Opinion
Opinion No. 25291.
Heard February 21, 2001.
Filed May 14, 2001.
Appeal From Marion County, Hicks B. Harwell, Circuit Court Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDEDBrenda Reddix-Smalls and Eleazer R. Carter, of Reddix-Smalls Carter Law Firm, of Columbia, for appellant.
Timothy H. Pogue, of Marion, for respondents.
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS OPINION WAS WITHDRAWN. FOR SUBSTITUTED OPINION, SEE 346 S.C. 472, 552 S.E.2d 709.]
This is an appeal from an appellate decision of the circuit court, upholding a ruling of the Marion County Council regarding the salary of appellant Levone Graves, a Marion County magistrate. We reverse.
FACTS
In 1982, Marion County entered into an agreement with the City of Mullins to provide a county magistrate to serve as a municipal judge for the city, to hold municipal court at least once a week. The agreement provided that the city would pay the county a monthly fee, adjustable from time to time, of $416.68 for these services. The agreement further provided, "It is suggested that the County may wish to compensate the magistrate and secretary for the extra work load imposed by the additional duties to the extent of $333.34 for Magistrate monthly and $83.34 for secretarial assistance monthly." On October 7, 1982, then Chief Justice Lewis signed an order acknowledging the agreement and ordering
commencing October 1, 1982, any magistrate in Marion County may be assigned to service as the municipal judge for the municipality of Mullins. . . .
The magistrate assigned to serve as municipal judge shall retain the powers, duties and jurisdiction conferred upon magistrates. The magistrate shall not be compensated for his service by the municipality.
The Chief Justice's order does not explicitly approve the agreement between the county and city, nor address whether the county may separately compensate the magistrate for his municipal duties.
In 1990, Judge Graves was appointed a full-time magistrate for Marion County and was assigned to serve as municipal judge for the City of Mullins. Judge Graves received his salary in the form of a single bi-weekly check from Marion County. On March 16, 1998, the City of Mullins terminated its agreement with Marion County. The county subsequently reduced Judge Graves' salary by some $9,000, from $32,353 annually to approximately $23,000 annually.
The Marion County Council conducted a hearing on Judge Graves' Petition for Magisterial Base Salary and Retroactive Compensation. Judge Graves argued the county's reduction of his salary violated S.C. Code Ann. § 22-8-40(I) (1976) which provided: "A magistrate who is receiving a salary greater than provided for his position under the provisions of this chapter must not be reduced in salary during his tenure in office. Tenure in office continues at the expiration of a term if the incumbent magistrate is reappointed." The council determined the county had not unlawfully reduced Judge Graves' salary because the salary "provided for his position under the provisions of this chapter" had not been reduced. Rather, the amount reduced was a stipend Judge Graves received for his service as municipal judge for the City of Mullins. Judge Graves appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the county council's decision. This appeal follows.
Due to a recent amendment, subsection 22-8-40(I) is now subsection (J). The subsection was also amended to address annual increases. This amendment does not affect the issue before the Court.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The standard of review in this case is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2000). The fact finder in this case was the county council, which heard the case pursuant to its authority under S.C. Code Ann. § 22-8-50 (1976). Section 22-8-50 authorizes the county council to hear cases of magistrates aggrieved by the county's action concerning compensation, subject to judicial review under § 1-23-380. Under § 1-23-380, the appellate court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact" and
may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(6) (Supp. 2000).
We reverse because the county council's factual determinations are affected by error of law and result in a statutory violation. Moreover, the circuit court, in affirming the county council's decision, misapplied the law.
II. § 22-8-40(I)
Judge Graves argues the circuit court erred in ruling that the county did not violate § 22-8-40(I) when it reduced his salary during his tenure as magistrate. We agree.
The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Gilstrap v. South Carolina Budget and Control Bd., 310 S.C. 210, 423 S.E.2d 101 (1992). This Court cannot construe a statute without regard to its plain and ordinary meaning, and may not resort to subtle or forced construction in an attempt to limit or expand a statute's meaning. Cox v. County of Florence, 337 S.C. 340, 347 n. 10, 523 S.E.2d 776, 780 n. 10 (1999). Nor may the Court engraft extra requirements to legislation which is clear on its face. Id.
In Cox, we addressed § 22-8-40(D) , which provided "[p]art time magistrates are entitled to a proportionate percentage of the salary provided for full-time magistrates." We held that part-time magistrates were entitled to a proportional percentage of the salary actually paid to full-time magistrates, rather than a percentage of the minimum base salary, as argued by the county. We reasoned the county's interpretation would require the Court to engraft additional terms onto the statute. 337 S.C. at 347 n. 10, 523 S.E.2d at 780 n. 10.
