His motion was granted. While the facts are fully set out in our original opinion, Grane v. Grane (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 332, some brief resume is needed here. Plaintiff is the son of defendant Hubert Grane, Sr., and the brother of defendants Hubert, Jr., Fred C. and Daniel T. Grane. The corporate defendants are family companies, and the Harris Bank is trustee of certain Grane family trusts. The individual parties signed an agreement on December 10, 1980, which appointed Thomas J. Boodell, Jr., with the "sole authority to resolve any conflicts existing between the Parties and to compromise any disputes concerning equity interests as he, in his sole judgment, after consultation with Mr. Hubert Grane, Sr., shall determine."

Teldata also argues that the arbitration clause is unenforceable as a matter of Illinois Common law Illinois courts have, on occasion, found an arbitration clause so unconscionable that it should not be enforced. See, e.g., Anderson v. Prab Conveyors, Inc., 69 Ill. App.2d 224, 216 N.E.2d 252 (1966); Grane v. Grane, 130 Ill. App.3d 332, 473 N.E.2d 1366 (1985). However, like the FAA, Illinois law requires that the arbitrator actually show impartiality in the arbitration proceedings or that there be fraud in the appointment of a supposedly neutral arbitrator.

Carol appealed pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 307(a)(1) (eff. February 26, 2010)), concerning interlocutory orders granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction. See Grane v. Grane, 130 Ill. App. 3d 332, 339 (1985). This court stayed arbitration pending the outcome of the appeal.

An order denying a motion to stay arbitration is considered to be an interlocutory order appealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (107 Ill.2d R. 307(a)(1)). (See Grane v. Grane (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 332, 339, 473 N.E.2d 1366, 1370-71.) This is because such orders are analogous to orders denying injunctive relief.

Certainly statements were made. The allegation of concealment also fits, since the concept of "statement" includes silence if accompanied by deceptive conduct or suppression of material facts. Grane v. Grane, 130 Ill. App.3d 332, 344, 473 N.E.2d 1366, 1374, 85 Ill.Dec. 561, 569 (2d Dist. 1985). The statements also were material. A representation is material if the plaintiff would have acted differently if he had known the truth instead of relying on the representation.

DFI contends that when there is a substantial dispute as to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a particular claim, section 2(b) directs that the court "shall" hear the matter and render a decision, either for or against arbitration. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 10, par. 102(b); see also Grane v. Grane (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 332, 345.) DFI asserts that the use of the word "shall" is mandatory and requires a trial court to determine arbitrability without undue delay or unnecessary procedure.

Fraud in the inducement vitiates the agreement and renders it voidable at the option of the injured party. Grane v. Grane, 130 Ill. App. 3d 332, 343 (1985). ¶ 54 JL3's defense of fraud in the inducement hinges on two allegations: that Miller improperly served a dual role as attorney for Karlen and JL3 and that she misrepresented that the note would not be recorded or enforced.

The trial court resolved against Cantella the issue of whether the agreement required arbitration of discovery matters, and it denied the motion to quash. Although Cantella could have immediately appealed that interlocutory order under Rule 307(a)(1) (see Grane v. Grane, 130 Ill.App.3d 332, 334, 85 Ill.Dec. 561, 473 N.E.2d 1366 (1985) (order denying arbitration is appealable pursuant to Rule 307 )), it was not required to do so. See In re Haley D., 2011 IL 110886, ¶ 63, 355 Ill.Dec. 375, 959 N.E.2d 1108 (party who wishes to challenge an interlocutory order that is appealable as of right may wait until final judgment and challenge the order at that time).

An order denying a motion to stay arbitration is appealable under Rule 307(a)(1). ( Grane v. Grane (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 332, 473 N.E.2d 1366; see Besner, 214 Ill. App.3d 619, 574 N.E.2d 703 (order compelling arbitration is appealable under Rule 307(a)(1)); see also Notaro v. Nor-Evan Corp. (1983), 98 Ill.2d 268, 456 N.E.2d 93 (order denying motion to compel arbitration is appealable under Rule 307(a)(1).) A notice of interlocutory appeal must be filed within 30 days of such an order (134 Ill.2d R. 307(a)), or the right to challenge the ruling is lost ( Besner, 214 Ill. App.3d 619, 574 N.E.2d 703).

Our courts have adopted the Federal standard, drawn from Justice White's concurrence in Commonwealth Coatings, with respect to vacature of arbitration awards because of an arbitrator's appearance of bias. See Calabrese v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1989), 187 Ill. App.3d 349, 543 N.E.2d 215; Grane v. Grane (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 332, 473 N.E.2d 1366; Freeport Construction Co. v. Star Forge, Inc. (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 999, 378 N.E.2d 558; see also Sarnoff v. De Graf Brothers, Inc. (1990), 196 Ill. App.3d 535, 554 N.E.2d 335; J K Cement Construction, Inc. v. Montalbano Builders, Inc. (1983), 119 Ill. App.3d 663, 456 N.E.2d 889. Under the Federal court's jurisprudence, an appearance of bias is sufficient to set aside an arbitrator's award where the record shows that the relationship creating the appearance of bias "was so intimate — personally, socially, professionally, or financially — as to cast serious doubt on [the arbitrator's] impartiality."