The trial court granted the board's motion to dismiss, made on the ground that McGarvey had not exercised her appeal right set out in Code Ann. § 69-1211.1. The trial court also denied McGarvey's motion to be allowed to convert her mandamus application into an appeal, ruling that since no valid petition for writ of mandamus had ever been filed there was nothing to amend by. Mandamus is not available where another remedy exists, and thus to the extent that an appeal was available to plaintiff, her mandamus action will not lie. Code Ann. § 64-101; McClung v. Richardson, 232 Ga. 530 ( 207 S.E.2d 472) (1974); Wofford v. City of Gainesville, 212 Ga. 818, 820 ( 96 S.E.2d 490) (1957); Wofford v. Porte, 212 Ga. 533 ( 93 S.E.2d 690) (1956); Gray v. Gunby, 206 Ga. 63 ( 55 S.E.2d 588) (1949); Hall v. Martin, 136 Ga. 549 ( 71 S.E. 803) (1911). See also Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348 ( 249 S.E.2d 38) (1978).

3. It is fundamental that the writ of mandamus is never available where there exists another specific remedy available to the petitioner. Hall v. Martin, 136 Ga. 549 (1) ( 71 S.E. 803); Cheek v. Eve, 182 Ga. 30 ( 184 S.E. 700); DeBerry v. Spikes, 188 Ga. 222 ( 3 S.E.2d 719); Gray v. Gunby, 206 Ga. 63 (1) ( 55 S.E.2d 588); Westberry v. Taylor, 215 Ga. 464 (1) ( 111 S.E.2d 77); Solomon v. Brown, 218 Ga. 508, 509 ( 128 S.E.2d 735). In this case it is plain that the real and substantial relief which the plaintiff seeks, that is, the right to file a complaint for divorce on a pauper's affidavit without first making the advance deposit demanded by the clerk was denied to her by the defendant clerk of the superior court because he considered the law to forbid him to file her complaint under those circumstances; and that the right to this real and substantial relief depends upon a declaration by the court that the law upon which the clerk relied in refusing to file her complaint is unconstitutional.

1. The right to the extraordinary writ of mandamus is available only "if there shall be no other specific legal remedy." Code § 64-101; Gray v. Gunby, 206 Ga. 63 ( 55 S.E.2d 588); Wofford v. Porte, 212 Ga. 533 ( 93 S.E.2d 690); Westberry v. Taylor, 215 Ga. 464, 465 ( 111 S.E.2d 77). 2.

Mandamus is never an available remedy when there is a plain specific legal remedy. Code § 64-101; DeBerry v. Spikes, 188 Ga. 222 ( 3 S.E.2d 719); Gray v. Gunby, 206 Ga. 63 ( 55 S.E.2d 588)." Wofford v. Porte, 212 Ga. 533, 534 ( 93 S.E.2d 690). No valid attack upon the ordinance having been made in the instant case, and there being a complete and adequate remedy at law which the plaintiff has failed to pursue, it was not error to deny the writ of mandamus.

Mandamus is never an available remedy when there is a plain specific legal remedy. Code § 64-101; DeBerry v. Spikes, 188 Ga. 222 ( 3 S.E.2d 719); Gray v. Gunby, 206 Ga. 63 ( 55 S.E.2d 588). The case is different from that of Gay v. City of Lyons, 209 Ga. 599 ( 74 S.E.2d 839), which holds that mandamus will lie when the plaintiff contends that the zoning ordinance prohibiting the permit is unconstitutional and there is no other adequate remedy to secure a determination of that question.

The judge of the Superior Court of Dougherty County did not err in dismissing an appeal to that court from the probate court of said county where the record shows that the order appealed from was entered on May 8, 1975, and the notice of appeal to the superior court was not filed until June 13, 1975. See Code Ann. § 6-102 (as amended, Ga. L. 1972, p. 738); Gray v. Gunby, 206 Ga. 63, 64 (2) ( 55 S.E.2d 588). Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and Evans, J., concur.