Opinion
No. ED 80880
June 24, 2003
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Warren County, Honorable John C. Brackmann.
Irene Karns, 3402 Buttonwood, Columbia, Missouri, 65201-3724, for appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, 221 West High Street, P.O. Box 899, Greg A. Perry, Jefferson City, MO, 65102, for respondent.
Appellant, Lloyd Grass, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion for unconditional release from the custody of the Missouri Department of Mental Health. We affirm.
Our review of this case is guided by the principles enunciated inMurphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo.banc 1976). We will affirm the decision of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, or unless it erroneously declares or applies the law. Id. at 32. The appellate court accepts as true the evidence and inferences favorable to the judgment and disregards contrary evidence, mindful that the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is a matter for the trial court, which is free to believe none, part, or all of any witness's testimony. Morris v. National Refractories Minerals, 21 S.W.3d 866, 868 (Mo.App.E.D. 2000). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. Thurmond v. Director of Revenue, 759 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Mo.App.E.D. 1988). The trial court is accorded discretion even if there is evidence in the record that would support a different result. Id.
The record reveals that in October 1992, Grass murdered his wife, stabbing her to death because he thought she was Satan. In September 1994, he was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Section 552.030 RSMo 2000. He was committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health (DMH) and delivered to Fulton State Hospital. After several months in Fulton's maximum security unit, he was transferred to a less restrictive environment at St. Louis State Hospital in March 1995. In December 1995, the trial court granted Grass a conditional release. This court reversed that court's judgment in Grass v. Nixon, 926 S.W.2d 67 (Mo.App.E.D. 1996). In August 1996, he escaped from confinement. In January 1997, he was captured in New York City and eventually returned to Missouri. He was convicted of escape from confinement and sentenced to five years' imprisonment in the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections. His conviction was affirmed.State v. Grass, 14 S.W.3d 656 (Mo.App.E.D. 2000). In March 2000, he was paroled, but refused it because he did not want to return to the custody of the DMH. In March 2001, he was paroled back to the custody of the DMH and placed in Fulton's maximum security unit. Grass applied to the circuit court for unconditional or conditional release. In December 2001, a hearing was held on Grass's motion for unconditional release. The trial court denied the motion. Grass appeals from that judgment.
In his first point, Grass contends that the judgment of the trial court was against the weight of the evidence because he proved by clear and convincing evidence that he was not dangerous due to mental illness at the time of the evidentiary hearing. Section 552.040.7 RSMo 2000 establishes the standard in Missouri for unconditional release and requires that the person seeking unconditional release "prove by clear and convincing evidence that . . . [he] does not have, and in the reasonable future is not likely to have, a mental disease or defect rendering [him] dangerous to the safety of himself or others." (Emphasis added).
Here, Dr. Richard Gowdy, a clinical psychologist with the DMH, testified for the State. He evaluated Grass for the purpose of unconditional release. He testified that Grass suffered from a psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified. His diagnosis was based on observations of Grass in October 1992 and the fact that in November 1993 and in July 1994 symptoms such as auditory hallucinations and delusional beliefs were still present. He stated that although Grass presently exhibited no active or observable signs of psychosis, the disorder could return. He also said that because he could not trust what Grass said, it was necessary to look at his behavior to determine his actual mental condition. He specifically pointed to Grass's lack of insight into his mental condition and his resistance to treatment, both of which could make it difficult for Grass to recognize the signs and symptoms of his mental disorder if they re-emerged. He stated that Grass's underlying mental disorder still existed, but could not say whether the symptoms were in full or partial remission because of Grass's lack of cooperation as well as his guardedness with his therapists. He opined that Grass's psychotic symptoms could return. In addition, he could not say within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Grass was not likely to be a danger to others if he were released. Dr. Gowdy's testimony established not only that Grass had a mental disease rendering him dangerous to himself or others, but also that the mental illness was likely to return once he was no longer supervised by the DMH.
