Opinion
Civil Action CV-20-465
05-16-2021
MARC GRAHAM, Plaintiff, v. UNNKOWN RESPONDENTS WORKING FOR THE PORTLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, including; JONATHAN WHITEMAN, MATTHEW MORRISON, and NICHOLAS GOWEN
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
THOMAS MCKEON, JUSTICE
Before the Court are the Defendants' separate Motions to Dismiss. For the following reasons, the Motions are granted.
I. Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the Plaintiffs Complaint.
The Plaintiff was arrested by the following Defendant law enforcement officers on both March 25 and 26, 2020: Jonathan Whiteman, Matthew Morrison, and Nicholas Gowen. The Complaint does not describe the circumstances surrounding either of the Plaintiff's arrests. Instead, the Complaint alleges that on March 25, the Defendants were patrolling an area of Portland that is known to involve drug activity. The Defendants observed an alleged "known sex worker" in the area and watched the Plaintiff "drive up." The Plaintiff then states a legal conclusion that he was stopped, searched, and arrested, in violation of his constitutional rights.
Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants illegally obtained information from an unknown source and that this information was the basis upon which Defendants arrested the Plaintiff again on March 26. The Complaint does not include any factual allegations regarding the source of this information, how that information was obtained, or any specifics regarding what information was actually obtained. The Plaintiff again makes only a legal declaration that the evidence was obtained illegally.
The Plaintiff has previously been incarcerated in Los Angeles County, California. While incarcerated in California, the Plaintiff states that he used certain racial slurs toward jail staff. Plaintiff alleges that California law enforcement officials "drugged up" Plaintiff's food and water in retaliation for Plaintiff's behavior. The Plaintiff further alleges that since his release, L.A. County officials have continued their attempt to contaminate Plaintiff's drinking water. The Plaintiff theorizes that L.A. County officials specifically contact government officials wherever the Plaintiff is located and coordinates a collective effort to contaminate the local water supply.
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants arrested the Plaintiff for the sole purpose of confining the Plaintiff to the Cumberland County Jail and exposing Plaintiff to contaminated water. The Plaintiff further states that various individuals within the Maine government, including police, fire, and EMS, have gained access to an unidentified water treatment facility and introduced "harsh chemicals" into the local water supply. The Plaintiff argues that this water contamination was done at the request and in furtherance of L.A. County's retaliatory efforts against the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff brought this action against unknown persons working for the Portland Police Department. The Plaintiff has also named the law enforcement officers mentioned above in their individual capacity. The Complaint alleges: false arrest (Count I); false imprisonment (Count II); battery (Count III); assault (Count IV); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V); and a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of his constitutional rights (Count VI). The Plaintiff states that he filed this action in order to obtain discovery regarding his water contamination allegations and that he will likely supplement the Complaint once such evidence is obtained.
Defendants Matthew Morrison and Nicholas Gowen have been served with the Complaint. Both have moved separately to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.
II. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint, not the sufficiency of the evidence the plaintiffs are able to present" Barnes v. McGough, 623 A.2d 144, 145 (Me. 1993)(internal citations omitted). The court shall "consider the facts in the complaint as if they were admitted." Bonney v. Stephens Mem. Hosp., 2011 ME 46, ¶ 16, 17 A.3d 123. The complaint is viewed "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory." Id. (quoting Saunders v. Tisher, 2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 902 A.2d 830). "Dismissal is warranted when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim." Id. The court is not bound to accept legal conclusions in the complaint. See Seacost Hangar Condo. II Ass'n v. Martel, 2001 ME 112, ¶ 16, 775 A.2d 1166.
Although the motion to dismiss "standard is forgiving, it must still give fair notice of the cause of action by providing a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Meridian Med. Sys., LLC v. Epix Therapeutics, Inc., 2021 ME 24, ¶ 2, ___A.3d ___(quotations omitted). "The complaint must describe the essence of the claim and allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that the complaining party has been injured in a way that entitled him or her to relief." Id.
III. Discussion
The Defendants in this action are government employees. Government employees are immune from civil liability arising out of certain actions taken in furtherance of their employment. Accordingly, the court must consider whether the Complaint alleges facts which, if proven, would entitle the Plaintiff to relief without regard to the immunities applicable to government employees. Because the Plaintiff's Complaint alleges both tort actions and a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court must consider the claims separately.
As an initial matter however, the Plaintiff has filed this lawsuit pro se, and argues that his lawsuit is therefore held to a less stringent standard than those brought by licensed attorneys. Therefore, the court will first address the standards that apply to pro se litigants under Maine law before discussing any applicable immunities that may apply.
A. Pro Se Litigants
"It is well established that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as represented parties." Department of Envtl. Protection v. Woodman, 1997 ME 164, ¶ 3 n.3, 697 A.2d 1295; see also Dufort v. Bangs, 664 A.2d 6, 7 (Me. 1994); Uotinen v, Hall, 636 A.2d 991, 992 (Me. 1994). Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to the same pleading standards as are all other lawsuits.
B. Maine Tort Claims Act
Title 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(C) of the Maine Tort Claims Act grants immunity from liability to any government employee who performs or fails to perform "any discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused[.]" However, "[i]mmunity does not exist in any case in which an employee's actions are found to have been in bad faith." 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(E). Here the Defendants argue that the tort actions as alleged in the Complaint would qualify the Defendants to discretionary function immunity. Conversely, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendants do not qualify for any immunity because their actions were done in bad faith. Accordingly, the court will first determine whether the facts as alleged in the Complaint would qualify the Defendants for discretionary function immunity, and if so, determine whether the MTCA's bad faith exception applies.
