Additionally, a party cannot evade summary judgment on the mere hope that something may develop at the trial. See Essmiller v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 215 Kan. 74, 77, 524 P.2d 767 (1974); Gray v. Ray Gill, Frontier Industries, Inc., 208 Kan. 95, Syl. p 1, 490 P.2d 615 (1971); Meyer, Executor v. Benelli, 197 Kan. 98, Syl. p 1, 415 P.2d 415 (1966). Therefore, we are concerned with the issue of whether Hall set forth specific facts demonstrating there was a genuine issue of fact requiring a trial.
Thus, there were no facts pertinent to the issue remaining to be discovered. Facts which remain uncontroverted after a response to a motion for summary judgment has been filed are deemed to be admitted. Rule 141, 235 Kan. cx. Farmway cites us to Gray v. Ray Gill, Frontier Industries Inc., 208 Kan. 95, Syl. ¶ 1, 490 P.2d 615 (1971), wherein it was held: "When a party makes no suggestion to the trial court of any additional facts tending to support his position, he cannot escape summary judgment, if otherwise proper, on the mere hope that further discovery may reveal evidence favorable to his case."
The defense of incomplete discovery in summary judgment cases has been addressed by this court. In Gray v. Ray Gill, Frontier Industries, Inc., 208 Kan. 95, 97, 490 P.2d 615 (1971), it was stated: "Ordinarily, a motion for summary judgment should not be granted when the opposing party is proceeding diligently with his pre-trial discovery, but has not had an opportunity to complete it.
We have also held a party cannot escape summary judgment, if otherwise proper, on the hope further discovery might reveal evidence favorable to his case after he has reported discovery completed. Johnston v. Farmers Alliance Mutual Ins. Co., 218 Kan. 543, 545 P.2d 312 (1976); Cherry v. Vanlahi, Inc., 216 Kan. 195, 531 P.2d 66 (1975); Gray v. Ray Gill, Frontier Industries, Inc., 208 Kan. 95, 490 P.2d 615 (1971); In Fredricks v. Foltz, 225 Kan. at 666, we stated: "An appellate court should read the record in the light most favorable to the party who defended against the motion for summary judgment.
On numerous occasions this court has been confronted with appellants asserting a defense of incomplete discovery in summary judgment cases. Concerning such assertions we had this to say in Gray v. Ray Gill, Frontier Industries, Inc., 208 Kan. 95, 490 P.2d 615: "Ordinarily, a motion for summary judgment should not be granted when the opposing party is proceeding diligently with his pre-trial discovery, but has not had an opportunity to complete it. ( Lawrence v. Deemy, 204 Kan. 299, 461 P.2d 770; Timmermeyer v. Brack, 196 Kan. 481, 412 P.2d 984; Brick v. City of Wichita, 195 Kan. 206, 403 P.2d 964.)
However, appellants do not contend there were discoverable facts which would remove the bar of the statute of limitations. When the pleadings and files conclusively show that the only cause of action pled in the petition is barred by an applicable statute of limitations, and no suggestion is made to the trial court of any additional facts tending to remove the bar of the statute, the petitioner cannot escape summary judgment merely because pretrial discovery is not complete. ( Gray v. Ray Gill, Frontier Industries, Inc., 208 Kan. 95, 97, 490 P.2d 615; Sade v. Hemstrom, 205 Kan. 514, 521, 471 P.2d 340; Meyer, Executor v. Benelli, 197 Kan. 98, 100, 415 P.2d 415.) Accordingly we hold that plaintiffs' claim against the defendants-appellants is essentially one to question the validity of proceedings under K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 12-6a01, et seq., the general improvement and assessment law, and that such a suit cannot be successfully maintained after the expiration of thirty (30) days from the publication of the ordinance fixing said assessments.
Summary judgment should be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, and admissions before the district court show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. ( DeBauge Bros., Inc. v. Whitsitt, 212 Kan. 758, 512 P.2d 487.) A party cannot evade summary judgment on the mere hope that some thing may develop at the trial. ( Meyer, Executor v. Benelli, 197 Kan. 98, 415 P.2d 415; Gray v. Ray Gill, Frontier Industries, Inc., 208 Kan. 95, 490 P.2d 615.) We find no error in the district court's granting of summary judgment.
In any event the directors and officers of a corporation may be held liable for their fraudulent acts to persons dealing with the corporation and suffering damage as a result of their own false representations as to material matters. ( Gray v. Ray Gill, Frontier Industries, Inc., 208 Kan. 95, 99, 490 P.2d 615; 19 C.J.S. Corporations, § 850, p. 281; see also Hanson v. Murphy, 208 Kan. 297, 491 P.2d 551 and Anno. 32 A.L.R.2d 231, § 26.) From the undisputed evidence in this case Glenn W. Turner organized Koscot and has control of the corporation as chairman of the board of directors.
The first assertion of temporary damages appears on appeal. An issue not presented to the trial court cannot be a subject for appellate review. ( Gray v. Ray Gill, Frontier Industries, Inc., 208 Kan. 95, 490 P.2d 615.) When damage to the land from flooding becomes permanent, the statute of limitations bars recovery two years after the permanent damage is reasonably ascertainable.
" In Gray v. Ray Gill, Frontier Industries, Inc., 208 Kan. 95, 490 P.2d 615, this court said: ". . . [W]hen, as here, a party makes no suggestion to the trial court of any additional facts tending to support his position, he cannot escape summary judgment, if otherwise proper, on the mere hope that further discovery may reveal evidence favorable to his case.