Opinion
5:23-cv-02210-FLA (SHKx)
07-25-2024
MADEL GRAGEOLA, Plaintiff, v. WALMART ASSOCIATES, INC., et al., Defendants.
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHETHER PLAINTIFF CAN PLEAD SUFFICIENT FACTS TO STATE THE SECOND AND NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT BRIANA GONZALEZ [DKT. 10]
FERNANDO L. AENLLE-ROCHA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ORDER
On August 8, 2023, Plaintiff Madel Grageola (“Plaintiff” or “Grageola”) filed a Complaint in the Riverside County Superior Court, asserting nine causes of action for: (1) discrimination in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov't Code § 12940; (2) harassment in violation of FEHA; (3) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (4) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation in violation of FEHA; (5) failure to accommodate in violation of FEHA; (6) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process in violation of FEHA; (7) wrongful termination in violation of California public policy; (8) breach of oral/implied contract; and (9) intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. Dkt. 1-1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 14-80.
Although the caption of the Complaint also lists a cause of action for violation of the California Family Rights Act, Cal. Gov't Code § 12945.2 (Compl. at 1), Plaintiff did not plead such a cause of action in the body of the Complaint.
Plaintiff asserts all causes of action against Defendants Walmart, Inc. and WalMart Associates, Inc. (the “Walmart Defendants”), and additionally asserts the second and ninth causes of action against Defendants Briana Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), Alex Doe, and Rebecca Doe. Id. On October 27, 2023, the Walmart Defendants removed the action to this court, alleging the existence of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (“§ 1332”). Dkt. 1 (“NOR”) at 3-5.
On November 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Remand to State Court (“Motion”). Dkt. 10 (“Mot.”); Dkt. 10-1 (“Mot. Br.”). Plaintiff contends the action was improperly removed because complete diversity does not exist between the parties. Mot. Br. at 2-3, 5-6. The Wal-Mart Defendants respond the removal was proper because the non-diverse Defendant, Gonzalez, is a sham Defendant whose citizenship should be disregarded under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder. Dkt. 14 (“Opp'n”) at 2.
Diversity jurisdiction under § 1332 “requir[es] complete diversity: In a case with multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants, the presence in the action of a single plaintiff from the same State as a single defendant deprives the district court of original diversity jurisdiction over the entire action.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005). “In determining whether there is complete diversity, district courts may disregard the citizenship of a non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently joined.” GranCare, LLC v. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914)). “There are two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: (1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Fraudulent joinder is established the second way if a defendant shows that an individual joined in the action cannot be liable on any theory.” Id. (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted).
“[R]emoval statutes should be construed narrowly in favor of remand to protect the jurisdiction of state courts.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005). It is not enough for a defendant to show that a plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on her claim; “if there is a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the [non-diverse] defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state court.” GranCare, 889 F.3d at 548 (emphasis in original, quotation marks and citation omitted). “A defendant invoking federal court diversity jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder bears a heavy burden since there is a general presumption against finding fraudulent joinder.” Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
The Walmart Defendants contend “Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for relief against Defendant Briana Gonzalez, whom Plaintiff alleges to be her ‘supervisor/manager' and whom Plaintiff named as defendant to the Second Cause of Action for Harassment in Violation of California Government Code Section 12940(j) and the last purported cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (‘IIED').” Opp'n at 4. According to the Walmart Defendants, Plaintiff has not pleaded and cannot plead specific facts regarding conduct by Gonzalez sufficient to constitute harassment under FEHA (id. at 7-8) or “that is so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society,” as required to support a claim for IIED (id. at 6). Plaintiff did not file a reply or respond to this argument.
As this action must be remanded “if there is a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against [Gonzalez],” see GranCare, 889 F.3d at 548 (emphasis in original), the court ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause (“OSC”) in writing, within fourteen (14) days of this Order, whether Plaintiff can plead sufficient facts to state the second and ninth causes of action against Gonzalez. Plaintiff's response shall not exceed 8 pages and shall identify specifically the facts sufficient to state these claims that she has pleaded or will plead if given leave to amend. Failure to respond timely may be deemed an admission that these claims lack merit and result in the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against Gonzalez with prejudice. Defendants may file a response within seven (7) days of Plaintiff's response, if any is filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.