Graves v. State

Full title: GERALD WAYNE GRAVES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, Houston

Date published: Dec 18, 2008

No. 01-07-00212-CR (Tex. App. Dec. 18, 2008)

Opinion

No. 01-07-00212-CR

Opinion issued December 18, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

On Appeal from the 405th District Court Galveston County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 05CR2828.

Panel consists of Justices TAFT, KEYES, and ALCALA.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EVELYN V. KEYES, Justice.

A jury convicted appellant, Gerald Wayne Graves, of murder.¹ Appellant had two prior convictions — a robbery conviction in 1981 and conviction for delivery of a controlled substance in 1991. The jury, having found the two punishment enhancement paragraphs in the indictment true, assessed a life sentence to appellant. In four issues, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a new trial and to suppress evidence and that the evidence presented was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for murder. We affirm.

1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b) (Vernon 2003).

Background

Appellant and the complainant, Juanita Gonzales, had a romantic relationship. The complainant attempted to break off the relationship with appellant. The complainant's sister, Nellie Vargas, testified that appellant was jealous because the complainant began a new relationship with another person. The complainant was a paper carrier for Galveston County Daily News. Appellant helped the complainant with her paper route in the predawn hours of October 9, 2005. Appellant and the complainant were recorded together on surveillance video at the first stop of the complainant's paper route — a Coast Guard facility on Harborside Drive in Galveston, Texas — using a vehicle owned by the complainant. The complainant disappeared at some time after the first stop of her paper route. Vargas filed a missing person report with the police on October 9. On October 10, 2005, the complainant's home, which she shared with Vargas, was set on fire. Later on October 10, the police went to appellant's residence to investigate the complainant's disappearance. Appellant attempted to evade the police by climbing through the ceiling of appellant's leased portion of a duplex and entering the duplex of appellant's neighbor, Alfredo Cruz-Lopez. The police officers at the scene interpreted the noise created by appellant's attempted escape as evidence that the complainant was in danger. At approximately the same time that police made a warrantless entry into appellant's residence, the complainant's body was discovered underneath appellant's residence in plain view. Police exited appellant's residence when they discovered appellant had escaped. The police went to Cruz-Lopez to obtain consent to search Cruz-Lopez's residence for appellant. The police found appellant hiding under Cruz-Lopez's bed. The police arrested appellant and charged him with criminal trespass. When they searched appellant, the police found a .25-caliber automatic cartridge and several of the complainant's personal effects, including a credit card, car keys and a mobile phone. At trial, the State presented testimony that the complainant had been battered and had died of strangulation and multiple gunshot wounds from a .25-caliber automatic weapon. There was expert testimony that the complainant had been dead between 24 and 48 hours when her body was discovered under appellant's residence.

Motion for New Trial

In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because Section 61.003 of the Texas Government Code, which allows prospective jurors to donate their jury pay to state approved funds, deprived him of an impartial jury and therefore violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the Texas Constitution.

Facts

Appellant complains that the handout given to potential jurors by the district clerk exceeded the form letter the legislature intended for jurors to be given. The handout stated:

Chapter 61, Government Code, gives you the right to donate your jury payment to the Crime Complainant's Compensation Fund or the County Child Welfare Board. In addition to these two worthy recipients, the Commissioners' Court may select any other program operated by a public or private nonprofit organization that provides shelter and services to complainants of family violence. These funds help individuals and families who have been complainants of violent crimes or who are in need of services provided by the various agencies. This money goes toward helping your family, friends or neighbors who may need help in times of crisis.

This statement was followed by a list of applicable charities.

Analysis

Appellant challenges section 61.003 facially and as applied to him. We review a motion for new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1995). A facial challenge to a statute is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully because an appellant must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute will be valid. Santikos v. State, 836 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). A party has standing to challenge a statute's constitutionality only when the statute adversely impacts him; a party has no standing to challenge a statute's constitutionality when the statute may adversely impact third parties. Id. (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S Ct. 2908, 2915 (1973)). We presume that the statute is valid and that the legislature has not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily. Rodriquez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). The burden of establishing the statute's unconstitutionality rests on appellant challenging the statute. Id. The constitutional standard for juror impartiality is a question of law. Ruckman v. State, 109 S.W.3d 524, 527 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, pet. ref'd) (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037 n. 12, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2891 n. 12 (1984)). We review this question of law de novo. Id. Section 61.003, entitled "Donation of Reimbursement" provides:

(a) Each prospective juror reporting for jury service shall be personally provided a form letter that when signed by the prospective juror directs the county treasurer to donate all of the prospective juror's reimbursement for jury service to:

(1) the compensation to victims of crime fund under Subchapter B, Chapter 56, Code of Criminal Procedure;

(2) the child welfare board of the county appointed under Section 264.005, Family Code;

(3) any program selected by the commissioners court that is operated by a public or private nonprofit organization and that provides shelter and services to victims of family violence; or

(4) any other program approved by the commissioners court of the county.

Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 61.003 (Vernon Supp. 2008). Other courts of appeals have examined this statute. See Harvey v. State, 123 S.W.3d 623, 631 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd); Ruckman v. State, 109 S.W.3d 524, 526-29 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, pet. ref'd); Boone v. State, 60 S.W.3d 231, 236-37 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). The appellant in Harvey made a similar argument to that made by appellant in the present case. See Harvey, 123 S.W.3d at 631. The appellant in Harvey argued that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair and impartial jury were violated when potential jurors were informed of their right to make a donation under section 61.003. Id. The Harvey court overruled the appellant's complaint and stated:

All of the case law touching on this issue stresses partiality as the result of direct connections between juror and party that would be extraordinarily difficult for a person of common intelligence and reason to overcome. In this case, no such connection exists. . . . A juror may deplore the crime underlying the action in which he or she has been called on to serve, even donating to general funds designed to assist complainants or that crime, and still be able to impartially weigh the evidence presented as to a defendant's guilt or innocence and, if the defendant is found guilty, fairly assess punishment. Id. at 633; see also Ruckman, 109 S.W.3d at 528 ("A defendant's entitlement to impartial jurors on the question of whether he committed the crime charged is entirely distinct from the question of whether the crime itself is one which arouses their moral passion. A defendant is not entitled to demand a jury impartial to the underlying crime itself.") (citing United States v. Johnson, 990 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 1993)).

Here, appellant has failed to show that the form given to potential jurors to inform them of the opportunity to donate their juror pay creates the kind of "direct connection" between the jurors and a party or witness that deprives a defendant of an impartial jury. Moreover, appellant does not indicate which jurors actually participated in the program or how their participation biased them against appellant.² Appellant has failed to show that the jury who heard his case was biased because of the provisions of section 61.003 and that section 61.003 was unconstitutional as applied in his situation. See Harvey, 123 S.W.3d at 631-33. Because appellant has failed to show that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to him, appellant has also failed to show that the statute is unconstitutional under all circumstances, and therefore unconstitutional on its face. See Santikos, 836 S.W.2d at 633. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled appellant's motion for new trial. We overrule appellant's first issue.

Motion to Suppress

In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence retrieved from his residence when the police made a warrantless entry into his residence and later obtained a search warrant to retrieve evidence identified during the initial warrantless search.

Standard of Review

We review the trial court's decision to deny appellant's motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (citing Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)). The trial court is the sole trier of fact at a suppression hearing and thus evaluates witnesses' testimony and credibility. Id.; Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). We must afford almost total deference to a trial court's finding of historical fact as long as the finding is supported by the record. Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 627 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). However we review de novo the trial court's application of the law of search and seizure to the facts of the case. Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005).

Warrantless Entry

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of individuals to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S Const. amend. IV. A warrantless search by police is presumptively unreasonable. Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980)). However, the warrant requirement may be set aside when the State shows that exigent circumstances existed at the time of the warrantless search. Id. The State bears the burden to prove that such exigent circumstances existed through a two-step process. Id. First, the police must have probable cause to enter or search a specific location. Id. In this context, probable cause exists "when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that the instrumentality . . . or evidence of a crime will be found." Id. (quoting Estada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 609 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005)). Second, the exigent circumstance must require the police to make an immediate warrantless entry to a particular place. Id. Our jurisprudence recognizes three exigent circumstances that justify an immediate warrantless entry by police officers. Id. The first exigent circumstance is when the police must provide assistance to persons whom the police reasonably believe are in need of assistance. Id. The second exigent circumstance is when the police need to protect themselves from persons whom the police reasonably believe to be present, armed, and dangerous. Id. The third exigent circumstance is when the police attempt to prevent destruction of evidence or contraband. Id. Here, the trial court found that the police could enter appellant's residence without a search warrant because of exigent circumstances. Specifically, the trial court found:

9. The police heard banging and crashing in the house and feeling Juanita was in immediate danger entered the house but neither the Defendant, nor Juanita were located.

10. Almost simultaneously with the entry into the house, the police hearing noise coming from the premises of 5320 P½, looked under the house to make sure the Defendant was not breaking through the floor to escape and saw Juanita Gonzalez' body laying [ sic] in plain view. She was dead.

