Opinion
No. CV07-4001628 S
September 7, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The petitioner, Anthony Grant, alleges in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which has not been amended, that he was the subject of an illegal arrest and received ineffective assistance of counsel. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim pertains only to counsel's purported failure to challenge the petitioner's illegal arrest. The respondent's return denies that the petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief, requests that the court dismiss the petition, and asserts res judicata as an affirmative defense.
The respondent subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment supported by a memorandum of law. The ground asserted by the respondent is that the petitioner's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The petitioner filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment and the parties appeared before the court on August 6, 2010, for a hearing on the motion and objection thereto. Entered into evidence were several transcripts of a motion to dismiss proceeding adjudicated in the underlying criminal case. Counsel for the petitioner was given one week to submit to the court any additional authority that supported the petitioner's argument. On August 13, 2010 counsel for petitioner filed a supplemental brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
For the reasons stated more fully below, the motion for summary judgment is denied. However, in accordance with Practice Book § 23-29(5), judgment of dismissal shall enter.
DISCUSSION
The standard this court must apply is well established. "[S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Such questions of law are subject to plenary appellate review." Pouncey v. Commissioner of Correction, 84 Conn.App. 734, 737, 854 A.2d 1129 (2004); Practice Book § 23-37. "`In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Connell v. Cowell, 214 Conn. 242, 246-47, 571 A.2d 116 (1990). A material fact is `[a] fact that is significant or essential to the issue or the matter at hand.' Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009); accord Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 757, 905 A.2d 623 (2006) (`[a] material fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case' [internal quotation marks omitted.])." Voris v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance, 297 Conn. 589, 601 (2010).
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleges that the petitioner's arrest was illegal and that the State of Connecticut violated the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (hereafter "the Act"). The petitioner also asserts that his right to due process was violated, as well as that his attorney provided ineffective assistance. The petition makes the following factual allegations, which the court must view in the light most favorable to the petitioner.
See General Statutes § 54-157 et seq.
The Connecticut State Police pursued a suspect, namely the petitioner, into the State of New York. A New York State Trooper apprehended the petitioner in New York. There was no warrant issued by the Governor of the State of Connecticut and the petitioner at no time was charged with any offenses by the State of New York. The petitioner acknowledges that the Connecticut State Police could give close chase or close pursuit into New York and arrest the petitioner in New York, but that the Act requires that he without delay be brought to a local court where the arrest occurred to determine if the arrest was illegal or not.
The respondent seeks summary judgment premised on the doctrine of res judicata. More specifically, the respondent argues that the petitioner previously litigated a motion to dismiss in the underlying court and should not be permitted to again litigate the claim that he was illegally arrested. On May 24, 2006, the court (Kavanewsky, J.) denied the motion to dismiss after concluding that the petitioner had affirmatively acceded to returning to Connecticut after fleeing to New York and being apprehended there. See Respondent's Exhibits A, B and C.
Summary judgment is warranted in habeas corpus proceedings if a petitioner seeks the same relief via the identical legal ground. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner of Correction, 122 Conn.App. 637, 641-42 (2010); "The doctrine of res judicata provides that a former judgment serves as an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving any claims relating to such cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made . . . The doctrine . . . applies to criminal as well as civil proceedings and to state habeas corpus proceedings . . . However, [u]nique policy considerations must be taken into account in applying the doctrine of res judicata to a constitutional claim raised by a habeas petitioner . . . Specifically, in the habeas context, in the interest of ensuring that no one is deprived of liberty in violation of his or her constitutional rights . . . the application of the doctrine of res judicata . . . [is limited] to claims that actually have been raised and litigated in an earlier proceeding . . . [A] second petition alleging the same ground as a previously denied petition will elude dismissal if it alleges grounds not actually litigated in the earlier petition and if it alleges new facts or proffers new evidence not reasonably available at the time of the earlier petition . . ." (Internal citation and quotation marks omitted.) Campbell v. Commissioner of Correction, 121 Conn.App. 576, 579 (2010).
The instant habeas corpus petition is, as far as the record before this court evidences, the petitioner's first habeas corpus challenge alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata, with its narrow construction in habeas corpus, is not applicable. Nor is the related doctrine of collateral estoppel applicable, as the petitioner assails his illegal arrest and alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to properly challenge the purported illegal arrest. It is the claimed ineffective assistance of counsel in particular, because it has never been adjudicated, that makes summary judgment entirely inappropriate. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the respondent's motion for summary judgment must be denied.
"`The common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, embodies a judicial policy in favor of judicial economy, the stability of former judgments and finality . . . Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that aspect of res judicata which prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties upon a different claim . . . For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment . . .
