Opinion
Civil Action AP-15-03 AP-15-04
09-21-2015
BARBARA B. GRAUSTEIN, Trustee of Fryeburg Trust, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF FRYEBURG PLANNING BOARD and THE TRUSTEES OF FRYEBURG ACADEMY, Defendants.
ORDER ON M.R. CIV. P. 80B APPEAL
ROBERT W. CLIFFORD, ACTIVE RETIRED JUSTICE.
Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, Barbara B. Graustein, Trustee of the Fryeburg Trust brings this appeal from two decisions of the Town of Fryeburg Planning Board permitting Fryeburg Academy to change uses at two properties in which the Academy holds a leasehold interest.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
The Academy holds a leasehold interest with an option to purchase two parcels of land situated in the Town of Fryeburg. The first parcel is identified on the Town of Fryeburg tax maps at Map 42, Lot 61 ("the House Lot") and the second at Map 9, Lot 5 ("the Land Lot"). The House Lot is situated in the Village Residential District. The Land Lot is located in the Rural Residential District. According to the Planning Board decision, the Academy proposes to use the House Lot for administrative offices and storage, and the Land Lot as an outdoor education classroom for environmental science, conservation study, agricultural study, physical education, and recreation, with storage for those activities. The House Lot was previously used for residential purposes and the Land Lot for agricultural purposes.
The Trust appeals two Planning Board decisions AP-15-03 challenges the land use authorization permit issued for the House Lot and AP-15-04 concerns the Land Lot.
B. Procedural History
In October 2014, the Academy applied to the Planning Board seeking land use authorization permits to change the uses of both Lots to school uses. The Planning Board heard the applications at a public hearing held on November 13, 2014. The Planning Board concluded both proposed uses met the school use definition under Section 5.B.5.1 of the Fryeburg Land Use Ordinance and issued the permits. The Trust appealed to the Town of Fryeburg Zoning Board of Appeals, which affirmed the Planning Board's finding that the proposed uses constituted school uses.
The Planning Board decision is the operative decision under review.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Rule SOB Standard of Review
Government agency decisions appealed pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. SOB are reviewed for errors of law, abuse of discretion, and findings not supported by substantial evidence. Aydelott v. City of Portland, 2010 ME 25, ¶ 10, 990 A.2d 1024. The party appealing has the burden to show the municipal decision must be reversed based upon an error of law, an abuse of discretion, or findings not supported in the record. Id. The court reviews the municipality's ordinance interpretation de novo, and first looks "to the plain meaning of its language to give effect to the legislative intent, and if the meaning ... is clear, [does] not look beyond the words themselves." Wister v. Town of Mount Desert, 2009 ME 66, ¶ 17, 974 A.2d 903.
Although "[w]hether a proposed use falls within the terms of a zoning ordinance is a question of law, " Underwood v. City of Presque Isle, 1998 ME 166, ¶ 9, 715 A.2d 148, the ultimate characterization of a proposed use is ordinarily reviewed as a finding of fact. Jordan v. City of Ellsworth, 2003 ME 82, ¶ 8, 828 A.2d 768 (citations omitted). The municipal decision-maker's finding of fact will be overturned only if inadequately supported by record evidence. Id.
B. Standing
In a footnote, the Academy argues that the Trust lacks standing to challenge the permit issued for the House Lot. The Academy admits the Trust appeared before the Planning Board and participated as an abutter, but argues the Trust has nonetheless failed to demonstrate a sufficiently particularized injury as to the House Lot. Because the Trust made a prima facie showing of standing below and the Academy raises the standing issue for the first tune on appeal to this court, the Academy has the burden to present evidence that the Trust lacks standing to challenge the House Lot permit. See Wister, 2009 ME 66, ¶¶ 13-14, 974 A.2d 903. This the Academy has failed to do, and in light of the prima facie showing made below, the Trust has standing.
C. Whether the Proposed Uses Were Properly Characterized as School Uses
1. This Appeal Presents a Mixed Question of Law and Fact
The Trust primarily argues that whether the proposed uses meet the definition of a "school" use is a pure question of law and contends the Planning Board committed legal error in concluding the proposed uses fell within the definition. The Academy responds that the Planning Board's decision is based on factual findings and must be affirmed so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. The Planning Board's decision presents a mixed question of law and fact because the Ordinance definition of "school" is a legal question, but the ultimate characterization of the uses proposed on the House Lot and Land Lot are factual findings. Compare Underwood, 1998 ME 166, ¶ 9, 715 A.2d 148, with Jordan, 2003 ME 82, ¶ 8, 828 A.2d 768.
2. Whether the Planning Board Properly Decided the Proposed Uses Constituted School Uses.
A private secondary school use requires a permit from the Planning Board in the Village Residential District as well as the Rural Residential District. Fryeburg, Me., Land Use Ordinance § 5.B.5.1 (June 2014). The Ordinance defines a "School, Public or Private Elementary or Secondary" as "[a] place where courses of study which are sufficient to qualify attendance as compliance with State compulsory education requirements for grades Kindergarten through 12 are taught." Ordinance § 25-17.
The Academy proposed to use the Land Lot as an outdoor classroom to study environmental science, conservation, agriculture, and would occasionally use the upstairs of a barn structure on the parcel as a classroom. The House Lot will be used for administrative offices, specifically Admissions and Alumni Relations, and to store school equipment and materials. The Planning Board concluded these uses qualified as secondary school uses under Section 5.B.5.1 of the Ordinance, were allowable in their respective zoning districts, and issued the permits.
