Opinion
CA No. 3:98-CV-2204-R.
April 6, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before this Court is the DISD's and TASB's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed February 13, 2004). Plaintiff Ed Grant ("Grant" or "Plaintiff") failed to file an answer to Defendants' Motion, and Defendants Dallas Independent School District ("DISD") and Texas Association of School Boards ("TASB") (collectively "Defendants") filed a Notice of Default along with their Motion on February 13, 2004. With Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court has reviewed Defendants' Brief on Pendent Jurisdiction (filed October 6, 2003). For the reasons stated below and those enumerated in Defendants' Motion, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Grant's § 1983 and state law claims.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff originally filed suit against Defendants in state court in 1995, and the action was subsequently removed to federal court on September 17, 1998. On August 20, 1999, this Court granted a stay of court proceedings pending the resolution of Venable, et al. v. DISD, et al., Cause No. 92-12023, in the 101st Dallas County District Court. That case has since been resolved in favor of the Defendants. Defendants now move for summary judgment. They argue that no disputed material facts remain, and that Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law.
See Finland v. DISD, 90 S.W.3d 395 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2002, pet. den'd).
Grant alleges that Defendants wrongfully denied him representation in a suit filed against him and other DISD-affiliated defendants ("the 1994 lawsuit"). Grant bases his promissory estoppel claim on the existence of an insurance policy wherein TASB agreed to provide members of the DISD Board of Trustees with legal representation in the event they were sued and to indemnify Board members for any damages they may incur. Grant argues that Defendants failed to provide competent, conflict-free counsel, as they offered Grant the services of the lawyers against whom Grant had filed crossclaims in the 1994 lawsuit. In the 1994 lawsuit, judgment was rendered against Grant by one of the three plaintiffs in that case, and he was to pay $300,000 plus pre- and post-judgment interest on that sum. Grant ultimately settled with the remaining two plaintiffs for a total of $400,000. In this suit, Grant seeks $700,000 in additional damages (to cover the amount he was to pay in the 1994 lawsuit). Grant further claims a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to Defendants' alleged failure to provide him with competent, conflict-free counsel in the 1994 lawsuit. With the addition of the § 1983 claim, the case was removed to federal court.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows summary judgment only when the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Assoc. of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
Once the movant has discharged its initial burden under Rule 56, the nonmovant must set forth specific facts, by affidavits or otherwise, that show a genuine issue for trial. See Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825 (1992). In weighing the evidence, the court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Walker v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988); Thornbrough v. Columbus Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 1985). As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
Defendants have successfully demonstrated that no genuine issues of material fact remain. Plaintiff failed to file a response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and have failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact requiring resolution by trial. Defendants have demonstrated their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. For the reasons enumerated in Defendants' Motion, this Court is of the opinion that summary judgment should be granted.
B. Jurisdiction
This Court's jurisdiction was predicated on Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim; this Court has supplemental jurisdiction of Plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). In deciding not to remand Plaintiff's state law claims, this Court considered the four factors of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and has decided that it should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Grant's state law claims. First, Plaintiff's case presents no novel or complex issues of state law. Claims central to the resolution of Grant's § 1983 claim were resolved in Finlan v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 90 S.W.3d 395 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2002, pet. den'd). Second, there is no substantial predominance of Grant's state law claims. Third, the resolution of Plaintiff's state and federal law claims rest on the same factual basis, and this Court's dismissal of state and federal claims occurs contemporaneously. Fourth, comity dictates that this Court follow the state court's legal determinations that (a) Finlan and the Venables had no § 1983 causes of action against DISD, et al., and (b) the lawyers and law firm claimed by Grant to have wrongfully given the advice that lead to the 1994 lawsuit have been judicially determined to have no liability to Grant.
This Court has considered the four factors for consideration presented in § 1367(c) and balanced the factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity as outlined in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988).
III. CONCLUSION
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED as to all claims.
It is so ORDERED.