Graves v. R.M. Packer Company, Inc.

11 Citing cases

  1. Vascular Solu. v. Marine Polymer

    590 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2009)   Cited 7 times
    Pointing out that Massachusetts jurisprudence has not analyzed proof of special damages in commercial disparagement cases, but has followed Restatement with regard to other aspects of tort

    MPT's main claim is that VSI failed to provide a particular form of proof of "special damages" — namely, lost sales to specific named customers as opposed to expert evidence and general data from which aggregate loss of sales might be inferred. In most fields of tort law, a plaintiff having established wrongdoing may prove damages in any reasonable way, e.g., Graves v. R.M. Packer Co., 45 Mass.App.Ct. 760, 702 N.E.2d 21, 28 (1998) (stating that the damages evidence need only "afford a 'basis for a reasonable judgment'" (quoting Linkage Corp. v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 425 Mass. 1, 679 N.E.2d 191, 210 n. 38 (1997))); but for peculiar reasons, probably more historical than prudential, a number of jurisdictions following the Restatement (Second) of Torts require in product disparagement cases proof of specific lost sales to identifiable customers unless it is infeasible to provide such proof. The phrase "special damages" — common in defamation law — means nothing more than actual damages (as opposed to damages — e.g., to reputation — that are presumed for certain libelous statements), Peckham v. Holman, 28 Mass. (1 Pick.) 484, 486 (1831); the Restatement, followed in a number of jurisdictions, goes even further — in certain but not all cases — by demanding proof of specific lost sales.

  2. Saint-Gobain Indus. Ceramics Inc. v. Wellons

    246 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2001)   Cited 20 times
    Noting that ch. 93A "does not contemplate an overly precise standard of ethical or moral behavior"

    Wellons maintains that Deerskin requires a separate finding by the trier of fact only where the date of breach or demand is actually in dispute or otherwise ambiguous. Cf. Karen Constr. Co., 484 N.E.2d at 1012-14 (pre- Deerskin case referring to "alleged date of breach" in dispute involving owner's refusal to pay builder balance on several installments of contract; concluding that date of breach had not been established at trial and awarding prejudgment interest from date complaint was filed); Graves v. R.M. Packer Co. 45 Mass.App. Ct. 760, 702 N.E.2d 21, 29 (1998) (post- Deerskin case where there was no admission as to the date of breach of oral contract to repair and maintain underground storage tank; upholding award of prejudgment interest from date of commencement of the action). In Deerskin, the SJC established a bright-line rule mandating an award of prejudgment interest under the statute from the date of commencement of the action where "the demand of breach or demand is not established."

  3. Hermida v. Archstone

    950 F. Supp. 2d 298 (D. Mass. 2013)   Cited 21 times
    Finding administrative or clerical tasks such as organizing, distributing, or copying documents may not be billed at a lawyer's own rate even if the lawyer performs the tasks

    Wolf v. Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 367 Mass. 293, 300, 327 N.E.2d 885 (1975) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975)); see also Meaney v. OneBeacon Ins. Grp., LLC, No. 07–1294–BLS2, 2009 WL 884613, at *7–9 (Mass.Super.Ct. Feb. 25, 2009) (Neel, J.) (holding that a timely and effective offer to an individual claimant “will not serve to moot all claims brought ... on behalf of the putative class”). “The award belongs to the plaintiffs, not the attorneys.” Maston v. Poirier, 81 Mass.App.Ct. 1131, No. 11–P–358, 2012 WL 1398619, at *2 (Mass.App.Ct. Apr. 24, 2012) (“Regardless of the fee arrangements between the attorneys and the plaintiffs, having prevailed on their [Chapter] 93A claims, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover an award of reasonable attorneys' fees.”); Graves v. R.M. Packer Co., 45 Mass.App.Ct. 760, 771, 702 N.E.2d 21 (1998) (“The award of fees under [Chapter] 93A belongs to the prevailing party, not the attorney.”). The courts have not, however, clearly defined whether attorneys' fees awarded under Chapter 93A, Section 9 belong to the individual petitioner or to the class.