The proposed use for the Land Lot to teach outdoor (and some indoor) classes certainly meets the "school" definition set forth in the Ordinance because the lot will be used as a "place where courses of study . . . are taught." Ordinance § 25-17. The House Lot use, however, is more attenuated because the proposed uses for administrative offices and storage uses do not clearly fit within the Ordinance's school definition. The Academy argues that "integral" or "essential" administrative support for a secondary school qualifies, by extension, as a school use relying on several cases.
In Underwood v. City of Presque Isle, the school district obtained a permit to construct a building to be used for storing farm equipment and supplies as well as processing and marketing related to an agricultural educational program for elementary, middle, high school, and vocational students. 1998 ME 166, ¶ 3, 715 A-2d 148. The municipal ordinance allowed "schools and institutions of an educational nature"' in the residential zone, provided they obtained permits. The ordinance did not define "schools and institutions of an educational nature." Id. The Law Court set forth several broad dictionary definitions of "school" including "an institution or place for instruction or education." Id. ¶ 10. "Education" was further defined as "[a]quisition of all knowledge tending to train and develop the individual." Id. The Court concluded the proposed marketing and storage uses at the building were "subordinate to and an integral part of the predominant educational goals of the vocational training program." Id. ¶ 11. The Court found the Board did not err in determining the proposed use qualified as a use within the broad meaning of "schools and institutions of an educational nature." Id.
The Academy also relies on Jolovitz v. Waterville et al., in which the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Studstrup, J.) stated the school district's athletic fields "were an integral part of the school and therefore a permitted principal use" hi the residential zones. AP-01-82, 2003 Me. Super. LEXIS 272, *10 (Aug. 26, 2003). The court affirmed the Zoning Board's decision that die athletic fields were still a permissible "school" use that required no additional zoning approval. The court did not define "school use, " but construed the term broadly to encompass "integral" parts of the school, which included athletic fields.
That the Ordinance defines "school" distinguishes the present case from the cases above- In Underwood, the Law Court resorted to dictionary definitions to construe "school or institution of an educational nature" because the Ordinance did not define the term. 1998 ME 166, ¶ 10, 715 A.2d 148. The Court concluded the Town did not en" in finding the proposed uses qualified under broad dictionary definitions. To treat administrative support offices and storage as "school" uses here would require similarly defining "school" broadly as an institution rather than a physical location. The Ordinance forecloses such a broad construction because it defines a school as a "A place where courses of study . . . are taught." Ordinance § 25-17 (emphasis added). This definition does not regulate schools as whole entities or institutions, but as places, which makes the actual use activity that occurs on the land critical. The Ordinance at issue defines "school" and the Planning Board was obligated to apply the unambiguous language of that definition. Wister, 2009 ME 66, ¶ 17, 974 A.2d 903; see also Adams v. Town of Brunswick, 2010 ME 7, ¶ 25, 987 A.2d 502 (enunciating more deferential standard of review of municipal construction of undefined terms in an ordinance).
The proposed uses of the House Lot do not meet the Ordinance's narrow definition of "school." See Ordinance § 25-17. No classes will be taught at the House Lot. Instead, the Academy intends to use the House Lot for the admissions and alumni relations offices and for storage. The Planning Board did not make any additional findings of fact to substantiate the manner hi which these uses constituted school uses, aside from the connection with the Academy. The proposed use will plainly not be a "place where courses of study ... are taught" and the affiliation with the Academy does not transform the use into a "school use." Permissible uses of land are determined by reference to the proposed use, not the owner. This rule applies to schools. See Town of Castine v. Me. Mar. Acad., 2009 Me. Super. LEXIS 11, *2 (Me. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 2009), aff'd, Mem-09-158 (September 22, 2009) ("[U]se of the property as a residence does not become a post-secondary school use simply because the Academy owns it.").
The court is mindful that memoranda of decisions issued by die Law Court do not establish precedent. M.R. App. P. 12(c). The court nonetheless finds the case persuasive for the rule that land use applications must be evaluated on the substance of the proposal, not the party seeking zoning relief.
Because the uses proposed for the House Lot are not "school uses" within the plain language of the Ordinance, the Planning Board's decision must be vacated. To permit the proposed uses for die House Lot, the Town must either amend the ordinance to define "school" more broadly to encompass core administrative functions associated with a school, or permit the use under another section of the Ordinance. The issuance of the permit as a "school use" as currently defined was legal error.
For example, the proposed use may qualify as an "omitted use, " defined by the Ordinance as "a proposed use not specifically mentioned or covered by any general category in the enumeration of permitted and prohibited uses for each district." Ordinance § 5.D. Omitted uses are subject to approval by the Planning Board.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Trust's Rule SOB appeal must be granted as to the House Lot (AP-15-03), and that land use authorization permit vacated. The Rule SOB appeal must be denied as to the Land Lot (AP-15-04).
The entry will be:
The Plaintiffs' Rule SOB appeal is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. The Planning Board decision granting the land use authorization permit for the House Lot (AP-15-03) is VACATED. The Planning Board decision granting the permit for the Land Lot (AP-15-04) is AFFIRMED.