As to appellant's argument that it was error to charge that a witness may be impeached by proof of a prior felony conviction, that argument has been decided adversely to appellant. Grant v. State, 163 Ga. App. 775 ( 296 S.E.2d 110) (1982). 2.

Prather, supra. Favors complains that not one, but four previous convictions of six felonies were alleged and proven against him. Although listing a defendant's entire record on the facts of an indictment has been discouraged, see Biggers v. State, 162 Ga. App. 163, 165 (2) ( 290 S.E.2d 159) (1982), the state is not limited to alleging and proving only one prior felony conviction when proof of a felony conviction is an element of the crime charged. Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324, 326 (3) ( 316 S.E.2d 791) (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429 ( 322 S.E.2d 228) (1984); Sheffield v. State, 163 Ga. App. 533 ( 295 S.E.2d 336) (1982); Grant v. State, 163 Ga. App. 775 ( 296 S.E.2d 110) (1982). Refusal to limit the allegations and proof to one prior felony conviction was not reversible error.

When Wright started to open the cash drawer appellant drew a gun and robbed Wright of $75 cash, plus the value of the gasoline he had put in his car. Appellant was additionally charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, which required proof by the State that appellant had been convicted of a felony prior to the offenses charged here. Grant v. State, 163 Ga. App. 775, 776 ( 296 S.E.2d 110) (1982); Prather v. State, 247 Ga. 789, 790 (2) ( 279 S.E.2d 697) (1981). The State met this burden by introducing, without objection, certified copies of appellant's prior felony convictions, including his conviction for the armed robbery of Lewis. The certified copy of that conviction included the indictment, alleging that appellant unlawfully took $982 from Rosa Lewis by intimidation and by use of a knife.

"When jury instructions on these points are `clear, pertinent, legal and impartial,' as in this case, the granting of a new trial is inappropriate. [Cits.]" Grant v. State, 163 Ga. App. 775 ( 296 S.E.2d 110) (1982). 8. Likewise, while it would not have been error to charge as requested on reasonable doubt in the language of OCGA § 24-4-5, it was not necessary for this Code section to be quoted verbatim.

"[I]t may allege and prove as many as have in fact occurred . . ." Law v. State, 121 Ga. App. 106 (6), 109 ( 173 S.E.2d 98). Sheffield v. State, 163 Ga. App. 533 ( 295 S.E.2d 336), and Grant v. State, 163 Ga. App. 775 ( 296 S.E.2d 110), affirmed convictions under OCGA § 16-11-131 where respectively 7 and 2 prior felony convictions were admitted to establish convicted felon status. We find no error in admitting the three prior felony convictions.

One exception to this general rule, however, is the situation in which the words or conduct of the defendant are part of the res gestae of the offense with which the defendant is currently charged. Grant v. State, 163 Ga. App. 775 ( 296 S.E.2d 110) (1982); Jefferson v. State, 101 Ga. App. 308 ( 113 S.E.2d 500) (1960). A defendant's statements made during the commission of the charged offense which "present him in the light of contemplating future crimes or mentioning past ones . . . [may be] . . . so closely connected with the res gestae as to be admissible ( Hill v. State, 161 Ga. 188 ( 129 S.E. 647)), even though, as proof of other crimes, they tend to put the defendant's character in issue.