Grant v. State

5 Citing cases

  1. Brown v. State

    695 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 3 times

    Counsel explained that he did not serve the witness with a subpoena because the witness lacked the ability to come to court on his own while a prisoner in the county jail, and he saw no reason to do a meaningless act. All of these events — the signing of the production order, the release of the witness, and the date the witness was expected to testify — were within a three-day time period. See Grant v. State, 212 Ga. App. 565, 566-567 (1) (b) ( 442 SE2d 898) (1994); Brand, supra.See Johnson v. State, 177 Ga. 881, 883 ( 171 SE 699) (1933); see generally Grant, supra.

  2. Wilbanks v. State

    251 Ga. App. 248 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 29 times

    See id.Grant v. State, 212 Ga. App. 565, 566 (1) (a) ( 442 S.E.2d 898) (1994). 2.

  3. Kendrick v. State

    523 S.E.2d 414 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 4 times
    In Kendrick v. State, 240 Ga. App. 530, 532(2)(523 S.E.2d 414)(1999) (physical precedent only), we reiterated that "the ontrack system for drug detection is not (yet) sufficiently recognized as reliable and so is not admissible evidence without expert testimony supporting its verifiable certainty," although we affirmed the revocation on other grounds.

    " See Jordan v. State, 195 Ga. App. 405, 407 (2) ( 393 S.E.2d 461). "[I]t is an old and sound rule which excludes as incompetent any hearsay testimony relating statements attributed to an out-of-court declarant to the effect that the declarant, and not the accused, was the perpetrator of a crime." Lyon v. State, 22 Ga. 399); Grant v. State, 212 Ga. App. 565 (1), 566 (1, a) ( 442 S.E.2d 898). But that long-standing rule is not authority for the proposition that statements against penal interest by a party are not admissible under OCGA § 24-3-31. 3. The disciplinary report for alcohol infraction, Exhibit S- 2, recites:

  4. Adefenwa v. State

    471 S.E.2d 900 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 8 times

    "`Each of the requirements set forth in OCGA § 17-8-25 must be met before an appellate court may review the exercise of the trial court's discretion in denying a motion for continuance based upon the absence of a witness.' . . . Garrett v. State, 202 Ga. App. 463 ( 414 S.E.2d 693)." Grant v. State, 212 Ga. App. 565 (1) ( 442 S.E.2d 898). 3. Defendant's final two enumerations contend the trial court erred in overruling his motion for new trial on the special ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. He complains that trial counsel was ineffective "by not being prepared for the Motion for Funds to Hire an Expert Witness who was necessary in order to properly attack the use of the canine [and further by] not objecting to the jury array, which had a clear underrepresentation of [members of defendant's race]."

  5. State v. Grant

    457 S.E.2d 263 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 3 times
    In Grant, we held that because the defendant filed a timely demand for trial before the trial resulting in his conviction, and then appealed his conviction, which resulted in reversal, the State was required to retry him during the term in which the remittitur was filed or the following term, provided that juries were impaneled and qualified.

    ANDREWS, Judge. In Grant v. State, 212 Ga. App. 565 ( 442 S.E.2d 898) (1994), we reversed Grant's conviction and granted him a new trial on the basis that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a continuance of the trial because of the absence of a material witness. It is undisputed that, prior to the trial, Grant filed a timely demand for trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 requiring that the State try him within the two term limit of that statute, and that the original trial was held within the two term limit.