Now S.C. Code Ann. § 22-8-40(F) (Supp. 2000).
There are two ways of viewing this situation. If Judge Graves was a full-time magistrate, whose duties to the county included serving as municipal judge for the City of Mullins, then the county violated § 22-8-40(I) by reducing Judge Graves' salary simply because his duties changed. If, however, Judge Graves held two jobs, one as county magistrate and one as municipal judge, then terminating Judge Graves' position as municipal judge, along with his salary for that position, would not violate § 22-8-40(I) because § 22-8-40(I) would be inapplicable to the municipal salary.
The county council found Judge Graves held two distinct jobs, for which he was separately compensated; thus, eliminating Judge Graves' municipal salary did not reduce his magistrate's salary in violation of § 22-8-40(I). In support of this finding, the county cites "the procedures mandated by the South Carolina Supreme Court" and Judge Graves' payment agreements showing separate sums for county and city work. Specifically, the county council found "[t]he payment agreements for the last three fiscal years show the amount [Judge Graves] was being compensated by the County and by the City of Mullins." (emphasis added). The county council further noted that when the city terminated its contract with the county, "the stipend which [Judge Graves] was receiving from the City of Mullins was done away with." (emphasis added).
Although there is evidence to support the county council's finding, we reject it because, if correct, it would place the county and city in direct violation of the Chief Justice's order. The Chief Justice ordered that
[A]ny magistrate in Marion County may be assigned to service as the municipal judge for the municipality of Mullins. . . . The magistrate assigned to serve as municipal judge shall retain the powers, duties and jurisdiction conferred upon magistrates. The magistrate shall not be compensated for his service by the municipality.
(emphasis added). As we read the Chief Justice's order, serving as municipal judge was to be a duty assigned to a Marion County magistrate. Moreover, the order explicitly forbids the city to compensate the magistrate. Finding Judge Graves worked two jobs for which he was separately compensated would allow the county to circumvent the Chief Justice's order prohibiting the city to compensate the magistrate.
Under the standard of review provided in § 1-23-380(6), we need not accept the county council's factual determination because it is affected by error of law. We find that serving as municipal judge was one of Judge Graves' duties as magistrate. There are abundant facts in the record to support our finding. Judge Graves was at all times employed by the county, he was not a party to the agreement between the county and the city, he received one paycheck from the county, and he testified his work hours have not decreased since his municipal duties ended. Moreover, even if the county could lawfully serve as a conduit for Judge Graves to receive a stipend from the city, the county's failure to provide the requested accounting calls into question any such finding. We conclude Judge Graves was at all times employed by and compensated by the county, and the Chief Justice's order expressly forbade any other arrangement.
In response to Judge Graves' request for an accounting, the county provided a comparison between the minimum salary required by state law and what the county paid Judge Graves. This was not responsive to Judge Graves' request for an accounting. Significantly, it does not show how much money the county received from the city and how that money was allocated. Furthermore, it does not show how the money appropriated for magistrate's salaries in fiscal year 1998-99 was spent. The county's contract with the city terminated in March of 1998 and Judge Graves' salary was reduced, but the county's line item for magistrates' salaries the ensuing fiscal year was not reduced.
Having found that serving as municipal judge was one of Judge Graves' duties as a full-time magistrate for Marion County, it is clear the county violated § 22-8-40(I) when it reduced Judge Graves' salary. The statute is plain on its face and contains no exceptions.
The county argues that the situation presented here is highly analogous to the statutory supplement provided to chief magistrates, which ends when the extra duties end. See § 22-8-40(F). However, the statutory supplement is distinguishable, in part because it is contained in the very same statute as the prohibition on reducing a magistrate's salary, and the two provisions can be read harmoniously.
Now S.C. Code Ann. § 22-8-40(G) (Supp. 2000).
We reject the county's argument that appointment to chief magistrate constitutes a new tenure in office. Such an interpretation would leave the chief magistrate vulnerable to salary reductions, both at the beginning and end of his term as chief. Moreover, the case cited by the county is distinguishable in that it concerned appointment to the federal Court of Appeals after service on the District Court bench, unquestionably two separate offices. See O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939).
