Gray v. Quality Finance Co.

6 Citing cases

  1. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stephens

    238 S.E.2d 382 (Ga. 1977)   Cited 16 times
    Reaffirming prior holding that by analogy former Code Ann. § 102–102, providing for computation of days as to the exercise of any privilege or discharge of any duty, applies to contracts as well as statutes

    Code Ann. § 102-102 (8), among other things, provides, "When a number of days is prescribed for the exercise of any privilege, or the discharge of any duty, only the first or last day shall be counted; and if the last day shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, the party having such privilege or duty shall have through the following Monday to exercise such privilege or to discharge such duty." What Brooks v. Hicks did not make clear was that Code Ann. § 102-102 (8) applies only to limitations in terms of days. It does not apply where the limitation is in terms of months or years. Thomas v. Couch, 171 Ga. 602, 607 ( 156 S.E. 206) (1930); Brown v. Emerson Brick Co., 15 Ga. App. 332 ( 83 S.E. 160) (1914); Davis v. U.S. Fidelity c. Co., 119 Ga. App. 374, 376 ( 167 S.E.2d 214) (1969); Gray v. Quality Finance Co., 130 Ga. App. 762 ( 204 S.E.2d 483) (1974). Brooks v. Hicks' analogy to Code Ann. § 102-102 (8) can only apply to the extent that statute applies.

  2. Hanna v. Savannah Service, Inc.

    347 S.E.2d 263 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 1 times

    OCGA § 9-2-61 required that the action be recommenced within six months. Where the limitation was expressed in terms of months or years, the last date for filing a complaint within six months of October 11, 1984 was April 10, 1985. Veal v. Paulk, 121 Ga. App. 575, 577 (1) ( 174 S.E.2d 465) (1970); Gray v. Quality Fin. Co., 130 Ga. App. 762, 763 ( 204 S.E.2d 483) (1974); Thomas v. Couch, 171 Ga. 602, 607 (1) ( 156 S.E. 206) (1930); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 239 Ga. 717, 718 ( 238 S.E.2d 382) (1977). Hanna's refiled complaint was one day too late and the trial court properly sustained the motion to dismiss as to those aspects of the complaint seeking recovery for tort. OCGA § 9-3-33; Davis v. Hosp. Auth., 154 Ga. App. 654, 656 (3) ( 269 S.E.2d 867) (1980).

  3. Gregory v. J. T. Gregory Son

    338 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 5 times

    Let him step to the music which he hears, however measured or far away.' — Thoreau. I must dissent." Gray v. Quality Fin. Co., 130 Ga. App. 762, 764 ( 204 S.E.2d 483) (1974). The majority opinion acknowledges that "the corporation's action against Gregory Jr., as well as Gregory Jr.'s defense and counterclaims against the corporation, depended upon whether an issue of fact had been established over the existence of certain corporate bylaws which required the presence of two-thirds of the shareholders for a quorum necessary to transact business."

  4. Newton Lumber Supply v. Crumbley

    290 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 9 times

    The last day to file or initiate suit within that period was Sunday, November 9, 1980. "When a limitation is imposed in terms of years the expiration takes place at the end of a yearly period without giving additional consideration to when the last day falls." Gray v. Quality Finance Co., 130 Ga. App. 762, 763 ( 204 S.E.2d 483) (1974); Veal v. Paulk, 121 Ga. App. 575 (1) ( 174 S.E.2d 465) (1970). See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 239 Ga. 717 ( 238 S.E.2d 382) (1977).

  5. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stephens

    140 Ga. App. 720 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 4 times

    Brooks v. Hicks, supra, p. 502. Appellant argues the correctness of their interpretation of Brooks v. Hicks is shown in Gray v. Quality Finance Co., 130 Ga. App. 762 ( 204 S.E.2d 483), which was decided subsequent to the Supreme Court decision and is cited in Judge Deen's dissent. This court is bound by our state's Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-3708) to recognize the Supreme Court's decisions as precedents.

  6. Sellers v. ALCO Finance, Inc.

    204 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 9 times
    In Sellers the alleged typographical error was not de minimis, and a violation of GILA would result unless this court had elected to intervene to make a contract for the parties which would be substantially different from that executed by them.

    2. If the loan is treated as being for a period from January 12, 1972, to February 12, 1974, which would change the written maturity date from 1973, then the loan is void because it exceeds the statutory period of 24 months. Abrams v. Commercial Credit Plan, 128 Ga. App. 520 ( 197 S.E.2d 384); Gray v. Quality Finance Co., 130 Ga. App. 762; Code Ann. § 25-315. 3. If the loan note is treated as providing for 23 monthly payments due on the 10th day of each month with the 24th payment coming due on January 12, 1974, then the contract is void because the charges exceed the statutory maximum rate provided in Code Ann. § 25-315.