  4. B.C. Produce, Inc. v. Don's Wholesale Produce, Inc.

    550 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D. Me. 2008)

    It does not directly, however, address the question of whether a plaintiff, who retained an attorney on a contingent fee basis, may collect a statutory attorney's fee, once he prevails, under section eleven. More direct authority is found in Graves v. R.M. Packer Co., 702 N.E.2d 21, 23, 28-29 (Mass.App.Ct. 1998), where the appeals court upheld a ruling which conditioned an award of attorney's fees under section eleven on the abrogation of a contingent fee agreement. See also Siegel v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 288, 293 (Mass.App.Ct. 2005) ("Regardless of the arrangements Carole had with her attorney, as the prevailing party in a c. 93A case, she was entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee for the work done to vindicate her rights under the statute.").

  5. Ciardi v. Hoffman-La Roche

    No. 99-11936-GAO (D. Mass. Feb. 7, 2000)

    The two cases relied on by the defendants do not help them. Graves v. R.M. Packer Co., Inc., 702 N E.2d 21 (Mass.App.Ct. 1998) held that an "award of fees under c. 93A belongs to the prevailing party, not the attorney." Id. at 29.

  6. Graves v. R.M. Packer Company, Inc.

    428 Mass. 1112 (Mass. 1999)

    January 25, 1999Further appellate review denied: Reported below: 45 Mass. App. Ct. 760 (1998).

  7. New Eng. Precision Grinding, Inc. v. Simply Surgical, LLC

    89 Mass. App. Ct. 176 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016)   Cited 2 times

    We think the judge properly applied the statutory interest rate as of the date of commencement of the Simply Surgical's counterclaim. See Graves v. R.M. Packer Co., 45 Mass.App.Ct. 760, 771, 702 N.E.2d 21 (1998). 3.

  8. Siegel v. Berkshire Life Insurance Company

    64 Mass. App. Ct. 698 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 40 times
    In Siegel, the attorney's fees and expenses were incurred in defense of unfair and deceptive acts of creditors in attempting to obtain ownership of the plaintiff's life insurance policy.

    Regardless of the arrangements Carole had with her attorney, as the prevailing party in a c. 93A case, she was entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee for the work done to vindicate her rights under the statute. See Graves v. R.M. Packer Co., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 760, 771 (1998). The award of fees under the statute belongs to the prevailing party, not the attorney, while the extent of the party's obligation to pay his or her attorney is defined by the agreement between them.

  9. Commerce Bank Trust Company v. Hayeck

    46 Mass. App. Ct. 687 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 45 times
    Finding the notes were integrated documents because documents were unambiguous and apparently complete

    Continuing: when the first note fell due, and a renewal was necessary, the judge found that Gennaro, the loan officer, by negligent misrepresentations "fraudulently induced" Hayeck to sign the second note. See Graves v. R.M. Packer Co., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 760, 767 n.12 (1998), and cases cited therein. The judge found that Gennaro "assured Hayeck that the bank was [emphasis in original] holding the $65,000 in a separate NENMCO account from which the note would be repaid."

  10. NEWLY WED FOODS v. SUPR. NUT CO

    No. 05-0454E (Mass. Cmmw. Feb. 18, 2010)

    Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co. v. Checkers, Inc., 754 F.2d 10, 18 (1st. Cir. 1985); see also Massachusetts Employers Ins. Exch. v. PropacMass, Inc., 420 Mass. 39, 43 (1995); Community Builders, Inc. v. Indian Motocycle Assocs., Inc., 44 Mass.App.Ct. 537, 559 (1998). However, a case involving a breach of contract may establish unfair or deceptive conduct where the circumstances indicate that the defendant: (1) violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see Cherick Distribs. v. Polar Corp., 41 Mass.App.Ct. 125, 128 (1996); (2) made fraudulent misrepresentations, see Graves v. R.M. Packer Co., 45 Mass.App.Ct. 760, 768 (1998); or used the breach as leverage to gain an economic advantage or other concession, see Clamp-All Corp. v. Foresta, 53 Mass.App.Ct. 795, 812-13 (2002), and cases cited. Similarly, whether a breach of warranty qualifies as an unfair or deceptive act or practices depends on whether the circumstances demonstrate more than a simple breach of warranty.