See Seaman, 499 P.3d at 1030. See, e.g., Jeter v. State, 393 P.3d 438, 439 (Alaska App. 2017); Grant v. State, 379 P.3d 993, 994 (Alaska App. 2016).

Rather, criminal statutes should be given a reasonable or common-sense construction, consonant with the objectives of the legislature.Grant v. State, 379 P.3d 993, 995-96 (Alaska App. 2016), quoting State v. Jones, 750 P.2d 828, 831 (Alaska App. 1988).Grant, 379 P.3d at 996 ; Jones, 750 P.2d at 831 ; Belarde v. Anchorage, 634 P.2d 567, 568 (Alaska App. 1981).

Allen v. State, 853 So.2d 533, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("It does not offend double jeopardy principles to resentence a defendant to harsher terms when the original sentence was invalid, particularly when, as in the instant case, it is the defendant who brings his sentence into question"). Contrast Breest v. Helgemoe, 579 F.2d 95, 99-101 (1st Cir. 1978) (court had duty to correct statutorily invalid sentence even after petitioner began service and did not violate double jeopardy principles in doing so, though time for court to correct invalid sentence is subject to some temporal limit to prevent violation of due process); Grant v. State, 379 P.3d 993, 994 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016) (illegally lenient sentence not "meaningfully imposed," thus, upward modification to extent necessary to cure illegality not violative of double jeopardy); Waddell v. People, 2020 CO 39, ¶ 14, 462 P.3d 1100 ("Double [j]eopardy [c]lauses may function as a shield against multiple punishments, [but] they may never be used as a sword to enforce an illegal sentence"); People v. District Court, 673 P.2d 991, 997 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) ("Granting defendants a right to benefit from illegal sentences serves no sound public policy"); State v. Fry, 61 Haw. 226, 228-230, 602 P.2d 13 (1979) (court had duty to correct illegal sentence and impose original prison term even after seven-year delay and after defendant was released from prison because "[w]here the original punishment was invalid, as here, a correction which produces a valid sentence does not place the defendant in double jeopardy even if that correction increases his punishment"); State v. Calmes, 632 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Minn. 2001) (correc

The rule of lenity — i.e., the rule that an ambiguity in a criminal statute must be construed in the defendant's favor — "comes into play only when, after employing normal methods of statutory construction, the legislature’s intent cannot be ascertained or remains ambiguous." Grant v. State, 379 P.3d 993, 995 (Alaska App. 2016) (quoting De Nardo v. State, 819 P.2d 903, 907 (Alaska App. 1991)).Anthony, 329 P.3d at 1032; Ghosh, 400 P.3d at 154

But "this rule of lenity or strict construction comes into play only when, after employing normal methods of statutory construction, the legislature’s intent cannot be ascertained or remains ambiguous."Grant v. State, 379 P.3d 993, 995 (Alaska App. 2016).De Nardo v. State, 819 P.2d 903, 907 (Alaska App. 1991)

But "this rule of lenity or strict construction comes into play only when, after employing normal methods of statutory construction, the legislature's intent cannot be ascertained or remains ambiguous."Grant v. State , 379 P.3d 993, 995 (Alaska App. 2016).De Nardo v. State , 819 P.2d 903, 907 (Alaska App. 1991)

And as this Court has repeatedly held, if a sentence is unlawfully lenient, the double jeopardy clause does not bar a court from increasing the sentence to the minimum extent required to correct the illegality.Grant v. State, 379 P.3d 993, 994 (Alaska App. 2016), and the other six cases cited in footnote 3 of Grant. Under Alaska law, the State has a recognized right to seek appellate review of an illegal sentence (and to seek correction of that sentence) by filing a petition for review—i.e. , a request for discretionary review.