Opinion
No. 05-10-01151-CR
Opinion issued August 25, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Kaufman County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 28793CC.
Before Justices BRIDGES, LANG-MIERS, and MURPHY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Maria Cristina Graves appeals her conviction for felony driving while intoxicated. After the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress certain evidence, the trial court accepted appellant's pleas of guilty and true to two enhancement paragraphs. The trial court then assessed punishment at six years' confinement pursuant to a plea bargain agreement. In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress. We overrule appellant's point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to suppress. Specifically, appellant maintains the tip Officer Zachery Boyd received from appellant's husband was not a reliable basis for detaining appellant and the traffic stop in this case was "merely a ruse which enabled the officer to effectuate an unreasonable detention, arrest, and search." When, as here, an officer makes a valid traffic stop, the existence of another motive for the stop is irrelevant because the prohibition against pretextual stops has been abandoned in Texas. See Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). A stop is justified if the officer has specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would give the officer a reasonable suspicion that the driver has engaged in criminal activity. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). This standard is an objective one; so long as there is an objective basis for the stop, the subjective intent of the officer conducting the stop is irrelevant. Id. The reasonable suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. When conducting the totality of the circumstances determination, we use a bifurcated standard. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, and we review de novo the trial court's application of law to facts not turning on credibility and demeanor. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. St. George, 237 S.W.3d at 725. Here, Boyd testified appellant failed to signal her turn within 100 feet of the turn. Based on this observation, Boyd had reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense had been committed, and thus the stop was proper. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104(b) (West 1999) (operator intending to turn a vehicle right or left shall signal continuously for not less than last 100 feet of movement of vehicle before turn). Because the stop was valid, and the reliability of the tip Boyd received is irrelevant, we conclude the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress. Garcia, 43 S.W.3d at 530. We overrule appellant's sole point of error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.