Grass claims that the testimony of his witness, Dr. Jerome Peters, a psychiatrist with the DMH, supports his unconditional release. Dr. Peters evaluated Grass after the murder in 1992 and again in June 2001 for his transfer from Fulton to St. Louis State Hospital. He testified that Grass only suffered from a brief reactive psychosis. Although Dr. Peters did not agree with Dr. Gowdy's assessment of Grass's mental condition, he did agree that if the symptoms of a psychotic disorder in a patient extended beyond one month, the illness would not be diagnosed as a brief reactive psychosis but would be diagnosed as psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified. Thus, to some extent, Dr. Peters's testimony supported that of Dr. Gowdy, who reported that Grass was experiencing auditory hallucinations and delusional beliefs in 1993 and 1994. To the extent that there was a conflict in the evidence regarding Grass's mental condition, the trial court was free to weigh all of the evidence and to accept or reject any part of it. Grass did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he did not have, and in the reasonable future was not likely to have , a mental illness rendering him a danger to others. Grass's first point is denied.
In his second point, Grass claims that the trial court erred in failing to make the specific finding that he suffered from a mental illness, because he specifically requested findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 73.01(c). Grass points to the court's finding, "Whether [Grass] still has a mental disease or defect is a semantic issue. He will always be more susceptible to psychotic episodes." He argues that this finding does not satisfy Rule 73.01(c). He relies on the general proposition from State v. Halbrook, 18 S.W.3d 523, 525 (Mo.App.E.D. 2000) and State v. Revels, 13 S.W.3d 293, 286 (Mo.banc 2000) that there is no requirement that the hearing court make specific findings that an insanity acquitee is suffering from a mental disease or defect before denying an unconditional release, unless findings are requested in accordance with Rule 73.01(c).
We disagree that the court did not find that Grass suffered from a mental illness. The court's findings addressed the requisite statutory findings under section 552.040.7 and the findings regarding Grass's mental state were more extensive than the single finding recited by Grass. The court found in relevant part:
Briefly the court finds the following on the specific items mandated for consideration by 552.040(8)RSMo:
(1) Whether [Grass] still has a mental disease or defect is a semantic issue. He will always be more susceptible to psychotic episodes. . . .
[Grass] is in the state mental hospital because of an extremely violent act occurring while he was experiencing a psychotic episode. The psychosis has disappeared as mysteriously as it appeared.
Humans who have once experienced such a psychotic episode are statistically much more likely to have another episode than the population as a whole.
Treatment for Lloyd Grass includes a levels type group therapy in which the patient is to learn the warning signs of an oncoming episode. If the warnings are heeded the episode can be treated before a problem occurs.
Lloyd Grass refuses to participate in these sessions. His stated reason is that he does not need them because he is well.
Therefore Lloyd Grass is still a social menace. . . .
The court's findings sufficiently addressed the issue of whether Grass had, and in the reasonable future was likely to have , a mental illness rendering him a danger to others. The findings were adequate under Rule 73.01(a). Grass's second point is denied.
In his third point, Grass asserts that the trial court erred in denying his request to appoint an independent expert to evaluate him and to make a recommendation about his unconditional release from the custody of the DMH. He requested an independent mental examination at the same time he filed his petition for unconditional release. The State also requested a mental examination and later filed the evaluation of Dr. Gowdy. The court told Grass that it would not appoint a private psychiatrist, but would permit him to hire anyone he wished and offered to give him additional time to secure an independent evaluation.
Section 552.040.5 provides in pertinent part: "Prior to the hearing any of the parties, upon written application, shall be entitled to an examination of the committed person, by a psychiatrist or psychologist . . . or a physician . . . of its own choosing and at its expense. . . ." Contrary to Grass's assertion, State ex rel. Hoover v. Bloom, 461 S.W.2d 841 (Mo.banc 1971), did not mandate that because Grass was indigent, he had a right to an examination by an independent expert. Rather, a competent psychiatrist who is in a position to freely render his opinion based on his professional training is constitutionally adequate. Id. at 844. Absent a showing to the contrary, a psychiatrist who works for the State mental hospitals is assumed to be honest and competent. Id. In addition, the judge must be convinced that the expert can function in an independent capacity. Id.
Here, there was no showing the Dr. Gowdy was unable to function independently or that he was incompetent to testify. Dr. Gowdy's evaluation of Grass was sufficient to satisfy due process. In addition, Grass not only declined the court's offer to give him additional time to secure another psychiatric evaluation but also did not offer to pay for an independent evaluation. The court did not err in denying Grass's request for an independent evaluation at the State's expense. Grass's third point is denied.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Lawrence E. Mooney, C.J. and Sherri B. Sullivan, J.: Concur.