Opinion
Civil Action 22-1704
12-21-2022
TERRENCE GRAHAM, Plaintiff, v. A.U.S.A. JEROME MOSCHETTA; DOROTHY CURRY; and OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF WASHINGTON COUNTY PA, Defendants.
W. Scott Hardy, District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Terrence Graham (“Plaintiff'), ECF No. 1, should be dismissed sua sponte, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dismissal should be without prejudice to refiling should Plaintiff be able to demonstrate a favorable termination of his criminal conviction.
II. REPORT
Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Phoenix (“SCI-Phoenix”) in Collegeville, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff filed the instant cause of action on December 1, 2022 when the Complaint was received by the Clerk's Office along with the full filing fee. ECF Nos. 1 and 1-25.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and his right of access to the courts under the First Amendment, by allegedly failing to produce exculpatory evidence in underlying state criminal and post-conviction proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania, in violation of court orders requiring them to do so. ECF No. 1 at 13-14, 19, 22, and 24. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants, compelling them to produce a particularized list of allegedly exculpatory evidence. Id. at 25-28.
The underlying criminal proceeding is Commonwealth v. Graham, Docket No. CP-63-CR-1119-2010. ECF No. 1-4 at 2. According to the publicly-available docket in that case, a second petition for post-conviction relief was filed on November 15, 2021, followed by a motion for discovery on February 7, 2022 (docket available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocket Sheet?docketNumber=CP-63-CR-0001119-2010&dnh=HLhG21SPwk6i7hXOuatj9A%3D%3D (last visited Dec. 21, 2022)). Plaintiff also has a pending federal habeas petition, which has been stayed since March 29, 2021 while Plaintiff exhausts his claims in state court via the second post-conviction proceedings. Graham v. Sorber, No. 21-590 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 29,2021), ECF No. 23.
The Common Pleas Court docket lists Petitioner's first name as “Terrance.” Petitioner's filings with this Court in this matter indicate that his name is spelled “Terrence.” ECF No. 1 at 2 and 30. In Plaintiffs stayed federal habeas proceedings, his Petition indicates that he was convicted under the name “Terrance,” but his proof of service is signed “Terrence.” Graham v. Sorber, No. 21-590 (W.D. Pa. May 5, 2021), ECF No. 1.
A. Applicable Legal Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires a court to review to “a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” and to dismiss that complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b). Thus, a court must dismiss, sua sponte, a complaint that lacks arguable merit in fact or law.
As with the more commonly-utilized screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the standard for dismissal under Section 1915A mirrors the standard for determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Carter v. James T, Vaughn Corr. Ctr, 134 F.Supp.3d 794, 798-99 (D. Del. 2015) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)); see also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,10910 (3d Cir. 2002).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate if, accepting all factual allegations as true, no relief could be granted under any “reasonable reading of the complaint” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). A complaint must be dismissed even if the claim to relief is “conceivable,” because a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
A court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In a Section 1983 action, a court must liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings and “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). “Since this is a § 1983 action, the \pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.” Higgins, 293 F.3d at 688 (quoting Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)).
That said, when reviewing the complaint, it is not proper for a court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the .. . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Assoc'd Gen. Contractors of California, Inc, v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
B. Plaintiffs Claims are Barred by the Rule in Heckv. Humphrey.
Plaintiffs claims of denial of his due process rights and right of access to the courts in his underlying criminal case, due to Defendants' alleged acts or omissions, call into question the validity of his criminal conviction. As such, the claims are governed by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Heck v, Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court determined that civil rights law was not meant to provide a means for collaterally challenging the validity of a conviction through the pursuit of money damages. In so concluding, the Court announced the following rule:
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Id. at 486-87.
The Supreme Court has applied the logic of Heck to declaratory and injunctive relief where success would call into question the validity of a conviction. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) - if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”) (emphasis in the original). The Heck bar has been applied to civil rights conspiracy claims as well. Zhai v. Cedar Grove Municipality, 183 Fed.Appx. 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2006) (barring claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 under Heck).
In this case, the crux of Plaintiff s legal arguments is that Defendants violated his rights to due process and access to the courts because they failed to produce exculpatory evidence in violation of court orders to do so. ECF No. 1 at 19. A finding in Plaintiffs' favor necessarily would call into question the validity of his conviction. See Breakiron v. Hom, 642 F.3d 126,133 (3d Cir. 2011)(“A Brady violation occurs if: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, because either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the prosecution withheld it; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced because the evidence was “material.”). See also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403,415 (2002) (First Amendment access to the courts claim requires showing (1) a non-frivolous, underlying claim; (2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and (3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit.).
Plaintiff does not allege that he ever received a favorable determination of his criminal case. To the contrary, the Complaint and public record cited above are clear that Plaintiffs conviction currently stands. See, generally, ECF No. 1. Consequently, entering a judgment in favor of Plaintiff on these claims is barred by the Supreme Court's holding in Heck, and Plaintiff s Complaint should be dismissed, sua sponte.
C. Leave to Amend
Given the futility of any leave to amend, none should be granted. That said, dismissal should be without prejudice to refiling should Plaintiff be able to demonstrate a favorable termination of his criminal conviction. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp, v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint, ECF No. 1, be dismissed sua sponte, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dismissal should be without prejudice to refiling should Plaintiff be able to demonstrate a favorable termination of his criminal conviction.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219.
Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).