Opinion
HHDCV166072801S
08-16-2017
Charles Grasso v. Town of Enfield et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO STRIKE #102.00
Nawaz M. Wahla, J.
Defendants, Town of Enfield and Steven Belinda have moved to strike Plaintiff, Charles Grasso's count one through four and count six against Belinda of the amended complaint dated December 7, 2016. The defendants contend that the plaintiff's claims of breach of implied contract and promissory estoppel against the Town and Belinda are legally insufficient as these quasi-contract claims, which are impermissible in municipal settings. The motion to strike is granted for the reasons that follow.
1. Legal Principles
This court agrees with Judge Povodator, as he noted that. In lieu of a recitation of well-established standards for evaluation of a motion to strike, the court will focus on the principles more directly applicable here. See Todd Collins v. Town of Greenwich, No. CV166028449, 2016 WL 797535, at * (Conn.Super.Ct. December 14, 2016).
1. In the context of motion to strike, the court is required to accept as true all factual assertions of the nonmoving party; the court further is required to give the plaintiff, as the nonmoving party, the benefit of all reasonable/favorable inferences.
2. As something of corollary, in determining the merits of a motion to strike, the court is not concerned with the actual existence of facts that might prove the claims, but rather whether there might be facts/evidence that could establish the validity of the claims, i.e. that standard is whether the claim is potentially provable rather than actually provable.
3. The Town and Belinda, the named defendants in these counts (breach of contract and promissory estoppel) claim that the doctrine set forth in Fennell v. City of Hartford, 238 Conn. 809, 681 A.2d 934 (1996), serves as a bar to each of these counts.
4. A motion to strike, tests the legal sufficiency on an entire count or cause of action; it is not intended to test the sufficiency of individual " specifications" of liability.
2. Discussion
In its motion to strike, the defendants cite numerous cases, including appellate level cases, specifically, Fennell and its progeny. Defendants emphasis that they have not moved to strike the plaintiff's breach of contract or breach of oral contract claims, but instead moved to strike plaintiff's implied contract claims as invalid against the municipalities. Defendants argue that as far as the plaintiff's arguments about authority and subsequent ratification are concerned, these are irrelevant because the subject of the defendants' motion to strike does not address the actual existence of the contract, rather defendants' contend that Fennell and its progeny, as a matter of law preclude from bringing implied contract and promissory estoppel in a municipal settings.
3. The Fennell Doctrine
In Singhaviroj v. Town of Fairfield, Judicial District of Fairfield, Dkt. No. CV 05 4007480 S, (2011 WL 1176163), Judge Dooly addressed and elaborated the Fennell doctrine substantively and extensively. This court adopts the said reasoning and analytical framework.
In Fennell v. City of Hartford, 238 Conn. 809, 681 A.2d 934 (1996), the Supreme Court held that absent actual authority as set out in the Town Charter, contractual promises made by the town employees are void as a matter of law. Fennell involved a claim by former police officers that their pension benefits should have been calculated based upon a sum that included accrued sick leave, which was paid out upon retirement. The basis of their claim was language contained within a benefits manual created and provided by the police commission.
The court first discussed the parameters of municipal contract law.
It has been well established that a city's charter is the fountainhead of Municipal powers . . . The charter serves as an enabling act, creating power and prescribing the form in which it must be exercised . . . Agent of city, including its commissions, have no source of authority beyond the charter . . . In construing a city's charter, the rules of statutory construction generally apply . . . Id. at 813, quoting Stamford Ridgeway Assoc. v. Board of Representatives, 214 Conn. 407, 423, 572 A.2d 951 (1990) . . . the officer, body, board duly authorized must act on behalf of the municipality, otherwise a valid contract cannot be created. Generally the power to make contracts on behalf of the municipality rests in the council or governing body . . . Generally, no officer or board, other than the common council, has power to bind the municipal corporation by contract, unless duly empowered by statute, the charter, or authority conferred by the common council, where the later may so delegate its powers . . . It follows that agents of a city, including its commissions, have no source of authority beyond the charter. Their powers are measured and limited by the express language in which authority is given or by the implications necessary to enable them to perform some duty cast upon them by express language. (Internal citations omitted) Fennell, 238 Conn. at 813-14, 681 A.2d 934.
