failure to provide a notice of claim as required by A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Id. at 5-6. Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed due to his failure to state a claim. Id. at 6.
Rule 8(a) provides in pertinent part that:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Complaints that are confusing and conclusory are not in compliance with Rule 8. See Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th Cir. 1985). Generally, Rule 8(a) requires "sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them." McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
In deciding such a motion, all material allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996). Dismissal is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
A pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The Ninth Circuit requires liberal construction of a pro se litigant's pleadings and disfavors summary dismissal of their complaints.See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992);McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, before a district court may dismiss a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim, a court must provide the pro se litigant with notice of the deficiencies of his or her complaint and an opportunity to amend the complaint prior to dismissal. McGurkin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 8. While Plaintiff cites articles of the United States Constitution, the Arizona State Constitution, several federal statutes, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the Uniform Commercial Code as authority in support of his claims, the court remains unable to determine what Plaintiff's cause of action entails. The basis for Plaintiff's demands are unclear. Plaintiff claims: (i) "State agency and Agents . . . willingly and knowingly violated the VIII Amendment of the Constitution of the United States by arbitrarily subjecting Plaintiff to life-threatening conditions outside the parameters of the Federal-Sentencing Guidelines (effective 2004); and in addition violated the State Constitution [Art. II sect. 15];" (ii) that the State of Arizona violated Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States and Article II, Sections 10, 25 and 19 of the Constitution of the State of Arizona by "prohibiting the passage of bills of attainder or ex-post-facto law;" (iii) that the State of Arizona violated Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States and Article II, Section 25 of the Constitution of the State of Arizona by "impairing the obligation of contracts;" (iv) that the State of Arizona violated "Article X" of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States and Article II, Section 33 of the Constitution of the State of Arizona by "compelling a citizen of the United States to contract; and violating the U.C.C. mandate — U.C.C. 1.207;" (v) that the State of Arizona violated Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution of the United States, "which guarantees to every state a Republican form of Government;" (vi) that the State of Arizona is "guilty of violating jurisdiction, under Title 18 U.S.C.; Chapter 13 Sections 241, 242 ;" and (vii) that the State of Arizona "is guilty of Title 18; Part 1, Chapter 41, Section 872 = (Extortion by officers or employees of the United States." Complt. (doc. 1) at 2-3.
Plaintiff, in his response, seems to confuse the "notice" required under Rule 8 and that required under A.R.S. § 12-821.01. He argues that he provided "notice" to Defendants when,
. . . [a] NOTICE OF IMPENDING TORT ACTION was presented to the Department of Corrections, the ADULT Parole Dept [sic], and the Attorney General, Terry Goddard, [sic] Mr. Goddard's office received this notice via certified postage on March 1, 2004. Furthermore, an additional NOTICE was received by the Dept. of Corrections (Community Corrections Division) May 3, 2004.
Resp. (doc. 11) at 2. However, beyond the issue of "notice," Plaintiff fails to address any of Defendants' other arguments.
Additionally, in his response, Plaintiff raises issues of "concurrent negligence," alleged due process violations, and double jeopardy. Resp. (doc. 11) at 4-6. These claims were not raised in Plaintiff's Complaint and, consequently, shall not be considered by the Court.
Furthermore, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to define sufficient alleged facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732. His Complaint consists solely of conclusory statements. Although Plaintiff's response to Defendants' motion to dismiss discloses some events that can be assumed to be related to Plaintiff's claims, the nature of the action remains unclear to the Court. It is not clear to the Court what event, injury or damage Plaintiff claims to have suffered, and under what legal theory Defendants could be found liable for such an event, injury or damage.
The Ninth Circuit requires liberal construction of a pro se litigant's pleadings and disfavors summary dismissal of their complaints. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261; McHenry, 84 F.3d 1172. Thus, the Court shall allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint in order to correct the deficiencies discussed above.
B. Defendants' Motion to Strike
On March 7, 2006, Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Mot. to Strike (doc. 15). In their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be stricken from the record because (1) it does not comport with the requirements of Local Rule 56.1; and (2) Defendant's motion to dismiss, filed on October 6, 2005, has not yet been ruled upon by the Court. Id. No objection or response was filed by Plaintiff in opposition to this motion. Consequently, the Court shall grant Defendants' motion to strike.
Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 10) is DENIED, without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before June 19, 2006, Plaintiff shall file a First Amended Complaint in compliance with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule of Practice 7.1, which specifies the Court's jurisdictional basis therein, clarifies the statute(s) upon which Plaintiff is relying to support her claim(s), names the defendant(s) therein she believes are appropriate, provides a short and plain statement of the claim showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief, and demands judgment for the relief Plaintiff seeks.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that failure to comply with these Orders may result in the dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to provide the Plaintiff with a copy of "Filing A Complaint In Your Own Behalf."
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Defendants' motion to strike . . . Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (doc. 15) is GRANTED.