This Court has previously refused to permit a county to avoid paying appropriate compensation to a magistrate through hyper-technical division of a magistrate's duties. In Ramsey v. County of McCormick, 306 S.C. 393, 412 S.E.2d 408 (1991), the county paid Judge Ramsey $5,200 as a part-time magistrate, the $1,500 statutory supplement for her duties as chief magistrate, and $8,500 for her full-time secretarial duties. We held Judge Ramsey was entitled to a full-time chief magistrate's $17,000 salary and $3,000 supplement. We reasoned that because a magistrate's judicial function, by statutory definition, includes time spent performing ministerial duties, Judge Ramsey was "in substance, performing the duties of full-time Chief Magistrate." Id. at 398, 412 S.E.2d at 411. Therefore, the county could not avoid paying her a full-time chief magistrate's salary by classifying her as a part-time magistrate and full-time secretary.
S.C. Code Ann. § 22-8-20 (1976).
We are mindful of the potential for salary inequity which may result from this opinion. However, the record does not reveal the salaries of other magistrates in Marion County, so we have no basis for determining whether any inequity does in fact exist in this case. Moreover, § 22-8-40(I) contemplates salary inequities resulting from grandfathering higher salaries than those provided by statute. Despite the possibility of such disparities, we cannot escape the plain language of § 22-8-40(I). The county paid Judge Graves a higher salary than it was required by law to pay, and it may not now reduce his salary because it has changed his duties.
The county shall pay Judge Graves the difference in the salary he received and the salary to which he was entitled from the time of his last full paycheck until July 1, 2000, the effective date of the Magistrate's Court Reform Act of 2000, when Judge Graves' salary was substantially increased to $40,823.64.
In light of our disposition of the statutory question, we need not address Judge Graves' constitutional arguments, which are in any case unpreserved. However, given the result on appeal, we remand for consideration of Judge Graves' petition for attorneys fees.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TOAL, C.J., and PLEICONES, J., concur. MOORE, J., and Acting Justice George T. Gregory, Jr., dissenting in a separate opinion.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion. I do not believe the county council's factual determinations were affected by error of law or resulted in a statutory violation when the council found the reduction of Judge Graves' salary had not violated S.C. Code Ann. § 22-8-40 (I) (1976). I further disagree with the conclusion that the county council's finding, that Judge Graves held two distinct jobs for which he was separately compensated, would place the county and city in direct violation of the order of Chief Justice Lewis. The order stated
[A]ny magistrate in Marion County may be assigned to service as the municipal judge for the municipality of Mullins. . . . The magistrate assigned to serve as municipal judge shall retain the powers, duties and jurisdiction conferred upon magistrates. The magistrate shall not be compensated for his service by the municipality.
(emphasis added).
The majority concludes that if the county was allowing Judge Graves to work two jobs for which he was separately compensated, then this would allow the county to circumvent the Chief Justice's order, which prohibited the city from compensating the magistrate. However, the plain language of the Chief Justice's order states that the magistrate cannot be compensated for his service by the municipality. The order does not prevent the county from compensating the magistrate for his job of serving the municipality for the county's benefit. Cf. Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 533 S.E.2d 578 (2000) (the canon of statutory construction "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" or "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius" holds that "to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of another, or of the alternative.")
I also disagree with the conclusion that the county violated section 22-8-40 (I). Section 22-8-40 (I) (1976) provided:
A magistrate who is receiving a salary greater than provided for his position under the provisions of this chapter must not be reduced in salary during his tenure in office. Tenure in office continues at the expiration of a term if the incumbent magistrate is reappointed.
I agree with the county council's finding that the county had not unlawfully reduced Judge Graves' salary because the salary "provided for his position under the provisions of this chapter" had not been reduced. I believe the word "position" in the statute clearly means the position of magistrate, which would not affect the magistrate's position as municipal judge. See Lester v. South Carolina Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 334 S.C. 557, 514 S.E.2d 751 (1999) (if a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for employing rules of statutory interpretation and the Court has no right to look for or impose another meaning).
Prior to the reduction, Judge Graves was receiving two salaries for two jobs encompassed by one paycheck. When the municipal job ended, the county properly eliminated the amount of his payment that represented the amount he was being compensated for his municipal job. The county did not reduce the salary that represented his position of magistrate. It is clear that the statute acts to prevent the county from reducing a magistrate's salary; however, it does not prevent the county from eliminating the portion of the magistrate's payment that represents his job as a municipal judge.
This finding is supported by Judge Graves' payment agreements for the three fiscal years prior to the elimination of his municipal job, which show separate sums for county and city work.
Accordingly, I believe the county did not violate section 22-8-40 (I) by reducing Judge Graves' salary after his job of municipal judge was eliminated.
Gregory, A.J., concurs.