1. Discretionary Function Immunity
The court utilizes a four factor test to determine whether discretionary function immunity applies: (1) does the challenged act necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective; (2) is the questioned act essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of the policy program or objective; (3) does the act require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise on the part of the governmental agency involved; and (4) does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitutional, statutory or lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged act, omission or decision. See Lawson v. Willis, 2019 ME 36, ¶ 9, 204 A.3d 133. The Law Court has generally held that a criminal arrest qualifies as a discretionary police function "unless the [officer's] conduct clearly exceeded, as a matter of law, the scope of any discretion they could have possessed in their official capacity as police officers." Lyons v. City of Lewiston, 666 A.2d 95, 101 (Me. 1995); quoting Polley v. Atwell, 581 A.2d 410, 414 (Me. 1990); see also Creamer v. Sceviour, 652 A.2d 110, 115 (Me. 1995).
Here, the Defendants are Maine police officers who arrested the Defendant on various drug charges. The Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege any facts which detail the circumstances of these arrests. Instead, the Complaint makes a general assertion that the officers illegally obtained false information and that this evidence was used to arrest the Plaintiff. The only other detail describing one of the Plaintiff's arrests is the fact that he was present in a high drug crime area and associating with a known sex worker. The Complaint then makes a bare legal conclusion that the subsequent stop, search, and arrest of the Plaintiff lacked the requisite suspicion or probable cause required.
Based on the forgoing, the Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that either of the Plaintiff's arrests were performed in a manner that exceeded the scope of Defendants' police authority. Investigating and performing arrests for drug related crimes is certainly an essential police function. The Complaint does not allege any facts that would demonstrate whether the Defendants exceeded the scope of their discretion when they arrested the Plaintiff for drug related offenses. There are no allegations, other than bare legal conclusions, which show that the Defendants' conduct fell outside the scope of their official police duties. Thus, the allegations in Plaintiff's Compliant, if true, demonstrate that the Defendants' actions qualify for discretionary function immunity. Accordingly, there is no set of facts alleged in the Complaint that would entitle the Plaintiff to relief for any tort action under the Maine Tort Claims Act.
The Plaintiff's argument that immunity doesn't apply here because the Defendants have been sued in their individual capacity is also misplaced. The actions alleged in the Complaint are at issue. These actions were done in the course of the Defendants' government employment and are a discretionary function of that government employment. Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, government employees qualify for discretionary function immunity under these circumstances.
2. Bad Faith
The Law Court has consistently held that the bad faith exception does not apply to discretionary function immunity. See generally Huff v. Williams, 1999 ME 186, ¶ 7, 743 A.2d 1252; Grossman v. Richards, 1999 ME 9, ¶¶ 9-11, 722 A.2d 371; Beard v. McKinnis, 1997 ME 186, ¶ 11 n.7, 699 A.2d 1148; Dull v. Caron, 628 A.2d 117, 119 (Me. 1993). Accordingly, the discretionary function immunity granted to government employees "is absolute and not qualified by the bad faith" exception. Dall, 628 A.2d at 119.
Here, the Plaintiff's Complaint alleges facts that, if true, would qualify the Defendants for discretionary function immunity, which is absolute. The Plaintiff's allegation that the Defendants are involved in a cross-state conspiracy to arrest and expose the Plaintiff to contaminated water is irrelevant. Accordingly, the facts alleged in the Complaint would entitle the Defendants to absolute discretionary function immunity and prevent the Plaintiff from recovering under any tort action pursuant to the Maine Tort Claims Act.
Count's I through V are hereby dismissed.
C. Civil Rights Claim
The Plaintiff's Complaint also alleges violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "A plaintiff may maintain a section 1983 claim against governmental employees only if they are not entitled to qualified immunity.” Lyons, 666 A.2d at 99. "Pursuant to this doctrine, government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. (quotations omitted). The test for qualified immunity is: (1) whether the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated, and (2) whether those rights were so clearly established that reasonable defendants would have known that their specific actions transgressed those rights. See id.
Here, the Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his constitutional rights were violated. As stated above, the Plaintiff's Complaint alleges only bare legal conclusions that: (1) the Defendants' lacked the reasonable suspicion and probable cause necessary to stop, search, and arrest the Defendant on March 25; and (2) that the information justifying the Defendants' March 26 arrest was obtained illegally. The court is not bound to accept these legal conclusions. See Seacost Hangar Condo. II Ass'n., 2001 ME 112, ¶ 16, 775 A.2d 1166. The Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient for this court to discern what circumstances led to either of the Plaintiff's arrests and fails to demonstrate what, if any, constitutional violation may have occurred. Based on the record, there are no set of facts upon which the Plaintiff could prove that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights, which is necessary to prevail on a section 1983 claim, Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to sustain an action against the Defendant government employees pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983.
IV. Conclusion
If true, the facts alleged in the Plaintiff's Complaint would entitle the Defendants to discretionary function immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act. Discretionary function immunity is absolute and is not excluded in instances of bad faith. Moreover, the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants violated the Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Accordingly, there are no set of facts alleged in the Complaint which, if true, would entitle the Plaintiff to relief.
The entry is:
Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED.