Opinion
00-CV-2349 (JEW), 03-MISC-0066 (JBW)
November 6, 2003
JUDGMENT ORDER
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied, No hearing on this matter is necessary. This memorandum briefly addresses petitioner's claims.
I. Factual Background
Petitioner Granston was terminated from his job at the "Health Nut" store in May 1996. On August 26, 1996 he returned to the store and hid in the basement. At closing time the store's manager, Jocelyn Daniel, went down to the basement to retrieve some items and speak to her co-worker. As she was leaving, Granston emerged wearing a wool cap over his head and face and brandishing a gun. The cap had large holes cut for the eyes and mouth, allowing Ms. Daniel and former co-workers to readily identify him. When Daniel retreated Granston fired once, striking Daniel in the left temple. After being shot Daniel verbally identified Granston as the shooter.
Petitioner was charged in an indictment with attempt to commit murder in the second degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree, criminal possession of weapon in the second degree, burglary in the second degree, and assault in the second degree. At trial the prosecution called three of Granston's co-workers, including Daniel, as eyewitnesses as well as arresting officers Mindy and O'Brien.
The jury deadlocked on counts one, two, and five, charging attempted murder in the second degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree, and assault in the second degree, and rendered a guilty verdict on counts three and four, charging criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and burglary in the second degree. The court dismissed the deadlocked charges and sentenced Granston to consecutive indeterminate terms of seven and one half years to fifteen years on each of the charges.
On appeal Granston claimed the verdict was internally inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence. The Appellate Division, Second Department, rejected both arguments. It found the first claim both procedurally barred and without merit, and the second claim as failing to overcome the evidence on record. People v. Granston, 259 A.D.2d 760, 688 N.Y.S.2d 172 (N.Y.App.Div.2d Dep't 1999). Leave to appeal was denied March 29, 1999. People v. Granston, 693 KY.S.2d 508 (Table) (N.Y. 1999). All claims have been exhausted.
In the present petition Granston claims (1) the verdict was internally inconsistent and (2) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
II. AEDPA
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner on a claim that was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court only if it concludes that the adjudication of the claim "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
An "adjudication on the merits" is a "substantive, rather than a procedural, resolution of a federal claim." Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 313 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999)). Under the "contrary to" clause, "a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring and writing for the majority in this part). Under the "unreasonable application" clause, "a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. "[F]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, may as much be a generalized standard that must be followed, as a bright-line rule designed to effectuate such a standard in a particular context." Overton v. Newton, 295 F.3d 270, 278 (2d Cir. 2002).
III. Claim of Inconsistent Verdict
Petitioner's claim as to inconsistency of the verdict is likely procedurally barred. In order to preserve the appeal at the trial level an exception to a verdict based upon inconsistency should be raised before the jury is discharged. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.05; People v. Alfaro, 66 N.Y.2d 985, 987. (N.Y. 1985) In this case it was not. See People v. Granston, 259 A.D.2d 760, 688 N.Y.S.2d 172 (N.Y.App.Div.2d Dep't 1999). If a state court holding contains a plain statement that a claim is procedurally barred then the federal habeas court may not review it, even if the state court also rejected the claim on the merits in the alternative. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989) ("a state court need not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding" so long as it explicitly invokes a state procedural rule as a separate basis for its decision).
In order to salvage a claim not preserved at trial, petitioner must demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result. See Coleman v. Thompson 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). As he does not claim any cause for the default here, and was previously unsuccessful before the Appellate Division in arguing that ineffective assistance of counsel caused the default, the bar remains in place. See People v. Granston, 259 A.D.2d 760, 688 KY.S.2d 172 (N.Y.App.Div.2d Dep't 1999).
Regardless, the claim lacks merit. A reasonable juror could conclude that Granston did not possess the requisite intent to cause harm or death to Daniel while still concluding that he possessed the handgun with intent to use it unlawfully while entering or remaining unlawfully in the store. See People v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. 1981). Moreover, a verdict is only legally inconsistent if a defendant is "convicted for a crime on which the jury has actually found that the defendant did not commit an essential element, whether it be one element or all." Id. at 6. The Appellate Division relied on this analysis when it rejected the merits of the claim on direct appeal. See People v. Granston, 259 A.D.2d 760, 688 N.Y.S.2d 172 (N.Y. App, Div.2d Dep't 1999). As the jury never rendered a verdict of not guilty on any count, it never found that the elements of any charge were negated. The charges the jury found petitioner guilty of cannot by definition be inconsistent because there is no jury finding for them to be inconsistent with.
IV. Claim of Verdict Against the Weight of the Evidence
Petitioner's second claim, that his conviction was obtained through insufficient evidence, does not survive the presumptive validity a post-conviction court is required to give the decisions of the trier of fact. The relevant question for this court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Petitioner "bears a very heavy burden" when challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a state criminal conviction. Einaugler v. Supreme Court, 109 F.3d 836, 840 (2d Cir. 1997).
To support his claim petitioner points to alibi witness testimony presented by the defense as well as several inconsistences in eyewitness statements introduced by the prosecution. Neither is sufficient to override the findings of fact in this case, as neither shows the verdict as going against the great weight of evidence, but merely asserts that evidence should not have been given the weight it was. For Granston to prevail this court would have to find that no rational jury could believe the eyewitness statements and not believe the alibi testimony provided by Granston's sisters. The evidence does not support this conclusion.
This opinion complies with Miranda v. Bennett, 322 F.3d 171, 175-77 (2d Cir. 2003), and Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No other issue open to consideration by this court has merit.
V. Conclusion
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
No certificate of appealability is granted with respect to any petitioner's claims, petitioner having made no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Petitioner has the right to seek a certificate of appealability from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (2003). Any claims for which a certificate of appealability is granted will be reviewed de novo by the court of appeals.
SO ORDERED.