Opinion
08-02-1898
GRAND CASTLE OF THE GOLDEN EAGLES OF NEW JERSEY v. BRIDGETON CASTLE, NO. 13, KNIGHTS OF THE GOLDEN EAGLES OF STATE OF NEW JERSEY.
William J. Kraft, for complainant. Walter H. Bacon, for defendant.
Suit by Grand Castle of the Golden Eagles of New Jersey against Bridgeton Castle, No. 13, Knights of the Golden Eagles of the State of New Jersey. On motion for a preliminary injunction. Denied.
William J. Kraft, for complainant.
Walter H. Bacon, for defendant.
GREY, V. C. (orally). I am not satisfied that an injunction ought to go in this case. The answer sets up points which suggest some questions of law; also, makes denials of the material facts alleged in the complainant's bill, on which the complainant's equity depends. On this hearing,—whether an injunction shall issue according to the prayer of the bill,—such a denial leaves the complainant in such a position that its right to a preliminary injunction is not established. Nothing in the bill suggests that there is any immediate danger of loss of money or of property, which an injunction would prevent; nor is there any apparent necessity for such a writ, unless it be to conserve the dignity and rights of the complainant, the superior body, by prohibiting the continuance of the exercise by the local body (defendant) of the functions of the order, which, under the circumstances narrated in the bill, the complainant insists should be enjoined. It is also claimed that the individual member is deprived of his rights in the order which he claims by reason of his reinstatement, but the answer alleges that there is an undetermined appeal on this point. Stated generally, it may be said that the courts of the state will not interfere with the proceedings of these voluntary orders and associations so long as relief may be afforded by their own rules and methods of procedure, to the observance of which they have given their assent. Nothing in the bill leads me to believe that there may be any very serious loss or injury between this time and the final hearing, when the court will be able fully to know whether the complainant is entitled to the remedy it seeks, and what form it should take.
In addition to the denials of the answer, and the absence of apparent necessity for an injunction, it appears that the restraints prayed for in the bill, and to which the rule to show cause relates, are largely mandatory in their character; directing the defendant, affirmatively, to deliver property, etc., and to obey the directions and judgments of the superior body,—the very same judgments, the validity of which is, by the laws of the order, in dispute on the appeal, and yet unsettled.Property rights are sought to be changed, a charter to be delivered up, and funds to be paid over to the Grand Castle, the complainant; and it is asked that the defendant be restrained from holding meetings, and using, or acting or pretend to act under, the name, credit, and authority of the order. It may be that all this very broad exercise of the restraining and mandatory powers of this court may ultimately be justly called for, but I cannot say that I am satisfied that they should be allowed on this preliminary hearing. Mandatory injunctions ought not to be granted until final hearing, unless the situation indicates an absolute necessity for their use in the preservation of the rights of the parties.