Texas statutory provisions also militate against Amoco's argument. Article 5069-1.03 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes provides: "When no specified rate of interest is agreed upon by the parties, interest at the rate of six percent per annum shall be allowed on all accounts and contracts ascertaining the sum payable, commencing on the thirtieth (30th) day from and after the time when the sum is due and payable."Gray v. Laketon Wheat Growers, Inc., 240 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1951, no writ). Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 5069-1.

The chose-in-action for money had and received fell within the scope of indebitatus assumpsit, 1 Chitty on Contracts Ch. 29, p. 845-46, and encompassed claims for the return of money. See Staats v. Miller, 243 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. 1951) (stating that all a plaintiff need show to recover under a claim of money had and received "is that the defendant holds money which in equity and good conscience belongs to" the plaintiff); Miller-Rogaska, Inc. v. Bank One, N.A., 931 S.W.2d 655, 662 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1996, no writ) (stating the same); Gray v. Laketon Wheat Growers, Inc., 240 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1951, no writ) (stating the same). Additionally, the concept of "money" for purposes of the claim has come to mean more than mere coins or dollar bills. For instances, various jurisdictions, and at least one Texas intermediate court of appeals, have indicated that the "equivalent" of money, Gonzales Motor Co. v. Buhidar, 348 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hartman v. Townsend, 523 N.E.2d 199, 202-03 (Ill.App.Ct. 2d Dist. 1988); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 56 N.Y.S.2d 50, 56 (N.Y.App.Div. 1945), property received as money, Koller v. Shannon County Bank, 74 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Mo.Ct.App. 1934) (promissory notes), or property converted into money before suit, United States Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 703 P.2d 246, 250 (Or.Ct.App. 1985) (realty unjustly obtained and then sold for cash) may also be recovered via the cause of action.

But the filing of a petition tolls the statute of limitations as to every cause of action asserted in the original petition, and this is true no matter how imperfectly the cause of action is alleged — even if it is so defective as to be subject to a general or special demurrer, provided it is filed before the expiration of the statutory period of limitation and is based upon a proper cause of action described with sufficient certainty to apprise the defendant of its nature.Gray v. Laketon Wheat Growers, 240 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1951, no writ) (emphasis added). Given the references to Federated's alleged misrepresentations in Milestone's first amended petition and that the appellees raised no challenge to Milestone's claim for indemnity, we cannot say that the claim for indemnity is so defective that Milestone's tort claims do not relate back to it.

Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Humble Oil Refining Co., 103 S.W.2d 818, 824 (Tex.Civ.App. Galveston 1937, writ ref'd); Ford Motor Company v. Maddox Motor Company, 48 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1932, n. w. h.); Pullman Company v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company, 267 S.W. 1045, 1047 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1924, writ dism'd); Mann v. Mitchell, 241 S.W. 715, 717 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1922, writ dism'd); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Smith, 146 S.W. 332 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1912, writ ref'd); Missouri, K. T. Ry. Co. v. McFadden, 89 Tex. 138, 33 S.W. 853 (1896). All that is required to arrest the statute of limitations is a petition that advises a defendant of the nature of the cause of action against him, regardless of how defectively this is done. City of Houston v. Magness, 364 S.W.2d 702, 704-05 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston 1963, writ ref'd); Globel Corporation v. Vincent, 156 Tex. 398, 295 S.W.2d 640 (1956); Gray v. Laketon Wheat Growers, Inc., 240 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1951, n. w. h.); Garcia v. Hernandez, 226 S.W. 1099, 1100-01 (Tex.Civ.App. El Paso 1920, writ ref'd). Sheldon's first amended original petition (and its original petition insofar as Hudson Electric is concerned are substantially the same) fully apprises Hudson Electric of the nature of the cause of action, and more. The petition advises Hudson Electric of the date and time, location, the cause and the nature of plaintiff's loss, and the amount of plaintiff's damages.

'Payment by a cotenant of land of some charge thereon, such as taxes, has been held to entitle such payor to contribution from the other cotenants to the extent of their proportionate share of the charge paid, together with interest on such share at the legal rate.' Our conclusion is supported by the following authorities: Schluter v. Sell, Tex.Civ.App., 194 S.W.2d 125, 133; Norris v. Vaughn, Tex.Civ.App., 278 S.W.2d 582, 584; Gray v. Laketon Wheat Growers, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 240 S.W.2d 353, 356; Knesek v. Muzny, 191 Okl. 332, 129 P.2d 853, 855; Winn v. Winn, 131 Neb. 650, 269 N.W. 376, 379; Reed v. Henson, 158 Miss. 224, 130 So. 108, 110; 51 A.L.R.2d 465. Appellants and appellees were cotenants.

Appellant's first amended original petition, when read together with the bills that were attached thereto, reiterated most of the allegations of the original petition with the bills attached to it. Gray v. Laketon Wheat Growers, Tex.Civ.App., 240 S.W.2d 353; United States v. Johnson, 1961, 5 Cir., 288 F.2d 40. In First State Bank & Trust Co. of Rio Grande City v. Ramirez, Tex.Com.App., 1939, 133 Tex. 178, 126 S.W.2d 16, 18, the court stated: