Since Byrge , the Court of Appeals has dismissed numerous healthcare liability lawsuits, holding with little analysis that failure to comply with the content requirements in subsection (a)(2) of Section 121 precludes plaintiffs from relying on the 120-day extension of time. See, e.g. , Gray v. Saint Francis Hospital-Bartlett, Inc. , No. W2018-00836-COA-R9-CV, 2019 WL 1750945 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2019) (perm. app. pending ); Webb v. AMISUB (SFH) Inc. , No. W2017-02539-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 1422884, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2019) (perm.
Since Byrge, the Court of Appeals has dismissed numerous healthcare liability lawsuits, holding with little analysis that failure to comply with the content requirements in subsection (a)(2) of Section 121 precludes plaintiffs from relying on the 120-day extension of time. See, e.g., Gray v. Saint Francis Hospital-Bartlett, Inc., No. W2018-00836-COA-R9-CV, 2019 WL 1750945 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2019) (perm. app. pending); Webb v. AMISUB (SFH) Inc., No. W2017-02539-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 1422884, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2019) (perm.
His possession was not adverse, and was consistent with his dedication. As was said by Judge BRANNON in Wooldridge v. Coughlin, supra, "In almost every conceded right of way, whether by grant or necessity, there is actual possession of the land subject to such right of way. Arnold v. Stevens, 35 Am. Dec. 305; Gray v. Bartlett, 32 Am. Dec. 208, note." Nothing was done by defendant upon its succession to title in 1904 or thereafter which would indicate a change in the legal status.
" In Gray v. Bartlett, 20 Pick. 186, at page 192, occur these words referring to the right of a littoral owner: "he had a right to use and occupy his own flats to the full breadth, in any manner which he saw fit." In the note to Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 9 Gray, 451, at page 520, is found the statement that "The owner of flats has no right, either against the Commonwealth or against conterminous proprietors, to have his flats kept open for the ebb and flow of the tide, either for tide mills or for navigation; but only to the flow of the water below low water mark, and to some access thereto."
The distinction would seem to be well taken. For the right affirmed in The Davidson, Original Hartlepool Collieries Co. v. Gibb, and Sherlock v. Bainbridge, ubi supra, is the right to have a vessel lie at anchor or otherwise in public waters as an incident of and included in the public right of navigation. See in this connection Gray v. Bartlett, 20 Pick. 186. And it would seem (as held in The Wm. H. Brinsfield, Ranstead v. Fahey, and Braisted v. Denton, ubi supra,) that there is no right for a vessel to lie in a private dock, at any rate under ordinary circumstances. See in this connection Commercial Wharf Co. v. Winsor, 146 Mass. 559; Long Wharf v. Central Wharf, 14 Allen, 271.
(Boggs v. Merced Min. Co ., 14 Cal. 368, 371; Franklin v. Dorland , 28 Cal. 179; 87 Am. Dec. 111; Wilson v. Castro , 31 Cal. 440; Farish v. Coon , 40 Cal. 51; Stockman v. Riverside etc. Co ., 64 Cal. 59; Anaheim Water Co. v. Semi-Tropic Water Co ., 64 Cal. 195; Smith v. Cremer , 71 Ill. 186; Kingman v. Graham , 51 Wis. 233; Hermann on Estoppel, secs. 944, 974, 987; 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 807.) Though ignorant of the law, defendant was fully acquainted with the title, and knew as much of it as Bell did. (Davis v. Davis, supra;Flege v. Garvey, supra;Maye v. Yappen , 23 Cal. 309; Montgomery v. Keppel , 75 Cal. 133; 7 Am. St. Rep. 125; Burritt v. Dickson , 8 Cal. 113; Ferris v. Coover , 10 Cal. 591; Smith v. Penny , 44 Cal. 166; Gray v. Bartlett, 20 Pick. 186; 32 Am. Dec. 208; East India Co. v. Vincent, 2 Atk. 83; Davenport v. Turpin , 43 Cal. 602; Emeric v. Alvarado , 90 Cal. 447.) The party urging estoppel must have relied on the representations.
) An injunction lies to restrain the erection of the wharf. (Thornton v. Grant, 10 R.I. 477; Gray v. Bartlett, 20 Pick. 186; Frink v. Lawrence , 20 Conn. 121; 32 Am. Dec. 208.) JUDGES: Foote, C. Searls, C., and Belcher, C. C., concurred.
The rule even, as to them, is limited to a purchaser (permitted or encouraged by the holder of the title) of property from the vendor having no title, and of which defect of title he was at the time aware. The doctrine is further qualified in Gray v. Bartlett, (20 Pick. 193.) If the act be an encroachmenton the soil or rights of another, an acknowledged tort, equally well known, or equally open to the knowledge of both parties, it gives no right. There can be no concealment or fraud where both parties have access to the facts, especially when the facts are of record--of general notoriety; and they are charged with knowledge of the law. (See, on this doctrine of estoppel, Raw v. Pope, 2 Ver. 239; 1 Dev. 452, 465.)
(Hamilton v. Hamilton, 4 Barr, 194; Robinson v. Justice, 2 Penn. 19; Wendell v. Van Rensellaer, 1 Johns. Ch. 354; Higginbotham v. Barrett , 5 Id. 589; East India Co. v. Vincent, 2 Atk. 83; 1 Bay, 239; Gray v. Bartlett, 20 Pick. 193; Shannon v. Broadstreet, 1 Scho. & L. 73; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. 385, 388, 389.)