[32] Castle asserts that the evidence failed to establish that he was party to the crime of battery because, he says, "there was no evidence that [he] facilitated or encouraged the pistol-whipping performed by a third party." Castle is correct that "a person’s mere presence at the scene of the crime and mere approval of the criminal act are insufficient to establish that [he] was a party to the crime," Grant v. State, 298 Ga. 835, 837 (1), 785 S.E.2d 285 (2016), but there was evidence from which the jury could infer more than Castle’s mere presence or approval. Indeed, several witnesses testified that, when Norman fell to the ground after being pistol-whipped, Castle joined in attacking him, and that Castle shot Norman while he was lying on the ground after being beaten.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Strozier v. State, 277 Ga. 78, 79 (2) (586 S.E.2d 309) (2003). See also Grant v. State, 298 Ga. 835, 837 (1) (785 S.E.2d 285) (2016). And "criminal intent is a question for the jury."
Although proof of a shared criminal intent with the actual perpetrator is necessary to establish that one is a party to the crime, "shared criminal intent may be inferred from the person's conduct before, during, and after the crime." Grant v. State , 298 Ga. 835, 837 (1), 785 S.E.2d 285 (2016). That Burley participated in the crime is evident from the bloodstains on his clothes and the injuries he sustained on his hands and face during the lockdown.
While proof of shared criminal intent with the actual perpetrator of the alleged criminal act is necessary to be convicted as a party to a crime, such intent may be inferred from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the crime. See Grant v. State , 298 Ga. 835, 837 (1), 785 S.E.2d 285 (2016). The element of shared intent certainly may be inferred from the evidence presented in this case.
Under these circumstances, and because Hogans cross-examined Lewis with his prior inconsistent statements, the grant of a mistrial was not necessary to preserve Hogans’s right to a fair trial. See Grant v. State, 298 Ga. 835, 838 (2), 785 S.E.2d 285 (2016) ("[T]he denial of a mistrial constitutes reversible error only if it appears that a mistrial was required to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial."). (d) There was no error in failing to declare a mistrial when Lewis testified about alleged death threats he received as a result of his cooperation.
Indeed, it is not necessary for the State to prove motive to establish the crime of felony murder.” Grant v. State, 298 Ga. 835 , 836 (1) (785 SE2d 285 ) (2016). See also Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339 , 341 (1) (b) (745 SE2d 637 ) (2013)
On appeal, appellant argues that, because the agent testified that appellant was not under arrest in this case, the jury would have thought that he was wearing a prison jumpsuit because he was in jail for another offense and that the trial court therefore erred in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial. Pretermitting whether appellant properly preserved this issue for review, see Burrell v. State, 301 Ga. 21 , 26 (5) (799 SE2d 181 ) (2017) (explaining that “ ‘[a] motion for mistrial must be promptly made as soon as the party is aware of the matter giving rise to the motion’ ” and holding that the defendant’s motion for a mistrial was not preserved because it was not contemporaneously made (citation omitted)), we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion, see Grant v. State, 298 Ga. 835 , 838 (785 SE2d 285 ) (2016) (“Whether to declare a mistrial is a matter for the discretion of the trial court, and the denial of a mistrial constitutes reversible error only if it appears that a mistrial was required to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”). Here, the State’s theory of the case, for which it offered significant evidence, was that appellant was not in jail on the evening of March 29, but committed the crimes for which he was on trial that evening.
Messer v. State , 247 Ga. 316, 324 (6), 276 S.E.2d 15 (1981). See also Grant v. State , 298 Ga. 835 (2), 785 S.E.2d 285 (2016) (denial of a mistrial constitutes reversible error only if mistrial was required to preserve defendant's right to a fair trial); Brannan v. State , 275 Ga. 70 (12), 561 S.E.2d 414 (2002) (no abuse of discretion in declining to grant mistrial due to witness's display of emotion).Here, the trial court was walking the fine line of accommodating Green's right to be present at all critical stages of his trial, see, e.g., Sammons v. State , 279 Ga. 386, 387 (2), 612 S.E.2d 785 (2005), while also attempting to maintain orderly and fair proceedings in his courtroom.
To prove that Shepard was a party to the fatal shooting, the State had to prove that Shepard and the shooter shared a common criminal intent, and as we have explained, "such shared criminal intent may be inferred from the person's conduct before, during, and after the crime." Grant v. State, 298 Ga. 835, 837 (1), 785 S.E.2d 285 (2016) (citation omitted). In this case, one might reasonably infer from the evidence that Shepard shared a criminal intent with respect to the shooting, and we conclude that the evidence was more than sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Shepard was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted, either directly or as a party to the crime.
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, this Court applies the sufficiency of the evidence standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781. See Grant v. State, 298 Ga. 835, 836 (1), 785 S.E.2d 285 (2016). The evidence in this case, including evidence of Ghiden's pre-trial identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crimes, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges of which he was convicted.