The trial court's findings of exigency are supported by the record. The complainant had last been seen alive in the company of appellant. Vargas had filed a missing person's report that highlighted the violent personal relationship between the complainant and appellant. The police were investigating the complainant's disappearance at the time of the search based on information given by Vargas. The complainant already had been missing for at least one day prior to the search. The police also had a report that there was a suspected arson attempt at the home the complainant shared with her sister on the day after the complainant's disappearance. The police officers on the scene perceived loud noises in appellant's residence after announcing themselves to appellant. Detective McCullor testified that appellant looked at the police through his window and then disappeared into the residence. At that point, the police heard a loud noise and then entered the house. These facts would give a person of reasonable prudence probable cause to believe that the complainant was in need of emergency assistance. See Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 685. Appellant argues, however, that the police officers used the exigency as pretext to conduct a "general exploratory search." See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1154 (1987). Appellant argues that the police were aware that the complainant was already dead because the complainant's body was in plain view under appellant's residence and thus they knew that the complainant was no longer in need of assistance. Detective McCullor testified at the pre-trial hearing that the police were unaware that the complainant's body was under appellant's residence until either immediately prior to or during the initial warrantless entry. McCullor testified that, after he announced his presence, he heard "rustling" inside appellant's residence "like maybe something was being moved." He testified that the noises made him concerned for the complainant's safety. McCullor also testified at the pre-trial hearing that he and appellant "looked eye to eye" through the window adjacent to the door and that appellant then escaped into the residence out of McCullor's line of vision. He again announced his presence and told appellant to open the door for the police officers on the scene. When appellant did not comply, McCullor testified that he "kicked [appellant's] door in" and entered the residence. After a sweep of the house, no one was located in appellant's residence. McCullor testified that the complainant's body was observable from the street view of appellant's residence but that he never noticed the body underneath appellant's residence during the period just prior to the warrantless entry. Officer Gonzales, a member of the police identification team, also testified at the pre-trial hearing that the body was easily observable underneath appellant's residence. However, Detective McCullor testified that the identification team was called out to the scene at approximately 3:00 p.m., after appellant had been arrested and the body had been discovered, and Officer Gonzales testified that he arrived on the scene at approximately 3:30 p.m. This Court must give almost total deference to the trial court's finding of fact based on the trial court's evaluation of witness testimony and credibility as long as the finding is supported by the record. Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281; Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 627. The trial court apparently resolved any fact issue by finding that the police were unaware that the complainant was already dead when the police made their warrantless entry into appellant's residence.http://webmail.aol.com/common/empty.htm The trial court made a conclusion of law that the police acted under an exigent circumstance after hearing banging and crashing in the house and believing that the complainant was in need of immediate police aid and assistance. We agree. We conclude that the State satisfied the first prong of the exigent circumstances test. See Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 686. Therefore, the State has overcome the Fourth Amendment presumption that a warrantless search is unreasonable.

Warrantless Search of the Complainant's Body

The State has also satisfied the two-pronged "plain view" test when the complainant's body was searched before the police obtained a search warrant. Walter, 28 S.W.3d at 541. The plain view doctrine is more than a mere exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738-39, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1541(1983)). Because the article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy. Id. To satisfy the requirements of a plain view analysis of obtained evidence, the police must meet two requirements. Id. First, the police must have a right to be in the location where the article is in plain view. Id. Second, the article found in plain view is evidence which leads the police to have the immediately apparent belief that the article may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. Id. (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2306 (1990)). Here, the trial court made a finding of fact that the police were engaged in an investigation regarding the complainant's disappearance. Because we must give wide deference to the trial court's finding of fact, we must rely on this finding because it is supported by the record. Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 627. The State satisfies the first prong of the plain view test because the police were engaged in a normal investigation and had a right to enter appellant's yard and front steps to complete their investigation. Walter, 28 S.W.3d at 541. It is undisputed that the complainant's body was in plain view from in front of appellant's residence. Because the complainant's body found under appellant's residence was compelling evidence of a crime, the State satisfies the second prong of the plain view test. Walter, 28 S.W.3d at 541. But the State did not need to rely on the Walter test to satisfy the plain view requirements. Because the police had an exigent circumstance, the police could have seized any evidence of a crime found in plain view during their emergency assistance. Laney v State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 862 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Such evidence encompasses the complainant's body and any contraband found during the exigent circumstance. Id. Therefore, appellant has failed to show that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We overrule appellant's second issue.

Legal Sufficiency

In his third issue, appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial is legally insufficient to support his conviction for murder.

Standard of Review

To review the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and then determine whether a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320-21, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2790 (1979); King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).

Analysis

A person commits murder when he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b) (Vernon 2003). A jury may make an inference of guilt from a defendant's flight from police. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Evidence of a defendant's presence at the crime scene may also support an inference that the defendant is culpable in the crime. Id. at 779. Motive is never an element of a crime; however, motive may support an inference of guilt. Id. at 781. The State presented evidence that the police found the complainant's body, together with appellant's work radio, underneath appellant's residence. The State also presented evidence that appellant had a cartridge on his person consistent with the type of bullet that caused the complainant's death. Joe Lopez, the complainant's supervisor at the Galveston County Daily News, testified that appellant accompanied the complainant on her paper route in the hours just prior to her disappearance. The State produced a videotape that showed appellant and complainant together in the hours just prior to the complainant's disappearance at a U.S. Coast Guard facility in a vehicle owned by the complainant. The complainant's sister, Vargas, testified about the violent relationship between appellant and the complainant. Vargas also testified that the house she shared with the complainant was set on fire in a suspected arson in the day following the complainant's disappearance. Detective McCullor testified that appellant fled into his neighbor's adjoining unit when police announced their presence and asked to speak with him. The State further showed that appellant climbed under his neighbor's bed and refused to comply with police commands to surrender. This evidence is legally sufficient to show that appellant caused the complainant's death. See Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 779. We overrule appellant's third issue.

