Opinion
No. 1-737 / 00-79.
Filed March 13, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Davis County, DANIEL B. WILSON, Judge.
The respondent appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review reversing the respondent's refusal to rescind the revocation of the petitioner's driving privileges pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.13(6) (Supp. 1999). REVERSED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, David A. Ferree, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Kerry Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Steven Garnder and Paul Zingg of Kiple, Kiple, Denefe, Beaver and Gardner, L.L.P., Ottumwa, for appellee.
Heard by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
The respondent appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review reversing its refusal to rescind the revocation of the petitioner's driving privileges pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.13(6) (Supp. 1999). The respondent claims the district court erred in determining that the enactment of section 321J.13(6), with an effective date of April 7, 1999, retroactively required the respondent to rescind the revocation. We reverse.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. In December 1996, Roger Grant was arrested for operating while intoxicated (OWI). Grant failed a chemical test, causing his license to be revoked pursuant to implied consent procedure. Grant commenced contested case proceedings within the Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT). The revocation was sustained throughout the administrative proceedings and was affirmed on judicial review.
While the administrative proceedings were pending, criminal proceedings on the OWI charge were prosecuted. The district court granted Grant's motion to suppress, and Grant filed with IDOT a request to rescind the revocation pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.13(4) (1997). IDOT denied the request because section 321J.13(4) was repealed prior to the entry of the suppression order. The district court reversed IDOT's refusal to sustain Grant's motion to rescind. The supreme court reversed, effectively reinstating the revocation.
On August 3, 1999, Grant filed a second petition to rescind the driver's license revocation, relying on newly enacted Iowa Code section 321J.13(6), which became effective April 7, 1999. Section 321J.13(6) again provides for rescission of a license revocation upon entry of a suppression order in a companion criminal case. IDOT denied Grant's request. On judicial review, the district court entered an order determining that the newly enacted legislation was remedial and that the statutory language indicated that the statute should be given retroactive effect. The district court reversed the action of IDOT and ordered rescission of the revocation. IDOT then filed a notice of appeal.
II. Scope of Review. Our review of a district court's decision on judicial review of an agency action is confined to whether the court correctly applied the law. Wieslander v. Iowa Dep't. of Transp., 596 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Iowa 1999). We also review questions of statutory interpretation for errors at law. Id. III. Analysis. The sole issue presented here for our review is whether Iowa Code section 321J.13(6) applies retroactively. We find it does not.
This court recently ruled in a similar case that section 321J.13(6) only applies prospectively. The case was not published and is not binding authority. The appellee in this case raises new issues and attempts to distinguish the prior decision. With the adoption of new Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.14(5) (formerly Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 14(e)), we anticipate parties will cite unpublished opinions. We cannot ignore these opinions in light of our duty to speak as a single court, although we sit in panels of three judges.
As a general rule, we presume all statutes apply only to actions that arise after the effective date of the statute, unless the statute is remedial or procedural. Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Iowa 2000). Where a statute is remedial or procedural, a three-part test is applied to determine whether the legislature intended retrospective or prospective application. Id.
First, we look to the language of the new legislation; second, we consider the evil to be remedied; and third, we consider whether there was any previously existing statute governing or limiting the mischief which the new legislation was intended to remedy.
Id. (citations omitted).
The district court found section 321J.13(6) was a remedial statute.
A remedial statute affords a private remedy to a person injured by a wrongful act, corrects an existing law or redresses an existing grievance, gives a party a mode of remedy for a wrong where none or a different remedy existed, or remedies defects in the common law and in civil jurisprudence generally.
Board of Trs v. City of West Des Moines, 587 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Iowa 1998). We find section 321J.13(6) gives a party a mode of remedy for a wrong where none existed and is therefore remedial. However, these types of remedial statutes are specifically excluded from the exception to the prospective application rule normally afforded to remedial and procedural statutes. See Davis v. Jones, 247 Iowa 1031, 1036, 78 N.W.2d 6, 8 (1956); Hiskey v. Maloney, 580 N.W.2d 797, 799 (Iowa 1998). Therefore, we presume section 321J.13(6) applies prospectively absent express language to the contrary. See Frideres v. Schlitz, 540 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Iowa 1995).
Section 321J.13(6) is devoid of any language stating it applies retroactively. Instead, the legislature called for the section to take effect upon enactment. 1999 Iowa Acts ch. 13, § 29(7). Therefore, we conclude section 321J.13(6) applies prospectively. The district court erred in rescinding the department's revocation of Grant's license.