Granger v. State

34 Citing cases

  1. Burks v. State

    876 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)   Cited 272 times
    Holding Article 37.071 authorized the trial court to admit any evidence relevant to a defendant's deathworthiness, including evidence of any extraneous transactions where the prosecution "clearly proved" the offense was committed and the defendant was the perpetrator

    The test for sufficient corroboration is to eliminate from consideration the accomplice testimony and then examine the other inculpatory evidence to ascertain whether the remaining evidence tends to connect the defendant with the offense. Cockrum v. State, 758 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex.Cr.App. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1072, 109 S.Ct. 1358, 103 L.Ed.2d 825 (1989); Granger v. State, 683 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984) (quoting Edwards v. State, 427 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tex.Cr.App. 1968)), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012, 105 S.Ct. 2713, 86 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985). One hour before the offense, Guillem saw appellant with Mark McConnell in Mark's car.

  2. Ex Parte Granger

    850 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)   Cited 76 times
    Distinguishing prior case of Stephens v. State, 806 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) on the basis that the State in Stephens was barred from prosecuting a lesser-included offense in a subsequent trial after acquittal for the greater offense on appeal on legal insufficiency grounds when a lesser-included-offense instruction had not been submitted in the earlier trial, and the State had failed to request one

    That conviction, too, was overturned, because of trial error unrelated to the sufficiency of the evidence. Granger v. State, 653 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1983), aff'd, 683 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012, 105 S.Ct. 2713, 86 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985). In its opinion reversing appellant's second conviction, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals specifically rejected his argument that his retrial for murder had been barred by our federal and state constitutional guarantees against being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense.

  3. Ramirez v. State

    96 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App. 2002)   Cited 17 times
    Finding alleged victim falsely testified she was not looking for money and had not entered into a contract "to get money" where evidence showed the alleged victim had a written contract with an attorney to bring a civil lawsuit seeking damages

    Dix, § 22.55. A violation of this prohibition demands a conviction be set aside or rendered invalid, but only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103; Adams, 768 S.W.2d at 292; Granger v. State, 683 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Davis, 831 S.W.2d at 439. "This is essentially the harmless error standard for constitutional error embodied in the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a)."

  4. Sambrano v. State

    754 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1988)   Cited 5 times
    In Sambrano v. State, 754 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1988, no pet.), this court discussed the difference between newly discovered evidence that is merely impeaching and that which, although impeaching, requires a new trial.

    The general rule that merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral or impeaching evidence rarely is judged by appellate courts to be of such weight as likely to bring about a different result, has numerous exceptions. Jones v. State, supra; Granger v. State, 683 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984) (en banc); Burkhalter v. State, 493 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973); Spencer v. State, 69 Tex.Crim. 92, 153 S.W. 858 (1913). A possible standard for determining when the newly discovered evidence is no longer "merely cumulative or impeaching" was enunciated by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Spencer v. State.

  5. Colella v. State

    915 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)   Cited 67 times
    Holding that before a venireperson is disqualified, Texas courts no longer require that she be asked whether she can "give honest answers to questions of fact, even if it meant that the death penalty might be assessed as a result"

    The non-accomplice evidence is sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant to the offense; this evidence need not establish guilt or even directly link the defendant to the offense. Gosch v. State, 829 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex.Cr.App. 1991); Cox v. State, 830 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992); Granger v. State, 683 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984); and, Castaneda v. State, 682 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984). However, each case is determined on its own merit, Mitchell v. State, 650 S.W.2d at 807, and the non-accomplice evidence must point toward the defendant's commission of the offense.

  6. Munoz v. State

    853 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)   Cited 160 times
    Disapproving dicta to the contrary

    Corroborative evidence need not establish appellant's guilt of the charged offense nor directly link appellant to the offense, but is sufficient if it "tends to connect" appellant to the offense. Granger v. State, 683 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984) (citing Edwards, 427 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tex.Cr.App. 1968)). See, Gosch, 829 S.W.2d at 777; Castaneda v. State, 682 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984); and, Cox v. State, 830 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992).

  7. Jones v. State

    843 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)   Cited 235 times
    Holding that officer's testimony regarding statements made by a different suspect were not hearsay because they were offered to show why the officer secured an arrest warrant and searched the defendant

    A witness is rendered unavailable when she invokes her Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify. Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 804(a)(1) (A witness is unavailable when she "is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of [her] statement."); see also Granger v. State, 653 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1983), aff'd, 683 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012, 105 S.Ct. 2713, 86 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985). Since Comalander asserted her privilege against self-incrimination, she was unavailable as a witness to appellant.

  8. Duggan v. State

    778 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that the testimony of accomplice witnesses was false when they made firm, sweeping assertions that no agreements existed for leniency in exchange for testimony, but the prosecutor admitted post-trial that he told the accomplices he would consider leniency in exchange for testimony

    See Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.Cr.App. 1989). See also Granger v. State, 683 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984). In his second ground for review, appellant argues that the court of appeals erroneously concluded that the evidence was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice testimony.

  9. Gardner v. State

    730 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)   Cited 355 times
    Holding witness statement that "[appellant] told me that even when he was in the penitentiary, that he had stomach problems" was cured by trial court's instruction to disregard

    "It is sufficient if the combined cumulative weight of the incriminating evidence furnished by the non-accomplice witnesses tends to connect the accused with the commission of the offense. Granger v. State, 683 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984)." Romero v. State, 716 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986).

  10. Romero v. State

    716 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)   Cited 25 times
    Holding extra-judicial confession sufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony

    It is not necessary that the evidence corroborating the accomplice witness testimony directly link the accused to the crime or be sufficient in itself to establish guilt. It is sufficient if the combined cumulative weight of the incriminating evidence furnished by the non-accomplice witnesses tends to connect the accused with the commission of the offense. Granger v. State, 683 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984). The statement given by appellant corroborates the testimony of Leyva in that it places the appellant with the codefendants before, during and after the sexual assaults upon and murder of the deceased.