Gray v. U.S.

13 Citing cases

  1. Harris v. U.S.

    602 A.2d 154 (D.C. 1992)   Cited 93 times
    Holding that a prosecutor's comments that police officers' testimony was corroborated while defendant's testimony was not did not shift the burden of proof to the defense, but “merely conveyed to the jury that when evaluating the credibility of a witness, corroboration or a lack thereof of the testimony should be considered.”

    We will identify first the standard by which we will measure any such impropriety by the prosecutor in this case, next evaluate the claim that the prosecutor actually committed any impropriety in his cross-examination of Harris, and finally measure any demonstrated impropriety against that standard. When reviewing allegations that a prosecutor conducted an examination or argument improperly, we determine first whether the prosecutor's statements or actions actually were improper. Gray v. United States, 589 A.2d 912, 916 (D.C. 1991); Hammill v. United States, 498 A.2d 551, 554 (D.C. 1985). Normally, where we find that an impropriety has occurred and that the defendant has made appropriate objection, we then determine whether we can say "with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error." (Phillip) Dyson v. United States, United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C. 1980) (quoting Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (footnote omitted) (quoting in turn Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946))).

  2. Johnson v. U.S.

    613 A.2d 888 (D.C. 1992)   Cited 22 times
    Upholding admission of photographs showing victim who had been burned with a hot iron before being raped

    Such an improper comment in closing or rebuttal is one which raises questions for the jury that only the non-testifying defendant could have answered. See Gray v. United States, 589 A.2d 912, 917 (D.C. 1991); Boyd v. United States, 473 A.2d 828, 833 (D.C. 1984). The prosecutor's rebuttal statement in this case was not of that quality.

  3. Harrison v. United States

    76 A.3d 826 (D.C. 2013)   Cited 24 times
    Finding that there were sufficient corroborating circumstances to justify admission of the defendant's inculpatory statement under the Laumer test because the statement “was made shortly after [the defendant's] arrest, to his then-girlfriend, whom he presumably trusted, ... the statement was consistent with the testimony of several government witnesses, the statement was sufficiently against [the defendant's] penal interest that a reasonable person in his position would not have made the statement without believing it to be true”

    They are only intended to assist you in understanding the evidence.” See Gray v. United States, 589 A.2d 912, 918 (D.C.1991) (“The trial court ... instructed the jury that counsel's statements in closing were not evidence. Juries are presumed to follow the trial court's instructions.”).

  4. Jordan v. U.S.

    18 A.3d 703 (D.C. 2011)   Cited 8 times

    "See Gray v. United States, 589 A.2d 912, 918 (D.C1991). But even if some of the jurors, despite the lack of an aiding-and-abetting instruction, were struggling because of a perception that Hamlin was the more likely striker, our case law supports the trial court's decision not to answer the jury's first question.

  5. McNeely v. U.S.

    874 A.2d 371 (D.C. 2005)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that, given the well-known dangerous proclivities of the breed, the owner's “knowledge that his dogs were pit bulls should have moved him to inquire into his heightened obligations under the Act”

    The jury is presumed to follow instructions, see Clark v. United States, 593 A.2d 186, 193 (D.C. 1991) (citations omitted), and we "will not 'upset the verdict by assuming that the jury declined to do so.'" Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 165 (D.C. 1992) (en banc) (quoting Gray v. United States, 589 A.2d 912, 918 (D.C. 1991)). There is little reason to doubt the ameliorative effect of these instructions given their forcefulness and timing.

  6. Davis v. U.S.

    700 A.2d 229 (D.C. 1997)   Cited 9 times
    Concluding there was no abuse of discretion where the trial court gave the Winters instruction, which is more forceful than the Gallagher instruction, after the jury stated “that we are not going to reach a verdict no [matter] how long we sit here”

    This court will not upset a verdict by assuming that the jury declined to follow the trial court's instructions. Gray v. United States, 589 A.2d 912, 918 (D.C. 1991). The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.

  7. Owens v. U.S.

    688 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1996)   Cited 17 times
    Affirming runner's PWID conviction under aiding and abetting theory

    In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, this court first determines whether the action actually constituted misconduct and, second, weighs several factors to determine if the misconduct requires reversal of the conviction. Gray v. United States, 589 A.2d 912, 916 (D.C. 1991). Because we find there was no prosecutorial misconduct, we need not move to the second stage of the analysis. Appellant Williams does not cite anything in the record that rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.

  8. Buergas v. U.S.

    686 A.2d 556 (D.C. 1996)   Cited 5 times

    When a party alleges that a prosecutor made an improper argument, the court must initially determine "whether the prosecutor's statements or actions actually were improper." Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 159 (D.C. 1992) (en banc) (citing Gray v. United States, 589 A.2d 912, 916 (D.C. 1991); Hammill v. United States, 498 A.2d 551, 554 (D.C. 1985)). But even if the remarks were improper, a new trial is only mandated when the defendant was "substantially prejudiced" as a result of the comments.

  9. Byers v. U.S.

    649 A.2d 279 (D.C. 1994)   Cited 24 times

    In reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we consider first whether impermissible conduct occurred. Gray v. United States, 589 A.2d 912, 916 (D.C. 1991). If it did, then we determine whether reversal is required based upon "the gravity of the misconduct, its relationship to the issue of guilt, the effect of any corrective action of the trial judge and the strength of the government's case." Dixon v. United States, 565 A.2d 72, 75 (D.C. 1989). If appellant failed to object at trial, we reverse only "if the misconduct is so clearly prejudicial to [his] substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of [the] trial.

  10. Morris v. U.S.

    622 A.2d 1116 (D.C. 1993)   Cited 26 times
    Holding that when two predicate crimes for PFCV merge into one, the PFCV offenses also merge

    We disagree. See Gray v. United States, 589 A.2d 912, 917-18 (D.C. 1991); McCowan v. United States, 458 A.2d 1191, 1197 (D.C. 1983); Boyd v. United States, 473 A.2d 828, 833-34 (D.C. 1984) (citing inter alia Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965)). Appellant's reliance on Price v. United States, 531 A.2d 984, 990-92 (D.C. 1987), is misplaced because that case concerned cross-examination that established that appellant knew of no reason why missing witnesses could not testify at trial.