¶ 14 Based on the above arguments, the differences between officials in the judiciary branch and officials in the other branches of government are of sufficient magnitude to show that different treatment is reasonably necessary, and that the classification created by the statute serves important governmental objectives and is substantially related to achievement of those objectives. ¶ 15 Nor is there a constitutional problem with requiring an appointed judge to resign from a non-elected position if the incumbent elected judge seeks to retain her elected position. Although it is true that the threat to professional harmony and discipline would be lessened if the appointed judge seeking the elected position came from a jurisdiction such as a municipal court instead of the county courthouse, see Gray v. State Election Board, 962 P.2d 1, 3 (Okla. 1998) (Opala, J., concurring in result), there still exists the possibility that the public could be confused by the concept of two sitting judges seeking the same position. This is sufficient to show the resign-to-run requirement of this portion of the statute is reasonably necessary to eliminate this confusion. Cf. Freeman v. State Election Board, 969 P.2d 982 (Okla. 1998) (In examining an election statute requiring a "preliminary declaration of candidacy" if the candidate has a similar name to incumbent, the Court states "confusing the voters" is a valid reason to refute a disqualified candidate's claim his equal protection rights were violated).