Opinion
No. 1:00CV165-D-D
August 12, 2002
OPINION GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Presently before the court is the Defendants' motion to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be granted.
A. Factual Background
On April 4, 2000, the Columbus City Council voted to promote the Plaintiff Officers James Grant and Dan Laird to the rank of corporal and to promote the Plaintiff Officer Louis Alexander to the rank of sergeant within the Columbus Police Department. Three days later, Mayor George Wade vetoed the order passed by the City Council, stating that he was concerned that the procedure utilized in promoting the officers contravened the City's established policy regarding promotions.
Subsequent to Mayor Wade's veto of the promotions, a special Columbus City Council meeting was called for April 12, 2000, in order for the Council to discuss the April 4th promotions. During this meeting, a motion was made to rescind the April 4th promotions. The vote on this motion was three-three, with Mayor Wade casting the deciding vote in favor of rescission.
Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiffs appealed to the Columbus Civil Service Commission, asserting that they had promoted and subsequently demoted without cause or notice. The Commission held a hearing on April 25, 2000, and voted unanimously in favor of the Plaintiffs, stating that they had "acquired promoted positions" and that the promotions should be restored. The City appealed the Commission's decision to the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, which held that "the Civil Service Commission was without authority to issue an enforceable order" and that "the [Mayor's April 7, 2000] veto [of the promotions] was valid." In so ruling, the court vacated the Commission's decision to restore the Plaintiffs to their promoted positions.
The Plaintiffs appealed the circuit court's decision to the Mississippi Supreme Court, which recently affirmed the circuit court's ruling in an en banc decision. Grant v. City of Columbus, 812 So.2d 976 (Miss. 2002). In affirming the circuit court's decision, the Grant Court ruled that the Plaintiffs were "never effectively or permanently in the positions from which they claim to have been demoted," thus rendering the Plaintiffs without a constitutionally-cognizable property interest in the promotions. Grant, 812 So.2d at 980.
In the meantime, the Plaintiffs brought the case sub judice in this court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983 and 1985, claiming that the Defendants promoted the Plaintiffs and subsequently demoted them without due process, in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Defendants have now moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims or, alternatively, for summary judgment.
B. Summary Judgment Standard
Because matters outside the pleadings have been presented to the court in conjunction with this motion, the court shall treat the motion as one for summary judgment as provided for in Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to go beyond the pleadings and "by . . . affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. That burden is not discharged by mere allegations or denials. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
While all legitimate factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
C. Discussion
In order to establish a due process violation in the public employment context, the Plaintiffs must first show that they possess a legitimate property interest in the positions at issue, which in this case are the position of Corporal for the Plaintiffs Grant and Laird, and the position of Sergeant for the Plaintiff Alexander. State of Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 818 (5th Cir. 1998); see Spuler v. Pickar, 958 F.2d 103, 107 (5th Cir. 1992) (ruling that plaintiffs must establish existence of constitutionally-protected property interest in order to state claim for federal constitutional due process violation). The United States Supreme Court has held that courts are to refer to state law in order to determine if a plaintiff possesses a constitutionally-cognizable property interest in the subject employment or promotion. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976).
In referring to state law, the court finds that it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs did not possess a property interest in the subject promotions, because the Mississippi Supreme Court specifically considered the Plaintiffs' case and ruled en banc in favor of the City. See Grant, 812 So.2d at 980. In so ruling, the court found that the Columbus City Council's April 4, 2000, order promoting the Plaintiffs was vetoed in a timely manner by Mayor Wade, and that the Mayor's veto was not subsequently overridden by two-thirds vote of the City Council. Id. at 979. Hence, the court stated, "the action of the city council [promoting the Plaintiffs] never became effective." Id.
Indeed, the City Council buttressed the Mayor's veto by subsequently voting to rescind the April 4, 2000, promotions.
Thus, the court finds that the Plaintiffs never possessed a property interest in the promotions, and they therefore cannot establish a federal constitutional due process violation. Spuler, 958 F.2d at 157. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to this issue and the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Plaintiffs' claims.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that
(1) the Defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment (docket entry 29) is GRANTED;
(2) the Plaintiffs' claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
(3) this case is CLOSED.
All memoranda, depositions, declarations and other materials considered by the court in ruling on this motion are hereby incorporated into and made a part of the record in this action.