However, if the issue raised is of constitutional dimension, then "reversal is required unless this court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Davis, 794 P.2d at 189; see also Rodgers, 756 P.2d at 984; Graham v. People, 705 P.2d 505, 509 (Colo. 1985). The issue Harlan presents is of constitutional dimension.
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and likewise affirmed, finding that the "prosecution's allowing testimony about the scope of the, agreement with Reddick, if a misrepresentation, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Graham v. People, 705 P.2d 505, 509 (Colo. 1985). While serving his sentence at a Colorado state correctional facility, Graham filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Pursuant to District of Colorado Rule 605, the petition was referred to a magistrate for consideration. The magistrate recommended dismissal, agreeing with the Colorado Supreme Court that allowing Reddick's testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
1990); People v. Rodgers, 756 P.2d 980, 984 (Colo. 1988); People v. Graham, 705 P.2d 505, 509 (Colo. 1985). This latter proposition is inconsistent with the current direction from the United States Supreme Court.
1990); People v. Rodgers, 756 P.2d 980, 984 (Colo. 1988); People v. Graham, 705 P.2d 505, 509 (Colo. 1985). This latter proposition is inconsistent with the current direction from the United States Supreme Court.
Under these circumstances, we would reverse the defendant's conviction only if the procedure adopted by the trial court were contrary to the requirements of Crim. P. 15(d) and also constituted plain error. See, e.g., People v. Cowden, 735 P.2d 199, 202 (Colo. 1987); People v. Graham, 705 P.2d 505, 509 (Colo. 1985). Although Crim. P. 15(d) requires that the "presence" of the defendant be procured, we do not read this to mean that the defendant has a right, derived from the rule, to be present in the room where the deposition is taking place.
If there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant could have been prejudiced, the error cannot be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 23-24; Graham v. People, 705 P.2d 505, 509 n. 6 (Colo. 1985). The question from the jury in this case betrayed a serious misunderstanding regarding the culpable mental state required for the crime of theft by receiving.
See Key v. People, 715 P.2d 319, 323 (Colo. 1986) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Graham v. People, 705 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1985); People v. Myrick, 638 P.2d 34 (Colo. 1981); People v. Blair, 195 Colo. 462, 579 P.2d 1133 (1978)).
The October 23 judgment and mittimus provided that Graham was sentenced to the following terms of imprisonment in the Department of Corrections: Some of the facts underlying the appellant's 1981 convictions are contained in Graham v. People, 705 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1985), which affirmed the denial of Graham's motion for new trial. See also Graham v. Wilson, 645 F. Supp. 664 (D. Colo. 1986) (granting writ of habeas corpus), rev'd, 828 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1069 (1988).
To uphold Merritt's conviction, this court must be able to declare that the trial court's denial of Merritt's right to confront Adams and Emery was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Graham v. People 705 P.2d 505, 509 (Colo. 1985). In so doing, we must determine whether the prosecution has met its burden of demonstrating that the trial court's limitations on Merritt's cross-examination of the juveniles did not contribute to Merritt's conviction.
If an asserted error is of constitutional dimension, reversal is required unless the court is convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967); Graham v. People, 705 P.2d 505, 509 (Colo. 1985). A constitutional error is harmless when the evidence properly received against a defendant is so overwhelming that the constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.