(3) California follows the federal approach to evaluating whether a legislative classification transgresses the equal protection clause. ( Graham v. Kirkwood Meadows Pub. Util. Dist. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1631, 1642 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 793].) In Board of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 903 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 245, 838 P.2d 1198], the court explained the standard for evaluating a classification equal protection challenge: "Not all statutes classify, but many do, and whenever the classification is challenged under the equal protection clause, we must decide its validity under one of the standards of deference required of us. [Citation.] [¶] When a law impinges on certain fundamental rights . . . it will ordinarily be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
Does an employee have a constitutional right to continued public employment? This question was recently answered in Graham v. KirkwoodMeadows Pub. Util. Dist. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1631, 1643-1645, where the court stated: "As to the assertion of a right to continued employment, there is no fundamental constitutional right to work for, or to have continued employment with, a particular public or private employer.
A "fundamental right for purposes of the judicial standard of review of administrative decisions" is different than "a fundamental right for purposes of constitutional analysis." (Graham v. Kirkwood Meadows Public Util. Dist. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1631, 1642-1643 (Graham).
"As to the assertion of a right to continued employment, there is no fundamental constitutional right to work for, or to have continued employment with, a particular public or private employer." ( Graham v. Kirkwood Meadows Pub. Util. Dist. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1631, 1643-1644 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 793] [residence requirements for public utility employees]; Rittenband v. Cory, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d 410 [mandatory retirement age for judge]; Kubik v. Scripps College (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 544, 549 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 539] [mandatory retirement age for college professor]; Hetherington v. State Personnel Bd. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 582, 589 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 300] [prohibition against employment of ex-felons as peace officers].) Accord, Lupert v. California State Bar (9th Cir. 1985) 761 F.2d 1325, 1327, footnote 2 ("There is no basis in law for the argument that the right to pursue one's chosen profession is a fundamental right for the purpose of invoking strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. . . ."); Brandwein v. California Bd. of Osteopathic Ex'rs (9th Cir. 1983) 708 F.2d 1466; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, 427 U.S. at page 313 [49 L.Ed.2d at page 524] ("we have expressly stated that a standard less than strict scrutiny `has consistenly been
Finally, Plaintiff contends that California's inconsistent treatment of the terminally ill violates John Doe's right to equal protection of the laws under the California Constitution. "California has followed the two-tier approach employed by the United States Supreme Court in reviewing legislative classifications under the equal protection clause." Graham v. Kirkwood Meadows Pub. Util. Dist., 21 Cal.App.4th 1631, 1642, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 793 (1994). Under this test, strict scrutiny is applied in cases involving suspect classifications or fundamental rights; rational basis analysis is applied to all other cases.
The equal protection clause of the California Constitution similarly states that a person "may not be denied equal protection of laws" (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7), and statutory classifications challenged thereunder are analyzed by the same rules applicable to challenges to the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Board of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 903, 913 (Board); Graham v. Kirkwood Meadows Pub. Util. Dist. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1631, 1642.) Legislative classifications are presumed valid and will be sustained if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
(Ibid.) As we held in Graham v. Kirkwood Meadows Pub. Util. Dist. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1631, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, "there is no fundamental constitutional right to continued public employment so as to trigger strict scrutiny...." (Id. at p. 1645, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 793; see also Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 503, 55 Cal.Rptr. 401, 421 P.2d 409.)
].) Peck identifies no constitutional right infringed by the order. (See Graham v. Kirkwood Meadows Pub. Util. Dist. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1631, 1643 ["there is no fundamental constitutional right to work for, or to have continued employment with, a particular public or private employer"].) F. Palacio's Motion for Sanctions
Where a regulation is being tested under the due process requirement, the legislation will be presumed to be constitutional, and the courts will defer to the legislative policy if the law is not arbitrary or irrational. (See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. (1976) 428 U.S. 1, 15; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) 300 U.S. 379, 391-392, 398-399; Nebbia v. New York (1934) 291 U.S. 502, 536-538.) Even though the regulation may not "achieve perfection," "the reasonableness of a policy is evaluated based upon whether it is designed to achieve its legitimate objectives" ( Graham v. Kirkwood Meadows Pub. Util. Dist., (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1631, 1641; 80 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 27, 31-32 (1997); 69 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 191, 197 (1986).)