The court, finding that the Hartford Charter did not delegate the determination of pension benefits to the commission which had created the manual on which the officers relied, held that the commission could not bind the municipality.
[A]ll who contract with municipal corporation are charged with notice of the extent of the powers of municipal officers and agents with who they contract, and hence it follows that if the . . . had in fact no power to bind the municipality, there is no liability on the expresses contract. Fennell v. Hartford, supra, 238 Conn. at 813-14, 681 A.2d 934 (citation omitted, emphasis added).
The court also set forth the substantial policy considerations which informed the court's decision.
Courts have consistently refused to give effect to government-fostered expectations that, had they arisen in private sector, might well have formed the basis for a contract or an estoppel . . .
We believe implied contract claims in the public sector, based upon pension or employee manuals, would only invite endless litigation over both real and imagined claims of misinformation by disgruntled citizens [and employees], imposing an unpredictable drain on the public fisc . . . Absent a clear legislative indication, we are loathe to attribute an intent to the legislature to draw down the public fisc in favor of those with no substantive entitlement thereto. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Fennell v. Hartford, supra, 238 Conn. at 816, 681 A.2d 934.
After Fennell, it appears clear that a municipality cannot be contractually bound by representation made by its agents unless the agent had actual authority to make the representation pursuant to the General Statutes, the municipal charter or another valid delegation of authority.
Since Fennell was decided, both the Appellate and Superior courts have applied the Fennell doctrine to bar a variety of claims brought against municipalities. In Biello v. Watertown, 109 Conn.App. 572, 953 A.2d 656, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 934, 958 A.2d 1244 (2008), the Appellate Court, is affirming the trial court, determined that an employee's claim of implied contract for specified wages was barred under Fennell . See also, Ferrucci v. Middlebury, 49 Conn. L. Rptr. 767, (May 3, 2010) Cronan, J.) (Fennell doctrine precluded cause of action where plaintiff, a police officer claimed that an implied contract created benefits when he received a letter from the finance director of the municipality as well as its actuarial contractor, because neither the finance director nor the actuarial had authority to confer benefits), Flaherty v. Naugatuck, judicial district of Waterbury, Dkt. No. CV 05 4004005, (Gormely, J.T.R.) (October 9, 2007) (Former fore chief's claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and promissory estoppel barred by Fennell doctrine.) Padula v. Weston Board of Education, Judicial District of Ansonia Milford, at Milford, Dkt. No. CV 06 40144625, (June 9, 2009) (Bellis, J.) (Court held that a claim of implied contract by plaintiff, a former grounds supervisor for the Weston Board of Education, was barred by Fennell doctrine); Kenny v. Town of Orange, 51 Conn.Supp. 506, 512, 11 A.3d 744 (2011) affirmed per curiam, 126 Conn.App. 351, 12 A.3d 1008 (2011). (Although the case was determined based upon other reasoning, the court noted that to the extent that plaintiff was claiming an implied contract or estoppel based upon his receipt of a letter regarding the start date of his pension benefits, such communications " ordinarily cannot bind the town" under Fennell) . The doctrine applies to the promissory estoppel claims as well. Vollemans v. Town of Wallingford, judicial district of New Haven, Dkt. No. CV 03 0283760, (June 26, 2007) Taylor, J.).
Applying this legal framework and principles to the present case, the court is compelled to find that there is no evidence put forth that Belinda had direct or delegated authority to enter into express or implied contracts on behalf of the Town. As such, any express or implied contracts entered into or suggested by his statements do not bind the Town and are void as a matter of law. Similarly, the claims of promissory estoppel are barred. See Buttner v. Town of W. Hartford, Judicial District of Hartford, Dkt. No. CV 06 5002982, (June 12, 2008) (Miller, J.) (motion for summary judgment granted where plaintiff provided no evidence that the defendant's pension and benefits manager had the authority to bind the Town); Ferrucci v. Middlebury, supra, 49 Conn. L. Rptr. 767, (after defendant established the applicability of Fennell, summary judgment was granted where plaintiff failed to demonstrate that town actors had authority to bind the municipality).
Additionally, in the present case the defendants' principal argument in terms of motion to strike is premised purely on the legal issue, rather than factual. The defendants point out and court agrees that the cases plaintiff relies upon either pre-date Fennell and/or distinguishable from the case at bar.
4. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants motion to strike is granted.