Thus, “ ‘[o]nly when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.’ ” Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 (2009) (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 741, 753, 607 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2005)).

`The abuse-of-discretion standard [also] includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions. `" Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 (2009) (quoting Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 260, 661 S.E.2d 415, 445 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, AME was served with the Kiritsises' complaint on May 24, 2006.

"Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred." Minh Duy Du, 292 Va. at 564 (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009)). It necessarily follows that "the abuse of discretion standard requires a reviewing court to show enough deference to a primary decisionmaker's judgment that the court does not reverse merely because it would have come to a different result in the first instance." Lawlor, 285 Va. at 212 (quoting Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 2008)).

Id. (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009)). "A trial court . . . 'by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.'"

Rather, we consider only whether the record fairly supports the trial court's action." Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009) (quoting Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 385 (1997)); see also

Id. (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth , 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634 (2009) ). "[T]he power to stay [a] proceeding[ ] is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control ... its docket," taking into account "economy of time and effort for itself, ... counsel, and ... litigants."

"Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred." Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564 (2016) (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009)). "A trial court has 'wide latitude' to make sentencing decisions such as the ordering of restitution, because '[t]he determination of sentencing lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Sigler v. Commonwealth, 61 Va.App. 674, 678 (2013) (alteration in original) (first quoting Deal v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 157, 160 (1992); and then quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 733, 735 (2007)). Code § 19.2-303 provides that, "[a]fter conviction, . . . the court may . . . suspend the sentence in whole or part and in addition may place the defendant on probation under such conditions as the court shall determine."

Rather, we consider only whether the record fairly supports the trial court's action.'" Carter v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 537, 543 (2017) (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009)). We "will not disturb a trial court's decision to admit [or exclude] evidence absent a finding of abuse of . . . discretion."

Instead, "we consider only whether the record fairly supports the trial court's action." Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 (2009) (quoting Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 385, 484 S.E.2d 898, 906 (1997)). Thus, a reviewing court can only conclude that an abuse of discretion has occurred in cases where "reasonable jurists could not differ" about the correct result.

"Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred." Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 (2009) (quoting in parenthetical Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 753, 607 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2005)).