Judge Bellows accurately characterized the prevailing law in his memorandum decision, and it is clear that his refusal to recuse himself was not an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 (2009) (stating that a review for abuse of discretion “includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions,” and finding no abuse of discretion where the trial judge's decision reflected proper application of governing legal principles). Prieto offered no evidence or even allegation of extrajudicial influence that would suggest bias.

Id. (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009)).

Rather, [this Court] consider[s] only whether the record fairly supports the trial court’s action.’" Carter v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 537, 543, 800 S.E.2d 498 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634 (2009)). [7–10] "The abuse-of-discretion standard [also] includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions."

Dang, 287 Va. at 146, 752 S.E.2d 885 (quoting Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., 282 Va. 346, 352, 717 S.E.2d 134 (2011) ). We can find an abuse of discretion has occurred only when "reasonable jurists could not differ" as to the proper result. Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634 (2009) (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 753, 607 S.E.2d 738, adopted upon reh'g en banc, 45 Va. App. 811, 613 S.E.2d 870 (2005) ). While we cannot substitute our judgment for the trial court's, the abuse of discretion standard requires us to determine "whether the record fairly supports the trial court's action."

“ ‘Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.’ ” Landeck v. Commonwealth, 59 Va.App. 744, 751, 722 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2012) (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 (2009)). 2.

“Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 (2009) (quoting in parenthetical Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 741, 753, 607 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2005)). That standard of review is applicable to decisions of trial courts as to the admissibility of evidence.

On appeal, we do not review there decisions de novo but rather under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. 'Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.' Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 (2009) ...On appeal, Allen does not claim the trial court abused its discretion in finding good cause for the joint trial.

Rather, we consider only whether the record fairly supports [that] action.’ " Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634 (2009) (quoting Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 385, 484 S.E.2d 898 (1997)). [12] Expert testimony must address issues beyond the "common experience of the jury."

will not permit a litigant to engage in gamesmanship by refusing to cooperate with the other party's expert while tendering evidence from their own expert. See, e.g. , Muhammad v. Commonwealth , 269 Va. 451, 507, 611 S.E.2d 537 (2005) (upholding the trial court's exclusion of the defendant's expert mitigation evidence on the basis that the defendant waived his right to present such evidence by refusing to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert); Grattan v. Commonwealth , 278 Va. 602, 620-21, 685 S.E.2d 634 (2009) (no abuse of discretion in barring a defendant from introducing evidence from his own insanity expert when he had refused to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert). In addition, the legislature has expressed a clear policy of excluding evidence in sexually violent predator proceedings when a respondent refuses to cooperate.

“ ‘Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.’ ” Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 (2009) (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 741, 753, 607 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2005) ). Under this standard, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Detective Fortunato's disputed testimony, as it plainly constituted inadmissible hearsay.