"An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise submitted for determination, and in fact determined . . . An issue is necessarily determined if, in the absence of a determination of the issue, the judgment could not have been validly rendered . . . If an issue has been determined, but the judgment is not dependent [on] the determination of the issue, the parties may relitigate the issue in a subsequent action.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lyon v. Jones, 291 Conn. 384, 406, 968 A.2d 416 (2009)." State v. Almedina, 119 Conn.App. 46, 51-52, 986 A.2d 1108, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 911, 989 A.2d 1074 (2010).
The court's conclusion that summary judgment is not warranted, however, does not end this court's analysis and authority to dispose of the petition. In accordance with Practice Book § 23-29(5), this court may, at any time and upon its own motion, dismiss the petition for any legally sufficient ground. Here, even if the court were to assume that counsel performed deficiently and the petitioner thereby has proven the first prong of Strickland v. Washington, CT Page 17612 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), as modified by Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), the petitioner cannot, as a matter of law prove that he was prejudiced thereby.
"`A habeas petitioner can prevail on a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [only if he can] establish both (1) deficient performance, and (2) actual prejudice . . . For ineffectiveness claims resulting from guilty verdicts, we apply the two-pronged standard set forth in Strickland . . . For ineffectiveness claims resulting from guilty pleas, we apply the standard set forth in Hill . . . which modified Strickland's prejudice prong . . . `To satisfy the performance prong, the petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . To satisfy the prejudice prong, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial . . . A reviewing court can find against a petitioner on either ground, whichever is easier.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Leatherwood v. Commissioner of Correction, 105 Conn.App. 644, 647, 938 A.2d 1285, cert. denied, 286 Conn. 908, 944 A.2d 979 (2008)." Williams v. Commissioner of Correction, 117 Conn.App. 510, 519-20 (2009).
"The relationship between an illegal arrest and a subsequent prosecution under federal constitutional law is well settled. In an unbroken line of cases dating back to 1886, the federal rule has been that an illegal arrest will not bar a subsequent prosecution or void a resulting conviction . . ." State v. Fleming, 198 Conn. 255, 259, 502 A.2d 886, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143, 106 S.Ct. 1797, 90 L.Ed.2d 342 (1986). "Where the fairness of a subsequent prosecution has not been impaired by an illegal arrest, neither the federal nor the Connecticut constitution requires dismissal of the charges or a voiding of the resulting conviction." Id., at pg. 263, citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952). See also State v. Patterson, 213 Conn. 708, 715-16, 570 A.2d 174 (1990) (recklessly made false statement in arrest warrant affidavit does not warrant dismissal of charges); State v. Mitchell, 200 Conn. 323, 332, 512 A.2d 140 (1986) ("any irregularities in the arrest procedure do not affect the subsequent jurisdiction of the court to hear the case"); Reed v. Reincke, 155 Conn. 591, 598, 236 A.2d 909 (1967) ("Arrest and detention are primarily for security purposes and not for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction"); State v. Laws, 36 Conn.App. 401, 411-12, 651 A.2d 273, (1994), cert. denied, 232 Conn. 921, 656 A.2d 671 (1995) (right to fair trial not compromised by admission of evidence stemming from the allegedly illegal arrest and seizure). Given this well-established body of law, a motion to dismiss based on the petitioner's allegedly illegal removal from New York and transport to Connecticut would be without any legal merit. Put another way, trial counsel's performance in pursuing such a motion could not be deficient because regardless of what arguments could have been made regarding the petitioner's arrest and transport, the court would have been required by well-settled law to deny the motion. For this reason, the petitioner could not have suffered any prejudice resulting from how counsel did or did not raise issues surrounding his arrest.
As noted earlier in the memorandum of decision, the court permitted counsel for the petitioner to file a supplemental brief, specifically with the proviso that such brief should identify any case supporting the petitioner's instant claim. Counsel for the petitioner was, not surprisingly, unable to discover and marshal any cases supporting the petitioner's claim.
Further weakening the petitioner's claim is that his convictions arise from guilty pleas. "A guilty plea is a waiver both of constitutional rights and of all nonjurisdictional defenses. CT Page 17613 Buckley v. Warden, 177 Conn. 538, 542, 418 A.2d 913 (1979); Consiglio v. Warden, 160 Conn. 151, 166, 276 A.2d 773 (1970)." Cajigas v. Warden, 179 Conn. 78, 81, 425 A.2d 571 (1979). An illegal arrest preceding a subsequent valid prosecution does not even rise, in the first instance, to the level of being an acknowledged constitutional or nonjurisdictional challenge. Even if the petitioner had such valid bases, which he does not, his guilty pleas operate as a waiver barring the present claim.
The court concludes, based upon the foregoing, that the petitioner cannot, as a matter of law, ever make the required showings of deficient performance and the resultant prejudice. Judgment shall enter dismissing the petition in accordance with Practice Book § 23-29(5). Counsel for the petitioner shall file a judgment file with the clerk within thirty days of the date of this decision.