Opinion
Lead Case 2:04-CV-260 TC, Member Case 2:04-CV-297, Member Case 2:04-CV-303.
August 18, 2005
ORDER
Plaintiffs, inmates at the Utah State Prison and Purgatory Correctional Facility, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2005). The case was referred to the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). See 28 id. 636. On April 5, 2005, the magistrate judge entered an order denying Defendants' motion to quash service. This case is now before the Court for consideration of Defendants' objections to that order.
I. Defendants' Objections
In his screening order of April 5, 2005, the magistrate judge concluded that Plaintiffs' allegation that the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") unlawfully discriminates on the basis of religion was sufficient to survive screening under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The magistrate judge further concluded that service upon the individual members of the Board was technically sufficient, and, there was "no support for Defendants' contention that service of process, which is otherwise sufficient, must be quashed merely because it occurred prior to screening." Based on these conclusions the magistrate judge declined to quash service and ordered Defendants to answer Plaintiffs' complaint.
Defendants object to the magistrate judge's order under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants argue that relevant case law does offer some support for their contention that service of process in this case must be quashed; thus, Defendants assert that the magistrate judge's order was "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." In light of the additional screening analysis set forth below the Court concludes that Defendants objections are moot.
II. Screening — Immunity
Although the magistrate judge's order of April 5, 2005, correctly concluded that Plaintiffs' religious discrimination claim for prospective injunctive relief is sufficient to survive screening, it failed to address whether Plaintiffs' claims against the Board are barred under the Eleventh Amendment, and whether the individual defendants are immune from suit. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of "resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S. Ct. 534 (1991) ( per curiam). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), which applies to any "civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity," the Court is required to "dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1915A(b)(2) (2005).
Although Roger Granguillhome is the only Plaintiff who filed in forma pauperis, making him subject to the screening provision under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, all three Plaintiffs seek relief from governmental entities and are subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Plunk v. Givens, 234 F.3d 1128, 1129 (10th Cir. 2000) ("§ 1915A applies to all prison litigants, without regard to their fee status, who bring civil suits against a governmental entity, officer, or employee").
The complaints in these consolidated cases name as defendants the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, and the individual members of the Board in both their official and individual capacities. In addition to prospective injunctive relief, the complaints seek compensatory and punitive damages based on Defendants' alleged religious discrimination in making parole determinations.
The Court first addresses Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants in their individual capacities. It is well-established that parole board members have absolute immunity "from damages liability for actions taken in performance of [their] official duties regarding the granting or denying of parole." Russ v. Uppah, 972 F.2d 300, 303 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Knoll v. Webster, 838 F.2d 450, 451 (10th Cir. 1988)). After thoroughly reviewing Plaintiffs' complaint the Court concludes that each of Plaintiffs' allegations involving the individual Defendants are directly related to "actions taken in performance of the Board's official duties regarding the granting or denying of parole." Id. Thus, the defendants sued in their individual capacities are absolutely immune from suit for money damages.
The Court now turns to Plaintiff's damages claims against the Board itself, and against the members of the Board in their official capacity. The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against entities that are arms or instrumentalities of a state. Sturdevant v. Paulsen, 218 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000). A parole board is an instrumentality of a state. McGrew v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons Parole, 47 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Giese v. Scafe, No. 04-2408, 2005 WL 1332315, at *1 (10th Cir. June 7, 2005). In addition, "suits against state officials in their official capacity are in essence suits against the state." Id.; see also Harris v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 9050-6 (10th Cir. 1995). "The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over suits involving a citizen seeking damages from a state, except where Congress has specifically granted jurisdiction." Russ v. Uppah, 972 F.2d 300, 302 (10th Cir. 1992). Because Congress did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted section 1983, id., Plaintiffs' claims for damages against the Board itself, or against the members of the Board in their official capacity, are barred under the Eleventh Amendment.
Having concluded that Plaintiffs cannot recover monetary damages from the individually named defendants, or from the Board itself, the Court must decide whether this case may proceed on Plaintiffs' claims for prospective injunctive relief. Plaintiffs' complaint does not specifically request any injunctive relief directly against the individually named Defendants. From the face of the Complaint it is clear that the only injunctive relief sought in this case is against the Board itself. Plaintiffs' prayer for relief uniformly refers to "the Board," rather than any individual defendant. As previously pointed out, the Board is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the state, however, there are limited exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity as enshrined in the Eleventh Amendment.
Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908), in a suit against a state official, "when a party seeks only prospective equitable relief — as opposed to any form of money damages or other legal relief — then the Eleventh Amendment generally does not stand as a bar to the exercise of the judicial power of the United States." ANR Pipeline Co. v. Lafaver, 150 F.3d 1178, 1188 (1998). The Tenth Circuit has outlined the following exceptions to the Ex parte Young doctrine:
First, federal courts have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit that seeks to require the state official to comply with state law — only allegations of violations of federal law are sufficient to come within the Ex parte Young rule. . . . Second, the doctrine will not go so far as to allow federal jurisdiction over a suit that seeks to redress past wrongs — only ongoing violations are covered. . . . Third, the doctrine does not allow a federal court to declare past state conduct unconstitutional when the only purpose for such a declaratory judgment would be its res judicata effect in a subsequent state-court proceeding; such a declaration would have the effect of adjudicating the liability issues in a damages action against the state even though a direct federal suit for damages would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. And fourth, although the doctrine will allow injunctive relief that might have a substantial ancillary effect on a state treasury, it does not allow an award for monetary relief that is the practical equivalent of money damages, even if this relief is characterized as equitable.Id. at 1188-1189 (internal citations omitted).
Because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se the Court liberally construes their claim for prospective injunctive relief against the Board as viable under the Ex parte Young doctrine. Although ANR Pipeline clearly circumscribes the scope of Plaintiffs' remaining claim it does not appear that any of the exceptions to Ex parte Young identified by the Tenth Circuit would prohibit Plaintiffs' remaining claim from proceeding. Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' suit for prospective injunctive relief may proceed against the Chairman of the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole within the narrow scope of the Ex parte Young doctrine.
Having concluded that the individual defendants named in this suit must be dismissed, the Court need not address Defendants' objections to the magistrate judge's refusal to quash service. Although the magistrate judge concluded that service upon the now dismissed Defendants was technically sufficient, he found no evidence that the Board itself had been properly served. Because Plaintiffs' claim for prospective injunctive relief against the Board is now the only claim remaining, the Board must be properly served for this case to proceed. Thus, a summons and copy of the complaint shall be served by the United States Marshal upon the Chairman of the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:(1) Each of the individually named defendants are dismissed from this case based on their entitlement to absolute immunity from monetary damages;
(2) Plaintiffs' claims for monetary damages against the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, and against the Board members in their official capacity, are dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment;
(3) Plaintiffs may proceed with their claim for prospective injunctive relief against the Chairman of the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole subject to the limitations of Ex parte Young; all other claims set forth in the complaint are dismissed;
(4) the United States Marshal shall serve a valid summons and copy of Plaintiffs' complaint, along with a copy of this order, upon Michael R. Sibbett, Chairman of the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole; and,
(5) Defendants' objections to the magistrate judge's order of April 5, 2005, are dismissed as moot.