Factual Sufficiency

In his fourth issue, appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial is factually insufficient to support his conviction for murder.

Standard of Review

Factual sufficiency analysis involves three basic ground rules. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 704 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). First, we must recognize that a jury has already passed on the facts and we must accord the jury the proper deference to avoid substituting our judgment for that of the jury. Id. at 704-05 (citing Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)). Second, when we find the facts determined by the jury to be insufficient to affirm a conviction, we must clearly lay out and explain how the evidence supporting the verdict is too weak on its own, or how contradicting evidence greatly outweighs evidence supporting the verdict. Id. at 705. Finally, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light when conducting this review. Id. We may only set aside a verdict when the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak as to render the verdict clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Id. (citing Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)).

Analysis

Appellant argues that the surveillance video taken at the Coast Guard facility did not identify appellant as one of the figures in the video. Appellant argues that Vargas and appellant's wife, Sheila Graves, failed to identify appellant as the figure in the surveillance video. Sheila Graves testified under direct examination that appellant was not the figure in the video. However, the State presented direct testimony from Vargas that positively identified appellant as the figure in the video. Because this Court must give almost complete deference to the jury's evaluation of the credibility of witness testimony, we defer to the jury's apparent decision to find that Vargas' testimony was more credible than Sheila Graves' testimony. Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 704-05. Appellant also argues that medical testimony that the complainant had been beaten, sexually assaulted, strangled and then fatally shot was inconsistent with the actions recorded on the surveillance video presented by the State. The State presented the testimony of Galveston County Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Stephen Pustilnik, who testified that the complainant died from a combination of strangulation and multiple gunshot wounds. Dr. Pustilnik further testified that the complainant received three gunshot wounds, with one fatal gunshot wound to the complainant's forehead. The State also presented expert testimony from Calvin Story, a ballistics expert from the Texas Department of Public Safety. Story testified that he examined the bullets extracted from the complainant's body, the cartridge taken from appellant at the time of his arrest and a cartridge found at the Coast Guard facility several days after the complainant's death. Story testified that all of the cartridges were consistent with the .25-caliber automatic bullet found in the complainant's body. The State presented the Coast Guard surveillance video along with the testimony of Coast Guard Chief Petty Officer Dennis James. James testified that he was responsible for security and surveillance around the Coast Guard facility in Galveston, Texas. On both direct and cross examination, James explained that the camera only recorded images of objects that make motion directly in front of the camera and then moves off those objects to complete a preprogrammed scan. Appellant argues that the video does not show that appellant battered, sexually assaulted, stabbed or shot the complainant. In fact, the video only shows images of appellant, the complainant, and the vehicle used by appellant. The record does not reflect that appellant committed any violent offenses on the surveillance video. However, the State used this evidence merely to show the date and time that appellant and complainant were seen together in appellant's vehicle during the hours prior to her disappearance. The State produced significant evidence to show that the complainant's body was found underneath appellant's residence, appellant had a cartridge in his pocket consistent with the type of bullet that caused the complainant's death, appellant had a violent relationship with the complainant and the complainant died from multiple gunshot wounds and strangulation. While none of this evidence was recorded on video, the jury apparently resolved any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the State. We must give due deference to the jury since the jury has already passed on these facts Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 704-05. Appellant next argues that the surveillance video time line is inconsistent with the time of death given by the State's expert, Dr. Pustilnik. Dr. Pustilnik testified that the complainant could have been dead at least 24 hours and up to 48 hours prior to the discovery of the complainant's body on October 10, 2005 at approximately 3:00 p.m. The video shows images of appellant, the complainant, and the vehicle appellant used. The record does not reflect that appellant committed any violent acts against the complainant while on camera. The jury apparently resolved the fact questions such that the time of death could have included the hours after the recording up until 24 hours prior to the discovery of the complainant's body under appellant's residence. We must give due deference to the jury since the jury has already passed on these facts. Id. This Court must give proper deference to the jury's decision such that we may not overturn a jury's verdict unless the evidence is so weak as to make the verdict clearly wrong or manifest unjust. Id. Given the amount and extent of the evidence presented to the jury, we cannot conclude that the verdict is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. We overrule appellant's fourth issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.