Summary
denying leave to appeal from the Michigan Court of Appeals' reversal of $29.3 million verdict
Summary of this case from Fieger v. GromekOpinion
No. 123104.
July 17, 2003. October 10, 2003.
Leave to Appeal Denied.
No. 123104; reported below: 253 Mich App 486.
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ. We would grant leave to appeal.
Reconsideration denied.
The motion for recusal and for an evidentiary hearing is also denied. Court of Appeals No. 226645.
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ. We would grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration, would grant leave to appeal.
KELLY, J., not participating in the decision regarding the motion for recusal and for evidentiary hearing.
Not participating in the decision regarding the motion to recuse Chief Justice CORRIGAN and Justices TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, denies the motion to recuse herself, concurs in the denial of the motion for rehearing, and states:
This Court denied leave to appeal in this case on July 17, 2003. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing and a motion requesting that Chief Justice CORRIGAN and Justices WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN recuse themselves from this appeal.
Graves v. Warner Bros, 469 Mich 853 (2003).
I concur in the Court's decision to deny the motion for rehearing, and write separately to decide the motion requesting that I recuse myself.
A challenged judge decides the motion asking for his disqualification. MCR 2.003(C)(1)(3). Therefore, even though the plaintiff's motion also asks for the recusal of Chief Justice CORRIGAN and Justices TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, the only issue before me is whether I should recuse myself from participating in this appeal. I do not decide whether my colleagues should recuse themselves or not.
Plaintiff's motion for recusal is based on the same grounds alleged in the April 16, 2003 motion filed in Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler, Docket No. 122457 to recuse the same justices. But plaintiff recognizes that the allegations pertaining to the Michigan Chamber of Commerce participating as amicus curiae in Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler do not apply in this case.
Footnote 1 in plaintiff's Motion for Recusal and for Evidentiary Hearing, filed with the Court August 7, 2003, states: "The only allegations in the Gilbert Motion for Recusal which do not directly apply to the present case are those pertaining to the Michigan Chamber of Commerce and it [sic] involvement in the Gilbert case as Amicus Curiae."
In requesting my recusal from the appeal in Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler, plaintiff asserted only that the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which filed a brief as amicus in that case, contributed to my campaign for reelection to the Michigan Supreme Court in 2002 and aired advertisements advocating my reelection. There are no allegations in either Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler or this case that I made or caused to be published any statements about any of the parties, their attorneys, the amicus, or issues in the case that would raise the issue of bias or prejudice on my part.
For the full text of the allegations requesting my recusal, see my statement of reasons for denying the motion for recusal in Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler, 469 Mich 883 (2003).
I am neither biased nor prejudiced for or against any of the parties or their attorneys in this case, and plaintiff asserts no grounds supporting my recusal from participating in this appeal. Accordingly, I deny plaintiff's motion requesting that I recuse myself from this case.
Reconsideration of the Court's order of October 10, 2003, denying the motion for recusal and evidentiary hearing, is denied January 30, 2004.
WEAVER, J., not participating in the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to recuse Chief Justice CORRIGAN and Justices TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, states:
This Court denied leave to appeal in this case on July 17, 2003. Subsequently, plaintiff filed both a motion for rehearing and a motion requesting that Chief Justice CORRIGAN and Justices WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN recuse themselves from the appeal.
Graves v. Warner Bros, 469 Mich 853 (2003).
I concurred in the Court's October 10, 2003, decision to deny the motion for rehearing, and wrote separately to decide the motion requesting that I recuse myself. I denied plaintiff's motion requesting that I recuse myself from the case, on the grounds that "I am neither biased nor prejudiced for or against any of the parties or their attorneys in this case, and plaintiff asserts no grounds supporting my recusal from participating in this appeal." I did not participate in the decision regarding the motion to recuse Chief Justice CORRIGAN and Justices TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN.
Graves v. Warner Bros, 469 Mich 854 (2003).
Plaintiff has now filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of plaintiff's motion for recusal and an evidentiary hearing. In the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff specifically states that she does not seek reconsideration of my decision not to recuse myself because I gave detailed reasons for my decision.
But plaintiff does ask that I reconsider my decision not to participate in deciding the motion for recusal as it relates to Chief Justice CORRIGAN and Justices TAYLOR, YOUNG and MARKMAN. I decline to do so. A challenged judge decides the motion asking for his disqualification. MCR 2.003(C)(1)(3). Therefore, I do not participate in the motion for reconsideration with regard to the other four justices, and I do not decide whether or not my colleagues should grant the motion for reconsideration and recuse themselves.