(Footnote omitted.) Gray v. State, 260 Ga.App. 197, 198(2)(a), 581 S.E.2d 279 (2003). In this case, Thompson's defense was that he was not involved in the forgeries and that the only evidence implicating him to the fraudulent checks was the presumably biased testimony of McDowell and Russell.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197, 201 (4) ( 581 SE2d 279) (2003). As we have held:
These combined facts supported a finding of abandonment. See, e.g., Thomas, 274 Ga. at 159 (3) (abandonment properly found where defendants had left the premises and had been ordered to vacate by their landlord); Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197, 201-202 (4) ( 581 SE2d 279) (2003) (defendant abandoned contents of bag seized from residence, where defendant left the residence after being informed that he was no longer welcome there and never retrieved the bag he had left behind); Oliver v. State, 161 Ga. App. 567, 568 (1) (b) ( 287 SE2d 698) (1982) (testimony of landlady that defendant had abandoned the premises indicated that defendant no longer had expectation of privacy in the premises at the time of the search). Accordingly, the trial court was entitled to find that Driggers had no expectation of privacy in the outbuilding and its contents by the time of the investigator's search, and, therefore, lacked standing to complain of the search or any evidence seized as a result.
As such, appellants were principals in the theft of those items. See Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197, 198 (1) ( 581 SE2d 279) (2003) (presence in an area that had been burglarized in conjunction with possession of goods that had been stolen from that area supports a finding of theft by taking); Dunn v. State, 245 Ga. App. 847, 847-848 ( 539 SE2d 198) (2000) (an accomplice in a burglary is guilty as a principal). Yet, one cannot be a principal thief of stolen property and at the same time be convicted of theft by receiving the same property.
Further, when similar transaction evidence is being introduced to prove motive, intent, or bent of mind, it requires a lesser degree of similarity to meet the test of admissibility than when such evidence is being introduced to prove identity.Woods v. State, 275 Ga. App. 340, 343 (1) (a) ( 620 SE2d 609) (2005) (punctuation and footnotes omitted); see Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197, 198-199 (2) (a) ( 581 SE2d 279) (2003). "Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial court's determination that similar transaction evidence is admissible."
The evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury's finding that Walker was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary. See Cothran v. State, 269 Ga. App. 256, 257 (1) ( 603 SE2d 762) (2004); Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197, 198 (1) ( 581 SE2d 279) (2003). (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Citing no authority for his argument, Davis asserts that the jury was left with the prejudicial impression that "he has gotten away with it before." Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197, 198-199 (2) (a) ( 581 SE2d 279) (2003). Davis's argument fails for two reasons.
Johnson v. State, 242 Ga. 649, 653 (3) ( 250 SE2d 394) (1978).Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197, 199 (2) (a) ( 581 SE2d 279) (2003). 3. Drake next contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that trial counsel did not move for a directed verdict, did not call an essential witness, and did not object to the similar transaction testimony.
Henderson v. State, 170 Ga. App. 170 ( 316 SE2d 814) (1984).Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197, 198 (1) ( 581 SE2d 279) (2003).Slater v. State, 209 Ga. App. 723, 724 (1) ( 434 SE2d 547) (1993).
No evidence shows, however, that Gay relinquished or abdicated control and ownership of his backpack. Compare Gray v. State, 260 Ga. App. 197, 201 (4) ( 581 SE2d 279) (2003) (homeowner consented to search after defendant had been told that he was no longer welcome there and after defendant had left without taking his bag). Unlike the situation in Gray, Gay had not abandoned his property by leaving it in a home where he was unwelcome.