A home warranty falls within the Statute of Frauds and thus must be reduced to writing in order to be enforceable. See Stimson v. George haycock, Inc., 247 Ga. App. 1, 4 (2), n. 3 ( 542 SE2d 121) (2000); Grant v. Aulicky, 161 Ga. App. 817, 818 (1) ( 290 SE2d 107) (1982). And "[w]hen a contract is required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing, any modification of the contract must also be in writing."

If a jury should decide that the Stimsons did not receive a written warranty but that their warranty claim is based instead on an oral promise by George Laycock, "an oral one-year warranty on a house which was never reduced to writing [is] unenforceable." Grant v. Aulicky, 161 Ga. App. 817, 818 (1) ( 290 S.E.2d 107) (1982). [t]here is no evidence, nor any claim, that Plaintiffs gave express notice, written or otherwise, of an alleged problem with the installation of the EIFS on their house within a year of closing.

Held: "The law in Georgia is well-settled that `"(i)n the purchase and sale of real estate there is an underlying principle of law to the effect that one cannot be permitted to claim that he has been deceived by false representations about which he could have learned the truth of the matter and could have avoided damage...." Westbrook v. Beusse, 79 Ga. App. 654, 658.' Grant v. Aulicky, 161 Ga. App. 817, 819 ( 290 S.E.2d 107) (1982). Accord Ross v. Smith, 173 Ga. App. 384 ( 326 S.E.2d 527), rev'd on other grounds, 255 Ga. 193 ( 336 S.E.2d 39) (1985).

The other is where an inspection of the premises would not have disclosed the falsity of the misrepresentation.' Westbrook v. Beusse, 79 Ga. App. 654, 658." Grant v. Aulicky, 161 Ga. App. 817, 819 ( 290 S.E.2d 107) (1982). Accord Ross v. Smith, 173 Ga. App. 384 ( 326 S.E.2d 527), rev'd on other grounds, 255 Ga. 193 ( 336 S.E.2d 39) (1985).

In the purchase and sale of real estate, there is an underlying principle of law to the effect that one cannot be permitted to claim that he has been deceived by false representations about which he could have learned the truth of the matter and could have avoided damage." Westbrook v. Beusse, 79 Ga. App. 654, 658 ( 54 S.E.2d 693) (1949); Grant v. Aulicky, 161 Ga. App. 817 ( 290 S.E.2d 107) (1982). As there is no evidence that a confidential relationship existed between the parties or that Mrs. Smith was prevented by fraud or trick from ascertaining the truth or falsity of the alleged misrepresentations, her lack of diligence bars her from any recovery as a matter of law. Accord Simmons v. Wooten, 241 Ga. 518 ( 246 S.E.2d 639) (1978).

Moreover, the presence of the springs, which caused seepage into the basement and garage and damage to the driveway and carpet, was concealed from appellees by appellant, who did not mention the soil experts' findings and who, in response to appellees' question about the standing water, represented that it was due to unusually heavy rains. Despite appellant's assertions to the contrary, it is thus apparent that the major bones of contention — and actually the ultimate reason that appellees filed suit — were latent defects rather than patent ones. Compare P.B.R. Enterprises v. Perren, 243 Ga. 280 ( 253 S.E.2d 765) (1979); Grant v. Aulicky, 161 Ga. App. 817 ( 290 S.E.2d 107) (1982). In Worthey v. Holmes, 249 Ga. 104, 106 ( 287 S.E.2d 9) (1982).

Here, because ATTI proffered competent evidence that Buckley lied to the Air Force, a jury would be entitled to find that the Air Force was deceived and remained so notwithstanding evidence that ATTI told the Air Force that the existing PNMMs were beyond economic repair. See Potts v. UAP-GA AG CHEM, Inc., 567 S.E.2d 316, 320 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) ("The fact that [somebody] tells the person that the misrepresentation is false is simply one factor in determining whether that person reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation."); cf. Grant v. Aulicky, 290 S.E.2d 107, 109 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing summary judgment when fraud plaintiff had contradictory information because the defendant induced the plaintiff not to investigate). Nor am I persuaded by the fact that cost factored heavily in the Air Force's decision not to buy the replacement PNMMs.

A lack of due diligence has been found as a matter of law when the plaintiff clearly had notice that the fact was misrepresented but nevertheless acted upon the representation. See Grant v. Aulicky, 161 Ga. App. 817, 290 S.E.2d 107 (1982) (holding summary judgment in favor of vendor proper where water spots were notice to home purchaser of leaky roof even though vendor represented that roof was in good condition). In applying the facts of the instant case, it cannot be said that Ewers unreasonably acted in "blind reliance" on the representations of Ford. Ewers questioned Don Laye several times about whether there were any legal problems with the Atlanta dealership, and indeed called the lawyers at Ford with the same question. Ewers questioned representatives at Ford concerning matters about which they were in a position to know and concerning which they had superior knowledge.

Georgia and North Carolina require that the defendant knew the representations were false. See Grant v. Aulicky, 161 Ga. App. 817, 819, 290 S.E.2d 107, 109 (1982); Stone v. Martin, 56 N.C. App. 473, 289 S.E.2d 898, 901-02 (1982). In Virginia intention is immaterial, Ware v. Scott, 220 Va. 317, 257 S.E.2d 855, 857 n. 2 (1979), while in Tennessee and South Carolina intention is a necessary element of a fraud action.