Opinion
Case No. 2:08-cv-191.
October 20, 2008
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff has paid the initial partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Plaintiff Dennis Grayson #253538, an inmate at the Alger Maximum Correctional Facility (LMF), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Dr. Fernando Frontera. Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that on November 7, 2006, he requested a colon examination because he had been having blood in his stool, and burning in his left side, torso and buttocks. In addition, Plaintiff had been experiencing open cuts on his hands and feet. Defendant Frontera told Plaintiff that he would order a blood test. Blood was drawn on November 22, 2006, and November 28, 2006. The results showed symptoms of anemia. Plaintiff states that Defendant Frontera refused to perform further tests. Plaintiff seeks damages and equitable relief.
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 102, 103-04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied "[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner's need for medical care is obvious even to a lay person." Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). If, however the need involves "minor maladies or non-obvious complaints of a serious need for medical care," Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, the inmate must "place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment." Napier v. Madison County, Ky., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have "a sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care." Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference "entails something more than mere negligence," Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be "satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result." Id. Under Farmer, "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837.
Not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the Supreme Court explained:
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. Sanderfer, 62 F.3d at 154-55; Ward v. Smith, No. 95-6666, 1996 WL 627724, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1996). This is so even if the misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and considerable suffering. Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997).
A review of Plaintiff's complaint and the attached exhibits shows that he was not denied medical care. In the step I response to grievance number LMF 0702-053512d3, which is attached to Plaintiff's complaint, respondent Karen Scheaffer stated that Plaintiff's laboratory results did not show any clinically significant abnormalities, and were not indicative of a medical condition requiring attention or treatment. In the step II response, Jeannie Stephenson, R.N., stated that the slight variations in Plaintiff's lab tests could have resulted from something as minor as a common virus, and that a urine test had been ordered for Plaintiff. In the step III grievance response to LMF 0702535, which is also attached to Plaintiff's complaint, respondent J. Armstrong states:
Grievant alleges he received results from laboratory testing showing slight abnormalities and the Medical Service Provider (MSP) is not providing appropriate medical treatment as a result of the tests.
The information presented upon appeal to step III has been reviewed in addition to the medical record. The step I and step II responses appropriately address the grievance. As noted, the results were slightly abnormal; the MSP determined that they did not warrant medical intervention. Further reporting of medical symptoms have been made by the grievant. As a result the MSP ordered further lab testing and prescribed medication. Evidence does not support grievant's allegations that the MSP and health care staff are not taking his medical condition seriously, as alleged with his step III appeal.
According to a copy of a medical kite response dated February 26, 2008, asking why stool samples were not being sent out to Marquette. Plaintiff was told that testing for occult blood was done on-site, so that if Plaintiff saw blood in his stool, the facility would do a test. A medical kite response dated April 21, 2008, indicates that Plaintiff's stool sample was negative for occult blood. Plaintiff also attaches a copy of a kite response dated February 7, 2008, which indicates that Plaintiff was seen by a nurse and doctor, who stated that they did not observe any cuts on Plaintiff's hands, only dry skin. Plaintiff was advised to drink adequate water and limit hand washing, as well as to purchase cocoa butter cream from the prison store to use on his dry skin.
The Sixth Circuit distinguishes "between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment." Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976). Where, as here, "a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law." Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976); see also, Brock v. Crall, No. 00-5914, 2001 WL 468169, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2001); Jones v. Martin, No. 00-1522, 2001 WL 223859, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 28, 2001); Williams v. Mattson, No. 99-1796, 2000 WL 924145, at *1 (6th Cir. June 28, 2000); Davis v. Ulep, No. 97-2124, 1999 WL 98390, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 1999); Cain v. Huff, No. 96-1613, 1997 WL 377029, at * 4 (6th Cir. July 2, 1997); Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at * 2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997). As noted above, Plaintiff's complaint in this case is with regard to the specific treatment received and does not support an Eighth Amendment claim.
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the court dismisses this case, the court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should the plaintiff appeal this decision, the court will assess the $455 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
A judgment consistent with this Opinion will issue.